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'Designing its own shadow' – Reading Ann Quin 
 
Ann Quin (1936-1973) is a little known and little read British writer, and this 
thesis is the first comprehensive response to her oeuvre. It is driven by the 
questions: What is it like to read Quin's writing? Why should we read it? How 
might reading it help us reconsider the purpose and effect of experimentation in 
1960s and ‘70s British fiction?  
In response, the thesis provides extended and in depth readings of 
Quin’s books, short pieces, manuscripts and letters to demonstrate how these 
by turns overtly experimental, allusive, chaotic and frustrating texts are also 
carefully crafted, replete with clues and motifs, and in conversation with their 
time and place. Aware of the need to somewhat ‘introduce’ the writer, my 
readings draw out and consider locations of resonance and discord between 
her writing, life and cultural contexts. In addition, engagement with specific 
sources – from George Eliot to Beckett, Woolf to Sartre, Jane Harrison to 
William Burroughs, Dostoevsky to Alain Renais – reveals how Quin’s writing 
responds to, interrogates, encompasses and transcends these. Where relevant, 
the thesis is also informed and extended by a more theoretical approach. 
Indeed, my distinctive methodological approach reveals the points at which life, 
writing, historical context and theory are productively interwoven. Throughout, I 
argue that while the writing seems anachronistic by being immersed in earlier 
literature, it is precisely this immersion which energises its resistant rebellion to 
and ironic interrogation of the dominant ideologies and literary practices of its 
time. In this, Quin’s is writing both of the shadows and designing its own.  
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Timeline 
1936 Ann Marie Quin born in Brighton on 17th March, to Montague 
Nicholas Quin and Anne Ward (formerly Reid). 
 
1945 - 1953 Attends a Roman Catholic convent school in Brighton.  
 
1955 - 1961 Writes A Slice of Moon and Oscar – neither is ever published. 
 
1964 Berg published by John Calder.  
Quin awarded D.H. Lawrence Scholarship from the University 
of New Mexico and Harkness Fellowship. 
 
1965 - 1967 Living and travelling in America on Harkness Fellowship.  
 
1966 Three published by Marion Boyars.  
‘Leaving School’ published in the London Magazine. 
‘Every Cripple Has His Own Way Of Walking’ published in 
Nova. 
 
1968 ‘Never Trust A Man Who Bathes With His Finger Nails’ 
published in Mexico by El Corno Emplumado. 
‘Tripticks’ published in Ambit. 
‘Living in the Present’, co-written with Robert Sward, published 
in Ambit. 
 
Writes ‘Eyes that Watch behind the Wind’, which is published 
posthumously. 
 
1969 Passages published by Calder and Boyars.  
‘Motherlogue’ published in Transatlantic Review. 
 
Writes ‘Ghostworm’, which is published posthumously. 
 
1970 Hospitalised after increasingly severe psychotic episodes, first 
in Stockholm, then London.  
 
1972 Tripticks published by Calder and Boyars. 
 
Begins studying at Hillcroft College. 
 
1973 Continues at Hillcroft College. 
 
Begins to write The Unmapped Country. 
Writes ‘Matters of the Heart’. 
Writes television plays.  
 
Walks out to sea at Shoreham and drowns. Is pronounced 
dead on arrival at Southlands Hospital on 27th August. 
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Preface: Why Quin? 
 
 
In 1973, her contemporary B. S. Johnson named Quin as one of a small group 
‘writing as though it mattered, as though they meant it, as though they meant it 
to matter’.1 These writers were in antithesis to popular fiction, he said, because 
they refused the ‘stultifyingly philistine […] general book culture of this country’ 
and sought refuge in the imaginary of the continental avant garde.2 Whatever 
one makes of his bombastic tone in this piece, the sentiment is persuasive: 
Johnson wanted to rescue British fiction from stultification, and to foster a 
literary culture where experiment and risk were better allowed to flourish. And, 
while there has been some renewed interest in others of these writers, including 
Johnson himself – with, for example, Jonathan Coe’s Like a Fiery Elephant: The 
Story of B.S. Johnson (2004) – many of them, Quin included, remain largely 
overlooked and under-read. Despite some more recent appraisal – for instance, 
Giles Gordon’s ‘Ann Quin’ in Context 8, Philip Stevick’s ‘Voices in the Head: 
Style and Consciousness in the Fiction of Ann Quin’, and Brian Evenson and 
Joanna Howard’s, ‘Ann Quin’ in Review of Contemporary Fiction – there has not 
yet been a comprehensive, detailed response to the oeuvre.3  
Of course, this is partly to do with the availability of her writing, with the 
limited initial print runs of the books as well as their being out of print between 
the 1970s and early 2000s, when Dalkey Archive republished them. Indeed, 
                                                 
1
 Johnson, Aren’t You Rather Young To Be Writing Your Memoirs? London: Hutchinson and 
Co, 1973, 29. Johnson includes: Samuel Beckett, John Berger, Christine Brooke-Rose, Brigid 
Brophy, Anthony Burgess, Alan Burns, Angela Carter, Eva Figes, Giles Gordon, Wilson Harris, 
Rayner Heppenstall, ‘even hasty, muddled’ Robert Nye, Ann Quin, Penelope Shuttle, Alan 
Sillitoe ‘for his last book only, Raw Material indeed’, and Stefan Themerson, 29-30. 
2
 Ibid, 29. 
3
 However, there are several theses-in-progress featuring Quin as one among several other 
writers, which confirms that reassessment of Quin is timely. 

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some of the texts I read in this thesis are still to be published or collected. It 
could also be bound up with Quin’s gender. In their introduction to Breaking the 
Sequence: Women’s Experimental Fiction (1989) Ellen G. Friedman and Miriam 
Fuchs suggest that women’s experimental fiction – far more than men’s – 
subverts dominant narrative forms by refusing such things as authority, plot 
linearity and closure, and refuses the structures of patriarchal culture.4 Anxiety 
about this more insistent and disruptive subversion, they claim, has led to the 
neglect of women’s experimental fiction. However, despite Quin’s being 
included in their book, it is not helpful to define or limit her writing or its neglect 
wholly in terms of gender. This is not to negate its engagement with and 
interrogation of some of the gender issues of its time, but to acknowledge that 
the writing is not itself confined to and in fact, I would hazard, in some ways 
deliberately refuses, gendered terms. 
To my mind, the main reason for the neglect of Quin’s writing is bound up 
with the wider attitude to fiction writing in Britain identified by Johnson above. 
For instance, while including a short section on ‘experimental’ writers, Malcolm 
Bradbury comments, seemingly without much regret, that many of these writers 
are now rarely read, because what he calls the ‘serious ‘literary’ novelists’ 
became part of the fictional mainstream.5 More usefully, critics like Alan Sinfield 
and Bernard Bergonzi offer an explanation for this trajectory in their comments 
on the marked difference between Britain and America, particularly regarding an 
openness to the legacies of modernism.6 Recently, Gabriel Josipovici identified 
                                                 
4
 Friedman and Fuchs (Eds.), Breaking the Sequence: Women’s Experimental Fiction, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, 3-4. 
5
 Bradbury, The Modern British Novel, London: Secker and Warburg, 1993, 367. 
6
 Sinfield, ‘Reinventing Modernism’, Literature, Politics and Culture in Postwar Britain, 
London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Althone Press, 1997, 182-202; Bergonzi, ‘Beyond 
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similar limitations in the contemporary context in What Ever Happened to 
Modernism? (2010). Now, Josipovici says, at the start of the twenty-first 
century, is the time to reconsider the story of twentieth century British fiction. 
What we find, he argues, is a book culture that remains disappointingly 
mundane, where modernism’s legacy of risk has been largely ignored by the 
essentially conservative and anti-continental nature of ‘the prevalent English 
view’, ‘fuelled by anxiety rather than anything else’. 7  Most significantly for 
placing Quin, Josipovici laments how this has led to the neglect of fiction 
genuinely interested in experiment.8 Such writing has been ignored by many 
critics, and Josipovici calls for a reassessment of this era to include a ‘whole 
web of stories […] thus to restore a sense of history being made’ rather than 
already established.9 In this way, the story of British writing in the twentieth 
century would expand to include ‘the blind alleys’ – or shadows – rather than 
only spot-lighting the ‘achieved successes’.10  
 My desire to redress the neglect of her writing then, as well as to 
contribute to a wider web of stories about British fiction of the 1960s and ‘70s, 
are two of the answers to ‘why Quin?’ But perhaps a more compelling one lies 
in the kinds of ‘blind alleys’ and shadows Quin’s fiction leads us into. Here, 
rather than suggesting that the writing be spot-lit, I propose that it is precisely its 
                                                                                                                                               
Fiction?’ The Situation of the Novel, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1979, 188-
213. 
7
 Josipovici, What Ever Happened to Modernism? New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2010, 178. Josipovici himself was one of the fiction writers included in Gordon’s Beyond 
the Words: Eleven Writers in Search of a New Fiction, Hutchinson and Co: London, 1975, 
which also included Quin. 
8
 The British context remains one where experimental fiction is largely marginalised, despite 
Tom McCarthy’s 1960s-style experimental ‘C’ making it onto the 2010 Booker shortlist: this is 
unusual and most such fiction, for example, Stewart Home’s 69 Things to Do with a Dead 
Princess (which declares itself as writing in the tradition of Quin) is independently published 
and not widely read.   
9
 Josipovici, 182. 
10
 Ibid. 
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position both in and of the shadows that makes this writing worth reading. Not 
only was the writing at the shadowy edges of the British fiction of its time, it is 
also an oeuvre steeped in the shadow of writing that went before, for example, 
of Greek myth, realism, modernism and the nouveau roman. However most 
significantly and productively, this is an oeuvre that creates and proliferates its 
own shadows; writing which utilises and activates the literary power of 
foreshadowing, repetition and allusion to shape, energise and liberate its texts, 
and to interrogate some of the significant issues of its time. The effect that these 
shadows have on reading and the possibilities they open up for writing are the 
main concern of this thesis. 


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Introduction: Designing shadows  
 
 
Sometimes it is enough to watch the rain walk designing its own 
shadow. Hear the desert wind thru trees absorbed by that yet being 
raped by the mind’s eye into another landscape; emotions; limbs 
long, want the ocean. See the ocean. Ah that point that opens for the 
magic usage of things.1 
 
 
The text needs its shadow: this shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of 
representation, a bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary 
clouds: subversion must produce its own chiaroscuro.2 
 
 
Thus, it is apposite that the writing of a specific shadow provides this project 
with a way in to reading Quin. A little earlier in this 1968 New Mexico letter, the 
writer tells her reader, in this case her then lover the American poet Robert 
Sward, about the ‘what’ of her writing – ‘I’m concerned more in ‘how it is’ not 
with how it should/could be’ – and the ‘why’ – ‘I have yet to make peace with 
myself, all the selves’. The extract above concludes with the ‘how’ – the act is 
transformative, open to and performative of ‘the magic usage of things’. 3 
However, it is the sentence ‘Sometimes it is enough to watch the rain walk 
designing its own shadow’, which figures a further, more potent description of 
Quin’s writing process; one that is also a performance of it. For example, the 
sensory sublimation of watching the rain is in fact not ‘enough’; it is instead 
‘captured’, transformed ‘into another landscape’ of ‘emotions’, and re-formulated 
                                                 
1
 Letter: Ann Quin to Robert Sward, 18th July 1968. Olin Library Collection, Robert Sward 
papers, Series 1.1, box 10. 
2
 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, (Trans.) Richard Miller, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990, 32. 
3
 Jean-Paul Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions also terms our way of seeing the world 
as charged with emotion and meaning ‘magical’. Quin knew Sartre’s work well: ‘I used to come 
across writers like Sartre, and even Camus in the library in my teens’. Letter: Quin to Carol 
Burns, 14th October, 1963. This and all subsequent letters from Quin to Carol Burns: Carol 
Burns Papers. 
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as words on the page. Here, what is seen is translated into what is said and 
representation is substituted for perception. In this, the letter is more 
preoccupied with (re)enacting a verbal construction and with thus imbuing the 
particular description with a special significance, than with the original seeing 
act – which has already faded into and been transformed by rewritten memory. 
As such, the description of the rain’s movement is also a description and 
performance of the writing process itself ‘designing its own shadow’.  
For, as Sward himself would surely have noticed, the phrase echoed 
throughout writing to him at this time – ‘the way the rain walks designing its own 
shadow’; ‘see the rain walk designing its own shadow.’4 What is more, to the 
attentive wider reader, the phrase ripples further: for instance, in letters to long-
term friend Carol Burns; ‘the rain literally walks’ and ‘Rain walks designing its 
own shadow’, as well as in the 1969 book Passages; ‘Rain walked designing its 
own shadow’.5  This rewriting of ‘a moment’ of perception is clearly not the 
record of immediate experience, but is instead an ever distanced and edited 
recollection through repeated rewriting. The enactment of the drafting, 
patterning and play with articulation transforms the experience into a writing 
process, a literary construction, a pleasing phrase. Here then, the writing’s claim 
to representation has a conscious double-sense: it is real and imaginary at 
once; both at one time and apparently still in some ways mimetic, yet also 
always self-consciously crafted and performative prose. 
The duality and disconnect of this writing effect can be illuminated by 
Jacques Derrida’s wider meditation on artistic representation, which he claims 
                                                 
4
 Letter: Quin to Sward, 26th July 1968; untitled poem written for Sward in Iowa in 1967. Robert 
Sward Papers, Series 1.1, box 9. 
5
 Letters: Quin to Carol Burns 2nd July 1965 and 18th July 1966; Passages, Chicago and Illinois: 
Dalkey Archive Press, 2003, 7. 
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must always take place during ‘the suspension of the gaze’.6 He reminds us that 
during the act of drawing or writing about something the gaze does not and 
cannot remain on it, but instead that it is the drawn/verbal and not the actual 
image we look at. Derrida’s thinking here helps us account for the focus on 
verbal construction as opposed to the seeing act which takes place across the 
examples of Quin’s writing. But further, for Derrida, the suspension of the gaze, 
literal in the act of winking or blinking (‘cligner’), is the ‘moment of blindness that 
ensures sight its breath’.7 In other words, the interruption of the present of visual 
perception is in fact wholly necessary – not only for the continuation and 
rejuvenation of the process of sight, but also for enabling the processes of 
memory and articulation to take place. He likens the momentary gap in 
presence to amnesia, a self-reflexive process of removal or distance that allows 
for representation but in turn insists on the impossibility of ever actually 
ascertaining the initial moment of perception. Similarly, in the repetitions above, 
the kind of looking the writing does is always partially an amnesiac and circular 
process of deferral. There, the object of the gaze in the initial seeing act is the 
point from which the already distanced and conscious act of representation 
spirals out as it becomes further and further distanced in what seems like a 
paradoxical attempt to get closer to and better ‘capture’ the vision in language 
through adjustments in the repeated phrasing. This movement is exemplified by 
the metaphor itself – ‘the rain walks designing its own shadow’ – which begins 
as an attempt at representation and in turn becomes a construction that designs 
its own shadow across the writing of the time.  
                                                 
6
 Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: the Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, (Trans.) Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, 117. 
7
 Ibid, 32. The French verb, cligner, can be translated as either. 


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Moreover, the implication of ‘shadow’ as ‘design’ here is foundational for 
thinking about Quin’s associative and highly determined writing process as a 
whole. As friend and fellow writer Alan Burns identifies:  
 
Ann’s writing contains areas of shadow, inhabited by shadow 
images, areas of association, which slip further and further away 
from the text. She has this talent for throwing off ripples of 
association, and that’s very fine, it’s her best quality, her 
subconscious quality.8  
 
 
Here, shadows are identified as the elusive, slippery, slipping-away property of 
the writing; at the same time shadows throw off ripples of association which 
shape and determine our reading process. A shadow is something both there 
and not there, it is a glimpse or suggestion of something, the thing that prevents 
us from seeing clearly, or evidence of substance elsewhere/to come. While in 
common parlance the idea of a shadow is often used to indicate a level of 
removal or reduction – as in the shadowy cave of Plato’s allegory – in literature, 
and more specifically in Quin’s writing, the oblique and partial figuring of 
shadows have a more complex and positive relation to the whole, by signifying 
both absence and presence at once. 
Furthermore, and bound up with the process of perception becoming 
words, the phrase the ‘rain walk[s] designing its own shadow’ empathically 
presences the form of literary construction where an idea or image either 
(fore)shadows or prefigures what is to come or shadows something that was 
once there. This proleptic shadowing is bound up with the appreciation of 
divergent repetition and design: it is writing that does what it says, drawing our 
attention to Quin’s pleasure in the interweaving of idea and action; it is also a 
                                                 
8
 Alan Burns, ‘Blending Words with Pictures’, Books and Bookmen, July 1972, Volume 17, 
Number 10. 
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complement of form and content, where writing about shadows creates them. 
This happens across the oeuvre: the letters, short stories and books are crafted 
out of numerous and far reaching divergent repetitions within and outside of 
themselves. These are indeed texts full of ‘ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary 
clouds’, shaped by shadows, but also for example, by other images such as the 
repeated presence of birds, the sea, madness and myth. In this, Quin’s texts 
are haunted by other writing and source texts as well as figures and obsessions 
from across her own. As Roland Barthes – one of the key thinkers for this 
project because, I propose, this writing necessitates both his reading methods 
and his understanding of the text as a multidimensional, reverberating space – 
reminds us, texts ‘need’ their shadows. These shadows are the necessary bits 
or traces of representation that signify a double-sense, a chiaroscuro of contrast 
between dominant forms, ideologies and subject-matter, and those challenging, 
unusual, difficult forms which are necessary to subvert them.  
What is more, that the word ‘shadowing’ itself ripples across the writing – 
we also find it in the 1968 story ‘Never Trust A Man Who Bathes With His 
Finger Nails’ where ‘cloud shadows [gather] speed across the valley’, as well as 
elsewhere – acts as a theatrical ‘wink’ to what is going on in the writing of such 
texts.9 It is evidence of Quin’s sense of the absurd: 
 
Marion Boyars tells a relevant story of finding Ann in her office, intent 
apparently on destroying it, raging, but at one moment in this 
otherwise sad confrontation, Marion recalls, to her own amazement, 
that Ann winks at her. That wink, one wants to say, was her absolute 
and dear trademark.10 
 
                                                 
9
 ‘Never Trust A Man Who Bathes With His Finger Nails’, El Corno Emplumado 27 (July 
1968), 8. 
10
 Robert Creeley, ‘Ann Quin: A Personal Note’, unpublished manuscript, Carol Burns Papers, 
1. 
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Here, poet and friend Robert Creeley’s anecdote evidences a simultaneous 
desperation and humour: before trashing her publisher, Marion Boyars’ office, 
the writer pauses to wink at her. Similarly, one of the significant traits of the 
writing is a simultaneous sense of anguish and knowing performance. Despite 
the serious preoccupations of much of the oeuvre, the shadows and repetitions 
across the prose simultaneously figure – even if often obliquely and almost 
hidden – a knowing humour: a wink. However, this humour is something that 
can be hard to find in the writing, especially in the later books. Here, as Anthony 
Blomfield rightly points out, what is more evident is the: ‘scream of desperation; 
[and only] beneath it, the grin mocking the scream’.11 This grin is not quite 
humour. It is instead the writing’s sense of the absurd, not only in the allusive 
and often even stereotyped, parodic prose, but also in the carnivalesque disgust 
of the overly close detail, which I go on to discuss. There is even a shadow of it, 
although it becomes more of a grimace here, behind Leonard’s mime of suicide 
in Three, or the terror of the silent and inarticulate screams of Tripticks and The 
Unmapped Country. 
The humour of the writing is something most clearly present in the 
writing’s askance way of looking at things – a position made explicit in ‘Never 
Trust A Man Who Bathes With His Finger Nails’: ‘The women looked down at 
the men from the corners of their eyes’.12 The significance of this oblique stance 
can again be illuminated by reference to Derrida, whose thinking is pertinent to 
reading Quin chiefly because of his method of circling and returning to textual 
obsessions and knots. Here, not only does the wink recall his comments on the 
                                                 
11
 Blomfield, ‘Reasons for Existence’, unpublished manuscript, Carol Burns Papers, 3. 
12
 13. Also, Alan Burns to Nonia Williams Korteling: ‘she was noticing out of the corner of her 
eye. Her glance, her own particular vision of world’, face-to-face interview, 14th April 2009, 11 
am – 1.30 pm. 
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impossibility of ‘pure’ perception by the interruption of the gaze by blink or wink, 
but its askance, slippery direction and intent can be usefully thought about 
further in terms of his comments on the oblique. He admits that he has often 
made use of the word ‘oblique’ and offers an account that helps to illuminate 
Quin’s writing’s askance position. With typical paradox, on the one hand he 
dismisses the term as disruptive and crude; on the other he claims it as his own 
position: ‘one can reject, as I have done, the word ‘oblique’; one cannot deny 
the destinerrant indirection […] as soon as there is a trace’.13 He apparently 
rejects the word, while at the same time admitting that the sideways shift or 
predominance of the indirect that it implies is inescapable.  
The oblique, then, can be thought of as another manifestation of the 
shadow: the ‘other side’ or alternative to what is dominant, obvious or direct. In 
addition, given Quin’s performance in the anecdote above, it is noteworthy that 
elsewhere Derrida qualifies this sidestepping as ‘the ruse of an oblique or 
indirect gaze. A ruse that consists of sidestepping rather than meeting head-
on’.14 Here, the oblique is also a symbol for an avoidance or tricksy behaviour 
that is simultaneously a performance. Indeed, Quin’s writing as a whole adopts 
such a position: not only does it describe performance as avoidance but it 
performs its subversion and politics in an oblique manner, in parodic and tricksy 
narrative forms, rather than head on – in the refusal of conclusive endings 
across the oeuvre, for example, and the slipperiness of the third/first-person 
narration. 
                                                 
13
 Derrida, ‘Passions: An Oblique Offering’ (Trans.) David Wood, in David Wood (Ed.), 
Derrida: A Critical Reader, Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992, 24. 
14
 Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind, 87.  



In addition, as my readings below corroborate, the writing compellingly 
performs its slipperiness by the patterning of its narrative surface which often 
seems to represent and point to something in the world outside it, but more 
often than not points more to the patterns and shadows of its own making. This 
is evident in the detail of the over-writing at word level, for example: 
 
Thunder stirred over the distant mountains. A sirocco wind spiralled 
sand in the desert. Three spirals on their own, that approached, 
joined up into a whirling tower of sand. Stilts of rain came slowly 
down the mountains, faster over the valley.15  
 
This description is a site of resistance as much as of fascination: it gives 
unexpected, odd detail and its realism is made strange. The distant thunder, 
spiralling wind, whirling sand, and stilts of rain move now slowly, now faster, to 
reach a noisy climax. The onomatopoeic ‘s’s – stirred, sirocco, spiralled, sand, 
spirals, stilts – demand that we listen to the words. In this, the word ‘stilts’ is a 
particularly interesting and dissonant example. As a visual metaphor, it 
simultaneously suggests and dissolves the idea of rain as a solid or supporting 
structure. This quality admits the description is a written one; as does the 
insistent repetition of consonant sounds. But, more interestingly, these soft yet 
insistent ‘s’s are dissonant with and performative of the stilting, stuttering 
attempt at and failure of articulation in the metaphor, figured by the ‘st’ of stilts. 
The pause or gap in comprehension that results again recalls the necessarily 
interrupted quality inherent to Derrida’s understanding of representation above.  
The effect of this unusual and insistent patterning of articulation, which is 
a proliferate and essential quality of Quin’s writing, can be further illuminated 
with reference to Gilles Deleuze, who analyses the effect brought about when a 
                                                 
15
 ‘Never Trust A Man Who Bathes With His Finger Nails’, 11. 
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linguistic variable is placed in such a way that it interrupts the grammar or sense 
of a statement. In this, he claims, the sequence and sounds of the words 
‘stutter’: not because a character stutters in speech, but because the writer 
becomes ‘a stutterer in language’.16  Deleuze asserts that, in writing, when 
roughness and disruption replace smoothness and flow new meanings are 
being made rather than pre-existent meanings invoked. Thus, a straining of the 
language takes place which is largely to do with sound patterns, but also 
meaning patterns: this is syntax in the process of becoming. He also observes 
that stuttering often comes about as part of the attempt to capture unfamiliar or 
foreign experiences in the writer’s own language in such a way that it makes the 
description come to life, and draws on the example of T.E. Lawrence who he 
says: ‘made English stumble in order to extract from it the music and visions of 
Arabia’.17 Not only is this fitting for Quin’s method of attempting to describe the 
unfamiliar New Mexico landscape, but also for beginning to articulate exactly 
how her writing both reaches for and generates a renewed articulation precisely 
through the stuttering repetition and reformulation of its shadows. In this, 
Deleuze offers a pertinent frame for thinking about the ways in which, at word 
level, the disrupted and disruptive quality of Quin’s descriptions are exactly 
when her prose is ‘being made’, and where it ‘comes to life’.  
Indeed, throughout the writing, the associative patterning of the prose 
evidences a stuttering ‘glossomania’ based as much on sound repetition as 
sense.18 This has the effect of denying the narration transparency and insisting 
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on the materiality of its linguistic surface. In some ways the excess of this 
writing technique – and by this I mean a proliferation of patterning at both word 
and structural level in a way that over-determines the writing to the point where 
it can become difficult to see its sense – is too demanding. Indeed, Sward says 
of Quin that she asked: ‘only and essentially that one pay full attention… Ann’s 
life was so full and dense and limited too and narrow, drawn many times very 
close in on itself, haunted and with demons, marked and worn with the past’.19 
The writing, too – especially the later works – is ‘full and dense and limited too 
and narrow, drawn many times very close in on itself, haunted’. It disregards 
ordinary boundaries, asking ‘only and essentially that one pay full attention’. In 
this the narratives often seem to ask too much, of reader, author, words and 
narrative structures. They demand that it is precisely to the detail that we pay 
attention: to the difficult, oblique, stuttering, proleptic, repetitive and allusive 
writing that nevertheless, I propose, is also distinctively Quin’s.  
 
 
 
 
Reading Quin 
 
 
she was fascinated by ways in which the ‘seriality’ of prose, the mode 
of its continuities, might be altered, and these later books are tests of 
that possibility in part […] Had she lived – sad and useless phrase 
now – I am very sure that her later work would have resolved entirely 
the division between her conscious experiment and that intrinsic gift 
of initial story-telling, which was hers in every possible sense.20 
 
 
Evenings spent in reading; half-heartedly doing homework, preferring 
to explore books discovered in the Public Library: Greek and 
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Elizabethan dramatists. Dostoievsky [sic] (Crime and Punishment, 
and Virginia Woolf’s The Waves made me aware of the possibilities 
in writing). Chekhov, Lawrence, Hardy, etc.21 
 
 
 
My reading of the New Mexico letter in the first part of this introduction began by 
working closely with Quin’s prose; from there it drew connections across her 
other writing, included aspects of her life, and was extended by instances of 
theory which mirror and further the kind of thinking the writing is already 
beginning to perform. Consequently, the reading above functions as an 
introduction to the writing itself at the same time as an introduction to my 
methodological approach throughout the project, which works closely with texts 
to reveal the points at which life, writing, historical context and theory are 
productively interwoven. Now, before analysing the main texts of the oeuvre, I 
reflect more broadly on the question of how to read Quin by assessing how the 
writing has been read and placed so far, as well as by providing a more detailed 
description of my own reading method. 
As the excerpts from both the letter and ‘Never Trust A Man Who Bathes 
With His Finger Nails’ included in that opening section suggest, the stuttering 
prolepsis of the writing resists as well as suggests interpretation. Moreover, not 
only is much of the writing in the oeuvre startlingly unusual, in places it is so 
familiar it becomes cliché. While to my mind the use and thus subversion of 
such cliché is a success of the writing, as I go on to demonstrate, for many of its 
contemporaneous reviewers such qualities were its downfall. Those responses 
place the writing on a negative trajectory: the increasingly conscious experiment 
and explicit inclusion and repetition of source texts found in, for example, 
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Passages and Tripticks, is interpreted as a failing that marks a lack of 
authenticity. These later books were criticised for being overly derivative of the: 
‘new-wavers its author had obviously read in her own publisher’s translations’, 
evocative of ‘self-indulgent’ directors such as Antonioni, and ‘just the thing for 
the French’. 22  While Berg, and more cautiously Three, had been seen to 
evidence a compelling and instinctive storyteller, this later prose, precisely 
because of its increasing experiment and escalating intertextuality, was claimed 
to put off and alienate the average reader, who was often disinclined to carry 
on.  
But, while Quin was on the one hand criticised for following fashion, on 
the other she was praised for it. As well as the example of Johnson’s praise in 
the preface above, Alan Burns places her among counter-cultural British writers 
‘riding the crest: not earning much and not successful in monetary terms, but we 
felt we were the heart of the matter’.23 This ‘we’ was the ‘Writers Reading’ 
‘collective’: Paul Ableman, Alan Burns, Carol Burns, Barry Cole, Eva Figes, B. 
S. Johnson, Jeff Nuttall, Ann Quin, Alan Sillitoe, and Stefan Themerson. 
Although diverse, this group were united by ‘a profound interest in prose as a 
form of expression and not simply as a medium for story-telling’.24 More broadly, 
Gordon positively places Quin in terms of ‘Beckett, Burroughs, Creeley, Duras, 
Claude Mauriac, Henry Miller, Pinget, Robbe-Grillet, Sarraute’.25 He sees this 
American/European context as one in antithesis to mainstream British fiction, 
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which Gordon calls a ‘working class vernacular posing as social realism’ limited 
by ‘parochialism’.26  Indeed, despite (or maybe in part because of) her own 
working-class – and from the age of ten, single-parent – origins, Quin wanted to 
distance her writing from the content and plot driven ‘angry young men’ and 
social realist vogue: ‘Then there’s W.B.O & Co., (Wesker, Braine, Osborne) and 
they frankly stink with their dumb 19th century prose. Ugh’. 27 
Creeley’s appraisal of Quin’s writing (cited above) voices the perceived 
‘division’ between ‘initial story-telling’ and ‘conscious experiment’ which 
influences both praise and criticism here. As Johnson rightly observes: 
‘‘Experimental’ to most reviewers is almost always a synonym for 
‘unsuccessful’’.28 But, rather than dismissing Quin’s experimentation with similar 
value judgement, Creeley’s response provides a more precise way of reading it, 
which pinpoints the writer’s fascination with pushing at the boundaries of written 
form and technique – her writing’s desire to interrogate how ‘the ‘seriality’ of 
prose, the mode of its continuities, might be altered’. By praising the later 
writing’s motivation, as being ‘tests of that possibility’, Creeley makes a useful 
and important distinction between process and outcome. Indeed, as the avant 
garde composer John Cage remarks more generally: ‘the word ‘experimental’ is 
apt [when] understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of 
success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown’.29 
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Crucially, this experimental artist is shaper rather than maker, an observant 
‘tourist’ whose creative process is ‘inclusive rather than exclusive’.30  
While both sets of readers above understand the experiment of the 
writing as either ‘success’ or ‘failure’, my reading of Quin employs Cage’s 
suspension of judgement and emphasises instead its inclusivity, openness to 
risk and the unknown of its outcome. Therefore, I consider the experimentation 
across the oeuvre in terms of the processes, techniques and effects of the risk-
taking, while avoiding reductive value judgements. Throughout, the ‘‘seriality’ of 
[the] prose, the mode of its continuities’ is understood as the writing’s 
transgressive impulse – of its innovative formal experimentation and cultural 
ambiguity – as well as its resistance to reading and interpretation. In this, 
allusion and reiteration are understood as integral to the writing’s ironising and 
interrogation of literary precedents, sources and cultural contexts. In other 
words, it is precisely by enacting and generating intertextual continuity and 
seriality through reiteration that the writing also subverts, interrogates and alters 
familiar images, figures and techniques. 
 
The significance of this intertextuality demands that the thesis also pay attention 
to Quin as a reader. As such, I consider how the writing responds to, 
interrogates, encompasses and transcends some of those writers read in the 
Public Library above – for example, Dostoevsky, Woolf, Hardy – as well as 
others whose presence is also insistent – including George Eliot, Samuel 
Beckett, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alain Resnais. What becomes clear is that to dismiss 
Quin’s prose as derivative is to misunderstand the subversion of its method, 
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which rips sources out of their contexts to make them new, as in the violence of 
the rape performed by the mind’s eye in the New Mexico letter. These 
processes are indeed still crude and experimental, and perhaps because of the 
writer’s early death, never fully developed. But, to me, this is precisely their 
value: to read this writing is to see prose forms being made. In this way, rather 
than merely being in the shadow of other writers and writing, the oeuvre begins 
to create new patterns and shadows out of the old.  
Thus, to read this writing properly is to allow the shadows and ambiguity 
to remain.31 Here, the oblique position of the writing demands a similarly oblique 
response, which Derrida identifies as (fittingly) ‘a strategy that is still crude’.32 
This approach simultaneously avoids being ‘an approach’, by allowing the 
nature of the writing to shape reading. Indeed, as my response to the New 
Mexico letter above and the following excerpt suggest, the writing’s shadows 
are not only designed to be noticed and anticipate a pleasure of reader 
response, they also lead on as well as frustrate how they are read:  
 
But Christ what need have we for fabricating when it’s all there: can’t 
wait to take a bath at your new place and be dragged out of there by 
the feet. We must try Mescal some time taken from the appropriate 
place (this just to puzzle our future biographers and all those 
students at Buffalo!)33 
 
Here, Quin jokes about and anticipates a scholarly readership at the same time 
as admitting the ‘planting’ of confusing and resistant material, put there 
precisely to be noticed and to lead the reader on. This performs a double-sense 
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in which the patterns of the prose seem tangible, mappable even, at the same 
time as they resist the readerly desire for meaning.  
This tension figures the key question of how we might read a writer who, 
as it becomes clear here, so consciously figures – and therefore seems to have 
already provided a reading of – her own shadow. Indeed, throughout the oeuvre 
the readings that the writing invites, for example an oedipal interpretation of 
Berg, have already been done by the narratives themselves and therefore seem 
redundant. This presents a difficulty of interpretative position, and inevitably 
calls to mind Maud Ellmann’s method (not least because of the title of her book) 
in Elizabeth Bowen: the Shadow Across the Page (2003). Bowen’s fiction, 
Ellmann claims, ‘constantly outsmarts the interpretative methods brought to 
bear on it’.34 Her response is to ‘attempt to shadow some of Bowen’s most 
significant addictions’ and to listen to and account for its peculiarities.35 I find 
myself in a similar situation. This thesis seeks to offer a reading of Quin not 
already written or outsmarted by the author herself: a nuanced account of the 
writing’s ‘peculiarities’ without explaining them away, which follows her 
processes without attempting to fix them, but also one that investigates her 
shadows without being designed by them. 
 Furthermore, as the extract from the letter above suggests, and pertinent 
to a thesis aware of the need to somewhat ‘introduce’ the writer as well as 
writing, Quin herself believed there was a relationship between writing and life.  
 
To all the correspondences, parallels, echoes she would at times 
attach a significance that appeared almost superstitious. Her books, 
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the characters and events in her books, or so she seemed half to 
believe, were anticipatory of her own experience.36 
 
It was not only that, as in the ‘autobiographical’ piece ‘Leaving School’, the 
writer read mythic and literary significance into her life – ‘I saw myself as 
Antigone’; ‘I sold my soul to the devil for a Heathcliff’37 – but that her own writing 
itself seemed somehow to shadow, pattern or echo life events – for example the 
suspected suicide by drowning in Three.38 Indeed, when, in the spring of 1970, 
the writer was moved from a psychiatric hospital in Stockholm to the Atkinson 
Morley Hospital in London, it is noteworthy that professionals from both 
hospitals wrote to Marion Boyars to request copies of Quin’s books: 
 
Thank you very much for sending me Ann Quin’s edition of 
‘Passages’. I would be grateful if you could let me have the promised 
copies of ‘Berg’ and ‘Three’ as soon as possible because comparison 
between the books is important in order to follow the course of Miss 
Quin’s thinking.39 
  
And throughout the readings that follow, as my beginning with a letter suggests, 
I too provide a reading of the oeuvre which considers her life as one of several 
intertexts (rather than the source) of the writing, as well as looking to the texts in 
order to ‘follow the course’ of Quin’s thinking. However, at the same time the 
project is careful to avoid a reductive biographical interpretation or explanation 
of texts. Instead, while I refer to Quin’s letters as well as the memories and 
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narratives of close friends and fellow writers throughout the textual analyses, 
these are considered and treated as paratexts rather than causes.  
The clearest examples of this kind of material in the thesis are the 
paratactic passages of text entitled ‘Illuminations’. These narrate particular 
aspects of the writer’s life as separate texts intended to consolidate, clarify and 
open up, rather than close down, interpretation of not only the writing itself, but 
of the writer too. The juxtaposition of these ‘Illuminations’ with the analyses of 
an oeuvre patterned on shadows does not banish them by clarity or spot-light, 
but instead insists that perceived connections between writing and life must 
always be read obliquely, alongside and complicated by the presence of 
multiple texts as well as cultural contexts. Read together then, rather than in a 
supposed hierarchical order, the ‘Illuminations’ and analyses proliferate rather 
than reduce the writing’s psychological, historical, and literary intersections.40  
 
The analyses themselves provide extended, in-depth readings of Quin’s writing 
– primarily focussing on Berg, Three, Passages, Tripticks and The Unmapped 
Country. These are in chronological order so that the reader might better be 
able to chart the evolution, degradation and not-quite dissolution of the writing 
as a whole. My first chapter, ‘Berg, 1964: To be is to be perceived’, assesses a 
narrative pitted between oedipal determinism and unresolved procrastination, 
between sexual desire, and the nauseous disgust and ambivalent realism of the 
overly-close detail. More specifically, my reading considers the effects of 
relocating the Oedipus myth to a seedy seaside town, and argues that this 
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seamy setting compellingly restates the myth and interrogates Brighton novel 
precedents. I delineate the absurd, transgressive humour of this narrative – 
which ends with the father as witness rather than corpse – as well as 
demonstrating how its narrative surface is bound up with and inextricable from 
engagement with and exaggeration of avant-garde styles. This first chapter 
identifies some of the main qualities and tropes of Quin’s writing: the self-
conscious performance of its method; its simultaneous surrender and resistance 
to the determining role of its intertexts; the figure of the voyeur, which ever 
signifies and presences the reader; the import of uncertainty as performed by 
both the slipperiness of the third/first-person narration and refusal of conclusive 
endings.  
 In ‘Three, 1966: Role play in the shadow of death’, I consider the 
writing’s critique of marriage as well as the class tensions of the time. Here, as 
across the oeuvre, greater engagement with the world coincides with an ever 
increasing narrative experimentation, evident in the various journal forms – 
particularly the aural journal – which figure both writing and reality at once. Quin 
further develops a paradoxical distinction and elision between the depiction of 
reality itself and the patterning of literary realism in this narrative’s drive towards 
death. In Three, this death is the central and absent event of the book. The 
reading also considers the transgressive effects of the possible marital rape, the 
vandals’ attack, and the portrayal of suicide. Further, whereas the first chapter 
only briefly engages with the intertexts of Greene, Beckett and Sartre, the 
reading here – to reflect the writing’s greater engagement with cultural as well 
as social contexts – provides a more extended assessment of parallels between 
Three and one of its main intertexts, the film Last Year in Marienbad.  
	
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‘Passages, 1969: The transgressive resistant paradox’ further assesses 
the potential connections between the patterning of the narrative, sequential 
readability and cultural ambiguity in Quin’s writing. An example of this is the 
inclusion of direct extracts of its main source text – Jane Harrison’s 
Prolegomena to the study of Greek Religion – which seems to immerse the 
book in the past, but in fact, I suggest, simultaneously functions to complicate 
and invigorate the reading process. The increasing complexity of 
experimentation here – for example myth as marginalia to the journal sections – 
requires an increasing complexity of response. Thus, my reading here engages 
with thinkers such as Barthes, Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I also assess how 
Passages disturbs cultural norms by its representations of both the female 
voyeur and the Jew.  
 In ‘Tripticks, 1972: Seeking the centre’, I argue that the irony created by 
this book’s excessive reiteration enacts the writing as a whole’s simultaneous 
refusal of postmodern assent and its residual longing for the real.41 This book, 
which moves the writing beyond the Mediterranean travels of Passages and into 
an American road trip also enacts the oeuvre’s most frenetic and unstable 
experimentation. My reading demonstrates that not only does the book’s silent 
scream enact a distinctly modernist angst, but that the narrative as a whole also 
interrogates both mainstream American culture and the counter-culture 
supposedly in rebellion against it. Throughout, the various cut-ups enact a 
simultaneous repulsion from and desire for these cultures, as well as generating 
an immersive and performative prose that speaks the words of these cultures, 
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in order to figure their meaninglessness. In addition, I establish that its insistent 
echoes of contemporaneous thinking make this book the most politically 
engaged as well as the most unstably and challengingly experimental.  
Finally, in ‘The Unmapped Country, 1973: Too close reading and writing’, 
I argue that this last book interrogates the structures and very possibility of the 
meaning of writing itself through its representation of madness. My analysis 
here considers Shoshana Felman’s claims in Writing and Madness that 
madness is outside language, to propose that Quin’s writing goes further to not 
only demonstrate language’s failure to write madness but to reveal a madness 
deep within the structures of narrative itself. Further, I argue that it is precisely 
the detail of its reiterating and over-determined prose that activates not only the 
writing’s madness, but also its realism. Here, as throughout, the writing 
emerges as predicated on and energised by binaries and tensions which drive it 
forward into a seemingly mapped but also ever unmapped territory.  
Throughout, my readings demonstrate that while Quin’s is always writing 
immersed in and reiterative of earlier literature, it is precisely this immersion 
which energises its resistant rebellion to and ironic interrogation of the dominant 
ideologies and literary practices of its time. This writing not only theorises its 
own experimental processes as it performs them, it also coincides with and 
participates in the literary and cultural theories of its time. In this, it is indeed 
writing both of the shadows and designing its own. 

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Illumination 1 
 
Quin ‘sleepwalked through’ her convent school years in Brighton, preferring 
voracious public library reading and Saturdays spent ‘queueing [sic] up for a 
seat in the Gods at the Theatre Royal’.1 In 1953, at seventeen, she left school 
and got a job as an assistant stage manager. There she dreamed of becoming 
an actor, but instead gathered props, scrubbed the stage, sewed, made tea and 
attempted to be knowing, laughing at ‘camp jokes I didn’t understand’. 2 
However, when opportunity came her way, nerves sabotaged a RADA audition, 
and with hopes of the stage dashed she vowed instead: ‘I would be a writer’.3 
For money to live on, she took a secretarial course and got a job in London.  
It was during this period, while living at home with her mother in Brighton, 
commuting to work, and trying to write, that Quin suffered her first breakdown. 
She says she dug holes in the garden, lay in them weeping and woke up 
screaming; ‘convinced my tears were rivers of blood, that my insides were being 
eaten away by an earwig that had crawled into my ear’.4 But, this time, she 
decided to ‘climb back out of madness’ because ‘the loneliness of going over 
the edge was worse than the absurdity of coping with day to day living’.5 She 
recovered, and in the time that followed finished her first two books – A Slice of 
Moon: ‘about a homosexual, though at the time I had never met one, knew very 
little about queers (maybe I had read something on Proust?)’ and a ‘book about 
a man called Oscar, who kills his monster child – a book that developed into 
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telephone directory length of very weird content, without dialogue’.6 Both failed 
to find publishers.  
1959 found Quin living in Soho and working part-time for a law firm. She 
enjoyed watching prostitutes from her window, but longed to be able to buy 
books and clothes, a nice place to live in: ‘a tower, facing the sea. I’m never so 
happy as when by the sea’.7 Instead, she got another secretarial job, this time 
at the Chelsea College of Art, and moved to Lansdowne Road in Notting Hill – 
‘an attic kind of place, a small skylight, gas ring; partition next to my bed shook 
at night from the manoeuvrings, snores of my anonymous neighbour’.8 The 
combination of paid work and writing was not ideal. As she later complained to 
John Calder: ‘What I don’t want to do is to begin worrying about some bloody 
office job when I’m in the middle of or towards the completion’ of a book.9  
It was Calder who accepted Berg in 1963. Not only did this ease Quin’s 
financial angst, but once the book was published in 1964, it also meant some 
critical acclaim: a D.H. Lawrence Scholarship from the University of New 
Mexico and a Harkness Fellowship to spend time living and writing in America. 
Most crucially, as she had recognised while writing it, this book would open the 
way for writing to come:  
 
it’s been a good exercise, something anyway I had to write, not so 
much ‘to get out of my system’, but more as a sort of map I had to 
plan out, find several routes, and arrive at a point, an area, so to 
speak, that would open on to other areas, other routes.10   
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Berg, 1964: To be is to be perceived 
 
 
A man called Berg, who changed his name to Greb,         
came to a seaside town intending to kill his father. . . .1 
 
 
 
So Berg opens on a separate page before the narrative begins. Like a chorus in 
a Jacobean drama, it proclaims the fundamentals of the story to come. It is, as 
Dulan Barber, Quin’s editor, says: ‘incredibly well designed to lead the reader in 
and on’ and does, in brief, state ‘the plot and essence’ of the book.2 In the 
narrative that follows, the protagonist, a man called Alistair Berg but posing as 
one named Greb, does go to a seaside town supposedly intending to find and 
kill his father, Nathaniel.  
This parricidal drive, motivated by the desire to please or win his mother, 
Edith, clearly echoes the basics of, for example, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, 
where Oedipus fulfils a prophecy that predicts he will kill his father in order to 
impress and marry his mother. But, while in Sophocles’ play Oedipus’ actions 
are, most crucially, unconscious, in Berg the parricidal drive instead consciously 
motivates the text, as Quin herself recognised: 
 
I came across (oh yes, of course, in the Oresteian Trilogy – thank 
you v. much, a delightful surprise!) the fact that Oedipus means sore 
feet. Do you remember at the end of Berg the father is going to take 
up chiropody? One could say Jung’s collective unconscious at work 
here I suppose. But the truth of the matter was – my own father, 
when I last saw him, said he was going to be a chiropodist…3  
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This letter both suggests and disavows the notion of an ‘unconscious at work’ in 
the autobiographical and oedipal parallels of Berg. The overlap, which connects 
the two fathers’ intended chiropody practice with ‘the fact that Oedipus means 
sore feet’, is in part construct, in part happy coincidence. In this, Quin’s 
tendency to seek intertextuality between life and writing finds an oedipal tenor 
across the book and into her own life. Her simultaneous belief in and play with 
this is clearest in her response to her father’s death in 1973: ‘‘He’s gone… What 
a pity, I had intended doing him in myself!’’4  
Oedipus casts inverted shadows elsewhere in Quin’s writing, with the 
father as the symbol of sexual desire: ‘At eighteen I went up to London to spend 
Saturdays with my father (he had left my mother when I was ten) and pretended 
he was my lover’.5 The adolescent writer looks to her father and fantasises a 
lover, a hero, to rescue her from mundane existence.6 This incestuous desire is 
evidence of Quin’s fascination with oedipal taboo, the simultaneous repulsion 
and desire of which she explores further in the story, ‘Every Cripple Has His 
Own Way Of Walking’ (1966). This is purportedly about ‘my childhood in a 
house nr. the downs, with two old cranky aunts, and an invalide grandma’.7 It 
tells of a young girl who lives in a stale, cluttered house with strange, ailing and 
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 Carol Burns’ piece in memory of Quin, unpublished manuscript, Carol Burns Papers, 5. 
5
 ‘Leaving School’, 64. 
6
 Calder describes Quin as always: ‘fixated on her father’, personal correspondence; letter: 
Calder to Nonia Williams Korteling, postal date, 13th November 2008. 
7
 Letter: Quin to Sward, 16th February, 1966. Robert Sward Papers, Series 1.1, box 8. She goes 
on: ‘while writing it I was way back twenty-five years, in this house at Ovingdean, hearing the 
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witch then’. Here, the act of writing is seen to conjure up the past in a way that has palpable 
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ancient aunts of almost monstrous appearance. Throughout, the girl waits for 
her father to visit, in the hope that he will take her away with him. But when he 
comes, while she is drawn to him – particularly by his musty aroma of leather 
and tobacco – she is also frightened and repelled. His predatory presence jars 
with and disturbs her innocent fantasy: ‘Little bird eyes raised towards the man 
who held on. Grasped. Fondled. Clutched. The child struggled’.8 This ambiguity 
figures both the repulsion of and longing for the father.  
Indeed in Berg too, despite the gender shift to male protagonist, the 
oedipal quest is obsessed with not only a longing to kill, but also somehow to 
have – and even become – the father. Having arrived at the seaside town, the 
disguised ‘Aly’ Greb finds himself an attic-room (next door to, it emerges, and 
divided by only a thin partition from, his father and father’s lover, Judith). Here, 
living in squalor and on a pittance, he procrastinates a never carried out plan to 
kill his father. Instead, he listens to the lovers arguing and having sex, tries to 
befriend them in increasingly bizarre ways and fantasises about having Judith 
for himself. In place of Nathaniel’s death are a series of hesitant, agonised 
parricidal failures, where Berg instead kills Judith’s cat, Seby, possibly strangles 
Nathaniel’s budgie, Berty, and actually does ‘strangle’ his father’s ventriloquist’s 
dummy in a farcical case of supposed mistaken identity. He also, again 
supposedly, mistakenly identifies a drowned dead man as his father. This 
endless deferral of action is exacerbated by Berg’s dwelling on various troubled 
adolescent and childhood memories, and becoming caught up in existential 
agonies and increasingly surreal fantasy.  
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 ‘Every Cripple Has His Own Way Of Walking’, Nova, December 1966, 135. 
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Indeed, in Berg fantasy, as well as farce, dominates the narrative surface. 
The language is never transparent, but always waxy, eccentric and vivid. Its 
protagonist is first encountered as ‘a body’ which ‘rolls upon a creaking bed’, a:  
 
fish without fins, flat-headed, white-scaled, bound by a corridor room 
– dimensions rarely touched by the sun – Alistair Berg, hair-restorer, 
curled webbed toes, strung between heart and clock, nibbles in the 
half-light, and laughter from the dance hall opposite. Shall I go there 
again, select another one? A dozen would hardly satisfy; consolation 
in masturbation, pornographic pictures hanging from branches of the 
brain (1). 
 
 
This is a repulsive, inhuman creature, ‘a body’ ‘fish without fins, flat headed, 
white-scaled’ with ‘curled webbed toes’, that ‘nibbles in the half-light’. It is also a 
man named Alistair Berg, hair-restorer, an unremarkable seedy salesman 
selling dubious, almost comical, vanity products. This seediness is heightened 
by the references to getting a girl from the dance hall opposite, masturbation 
and pornographic pictures. The juxtaposition of highly-crafted, strange and 
disconnected language with ordinary and even sleazy detail is characteristic of 
the way the book jumbles so-called high and low cultural tropes: it is also a 
characteristic of the later prose which Quin begins to map out here. Similarly, 
the ‘experimental’ narrative technique of eliding speech marks to blur internal 
and external worlds is typical. The switch to the first-person  voice in the second 
sentence with the question ‘Shall I go there again?’ implies Berg is speaking or 
at least thinking the words, but it is unclear whether the comment that follows – 
‘A dozen would hardly satisfy’ – is his own, or the aside of a third-person 
narrator. This slippage questions the source of the storytelling voice, an issue 
dramatised and complicated by the shifting narratorial position throughout the 
book. In this, while Berg’s turbulent and spontaneous perspective dominates at 

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word level, the larger structures of the narrative drive always remain in the 
shadow of the opening oedipal statement.  
Given this, it is surprising that much critical response to Berg to date 
considers the oedipal frame in passing, if at all, before moving on to 
peculiarities of style and form.9 To me, an attentive reading of this book, and 
indeed of Quin’s appropriation of myth across her oeuvre, resists such 
separation of form and content. Instead, the presence of oedipal tropes is both 
in tension with and inextricable from the highly crafted and stylised, chaotic 
narrative structures and facades. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that 
the foreshadowing determinism of Oedipus is not only a site of narrative 
resistance; it is also in fact the mode of signification, or the type of speech, 
across the book as a whole.10 In illustration, I would like to offer an account of 
the opening sentence which extends Barber’s comments on the sentence’s 
function as a narrative hook. It seems to me that the formation of the opening 
declaration is just as significant as its content. Not only is the sentence 
incomplete and without dénouement, as also the book itself, but while the 
protagonist, Berg, and his father are named, the motivating force behind the 
intended murderous act – his mother – is not. This absent figure dominates 
Berg, and this is crucial. What is missed out, the ‘…’, is the absence that 
complicates and reshapes the implied line between intended pursuer and 
victim. It is the shadowy third and then fourth of the love triangle that obsesses 
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 For example: Stevick, in ‘Voices in the Head: Style and Consciousness in the Fiction of Ann 
Quin’, focuses on the narrative’s rendering of mind and consciousness; Evenson and Howard, in 
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

the narrative, the absent but defining and designing fifth that lies behind it. In 
turn, this absence dramatises the deferral and, in the end, absence of oedipal 
fulfilment. As such, the writing continually and indivisibly pits notions of freewill 
and determinism, desire and decision, against each other.  
 Throughout the narrative, oedipal tensions are reworked and distorted in 
terms of existential procrastination, bawdy ‘camped-up’ theatre, and the setting 
of a seamy and out of season ‘seaside town’. In this, the book tells the story of 
an ambiguous, epicene desire for the father, as well as an existential search for 
a self beyond the determinist (and gendered) terms of the oedipal frame. 
Indeed, I contend that such tensions are precisely what interrogate Oedipus as 
narrative determinism. The validity of this structure is further complicated and 
interrogated by the over-encoded, nauseous and disturbing detail of Quin’s 
strange and ambivalent realism – for example, in descriptions of Judith’s 
appearance – which, rather than being a ‘powerfully covert version of the reality 
effect’, is instead a powerfully overt, excessive and transformative one.11 
  
 
To kill his father 
 
 
Berg is an uncompromising, a ferocious Oedipal statement. It is not a 
retelling of the Oedipal story. I do not believe such an obvious 
reliance upon past models, no matter how great, would have 
occurred to or have interested Quin.12 
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 This citation forms part of Victoria Coulson’s definition of James’ ‘ambivalent realism’, 
Henry James: Women and Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 16. 
Coulson’s term is a useful starting point for thinking about realism in Quin and is one I return to 
more fully in my chapter on The Unmapped Country. 
12
 Barber’s afterword, 170. 
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Nevertheless, Barber goes on: ‘the prime source of interest lies in the Oedipal 
bones of Berg. True, they are familiar bones, but set together with such 
astonishing individuality that they positively rattle for attention’.13 It is the form 
and manifestation of the oedipal ‘bones’ of Berg – the forms, manifestation and 
motivation of Berg’s desire to kill his father – that concern me here.  
The narrative hangs on a determining frame, ‘a skeleton’, where the 
theatrical exaggeration – the excess and over-signification if you like – and 
ultimate failure of oedipal fantasy are set together. This frame works to 
dramatise that of traditional and causal narrative structures: Berg is initially 
driven by a desire to kill Nathaniel in order to revenge Edith. However, what 
seems to be a linear quest emerges instead as circular reiteration: no matter 
how hard he tries, Berg is unable to rid himself of his father’s presence or 
mother’s dominance. Thus against the despair of the seeming oedipal ‘trap’, the 
book pits another in its repetitive, absurd humour. Take its very starting point. 
Reversing the letters of Berg’s name so that the invented Greb takes his place 
means that he enters the text as a back-to-front and already parodic subject. 
This act of reversal is reminiscent of theatrical comedy, a case of mistaken 
identity or character substitution: indeed, the name ‘Greb’ is ridiculous, like a 
nonsense word from a child’s rhyme. Berg-become-Greb then is an example in 
miniature of the wider narrative’s play with an old idea. Throughout, on the one 
hand the narrative vernacular of the English seaside town refuses the poetic, 
brooding tragedy of the Oedipus story; on the other, the narrative’s exposition, 
its ‘ferocious Oedipal statement’, is that while the release of a classical 
dénouement is impossible, so too is escape from the determining frame. By the 
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end of the book, rather than killing his father Berg has instead become him: the 
grim rub of the narrative is that both the parricidal obsession and his father are 
ultimately impossible to escape.  
This simultaneous repression and perpetuation of the oedipal drive may 
all sound rather Freudian. Indeed, it is impossible to discuss Oedipus in Berg 
without acknowledging Freud’s influential interpretation of the myth. While some 
critics, including Barber and Mackrell, claim that Freudian ideas are 
‘unconscious’ or ‘instinctive’, Quin was in fact already a reader of Freud by this 
time. 14  However, it is significant that Berg’s approach to killing his father 
remains more reminiscent of the play than of psychoanalytic appropriation: the 
book utilises and exaggerates the dramatic irony, rather than unconsciousness, 
of Oedipus’ actions in Oedipus Rex. In the play, Oedipus’ ignorance juxtaposed 
the audience’s knowledge (a classical Greek audience could be assumed 
already familiar with the myth), but in Berg familiarity with Oedipus is not only 
assumed in the reader, it is made explicit by the protagonist himself: 
 
Such an absurd, fantastic idea: To take his father’s corpse back 
home to Edith – the trophy of his triumphant love for her! In a Greek 
play they’d have thought nothing of it, considered to have been a 
duty, the final act of what the gods expected from their chosen hero 
(106). 
 
Yes, Berg desires his father’s corpse to demonstrate triumphant love for his 
mother and thereby become the hero of his own life, but, the narrative implies, 
while in a ‘Greek play they’d have thought nothing of it’, here, the idea cannot 
be taken seriously. The protagonist is aware of the temptation to interpret his 
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 Barber’s afterword, 170, and Mackrell, ‘Ann Quin’, British Novelists since 1960, Dictionary 
of Literary Biography, Ed. Jay Halio. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983, 609. Actually, in 1962 Quin 
had at least read some of Freud’s collected papers – for example, ‘no. 7 volume 1, on anxiety-
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own ‘story’ in terms of Oedipus, but exposes such a reading as ‘absurd, 
fantastic’. In this the narrative simultaneously ‘speaks’ and denies the legitimacy 
of a psychoanalytic appropriation of Oedipus: of using elements of the myth as 
a universal frame with which to read and interpret an individual’s unconscious 
motivation. 
Rather than requiring a psychoanalytic process to tease such drives out, 
Berg himself consciously names and thus refuses and dismantles the 
usefulness of Oedipus as a psychoanalytic tool – it is very clearly not the 
unconscious but the consciousness of the text. In this, the narrative refuses 
psychoanalytic interpretation: for Freud, as Rachel Bowlby points out, it is 
absolutely crucial that oedipal drives are unconscious.15 Contrastingly, in Berg it 
is essential that Berg himself, as much as the reader, recognises and 
appreciates the absurd and fantastic oedipal ‘joke’. This joke comes from the 
refusal of Oedipus as the norm concurrent with the inability to escape from it. 
Arguably, the ‘type of speech’ represented by the Oedipus myth in Berg is the 
foreshadowing structure of realism. In this way the myth, as a knowing re-
enactment of a re-enactment (etc.), offers a frame for reading – a chain of 
signification and mode of continuity – at the same time as it is exposed as a 
limited interpretative tool.  
Further, in Berg it is the mother who drives the parricidal quest, not the 
son. At the time and place of narrative events, although Nathaniel is present 
and Edith (at least bodily) absent, it is her voice and influence that permeate. 
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 ‘Oedipus gave Freud not just, perhaps not even primarily, the two crimes of incest and 
parricide, converted in his theory to universal infantile wishes; it also gave him the 
unconscious’: Rachel Bowlby, Mythologies in Freudian Mythologies; Greek Tragedy and 
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This dominance serves to evoke her presence.16 Edith is the shadowy other 
(the third and, once Judith is involved, the fourth) that haunts Berg. Her chatter 
– in her letters as well as the block quotations that disrupt and disgruntle the 
narrative – invades and attempts to shape Berg’s childhood memories, just as 
the mother in Quin’s ‘Motherlogue’ (1969) dominates and maddens with her 
talk. There, the attempt to dominate is made literal. The story takes the form of 
a phone-call: the repetitive and virtually unpunctuated prose gives only one 
breathless side of a supposed dialogue. In it, the mother’s talk veers between 
assumption, moaning, gossip and judgement, and continually returns to her 
listener’s father. Here, descriptions of his visits are in fact wishful thinking: ‘I 
have the feeling if given half the chance he’d hang his hat up here and oh dear 
you know how soft I can be and then he tried to kiss me when he leaves but I 
always turn my cheek the other way’.17  
In Berg, Edith, too, is obsessed with Nathaniel. No matter how much she 
denigrates him, it is Nathaniel her words are full of. Fantasised and real man 
are pitted against each other: Edith’s patently enduring affection juxtaposes with 
the callous and fickle person encountered in the narrative. When Nathaniel 
writes that he wants to visit, she is immediately and painfully keen: ‘I think he 
needs me’ she writes to her son, ‘he seems to be in some sort of trouble, I can 
always sense it, even though he doesn’t actually mention it in his letter’ (159). 
Both fathers here, we suspect, are taking advantage, both mothers willing to be 
used. The mother remains obsessed with the father, despite and because of 
their abandonment.  
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However, Edith is no victim, and the mother-child relationship in the book 
is both dominating and persecutory. She continually harangues and guilt-trips 
Berg, resulting in his ambivalent, love-hate stance towards her. Her words and 
his memories describe a childhood hued with shame, chastisement and 
unhappiness. The complexity of their relationship, and the dominance within it 
of guilt and remorse, brings to mind the situation between Raskolnikov and his 
mother, Pulkheria Alexandrovna, in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment. 18 
Both mothers take the position of the needy oppressor of (whether in 
imagination or reality) a violated and victimised child.  
Moreover, in Berg, this dominance is sexualised: the child’s incestuous 
and oedipal desire for the mother is reciprocated. In a particularly vivid example 
of this, once, after Berg knocked off her ‘Sunday-best hat’ with a ‘huge 
snowball, made entirely by yourself’, Edith ‘produced the leather strap, the 
buckle end for you, for naughty boys who never love their mother’. Then, 
punishment with a belt:   
 
The white arms with veins, dimples and wrinkles at the elbow; you 
static over her knees, she rhythmically moving, the pleasure in her 
eyes, the pleasure that was yours. The sheer delight of not giving in 
to a single cry, and afterwards running out, blinking back the tears, 
whistling, splashing yourself with water. Later her sighs, her soft 
kisses covering the bruises, the wiping away of blood that took 
longer, far longer than the cause (121). 
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 Although it is The Brothers Karamazov and not Crime and Punishment which Freud names as 
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The unpleasant and characteristically close focus here – the imminence of the 
‘veins, dimples and wrinkles at the elbow’ – concurrently conveys the horror and 
intimacy, the repulsion and desire of the scene. The ‘bruises’ and ‘blood’ 
focalise the brutality of what happens; the shared ‘pleasure’, ‘her sighs’, ‘soft 
kisses’ and rhythmic movements evoke the intimacy of sexual intercourse.  
The desire and disgust of the description here both flouts and refuses 
oedipal taboo because it comes from both directions. Berg responds to the 
violent, sexual ambiguity of the contact by distancing himself, from his mother – 
the ‘sheer delight of not giving in’ – as well as from the child: ‘yourself’ ‘you 
static’, and ‘the pleasure that was yours’.19 As elsewhere, the pronoun ‘I’ eludes 
him even though he is clearly the subject of the recollection as well as the one 
recollecting. The distance gained by shifting the pronoun to the second person 
‘you’ attempts to depersonalise the memory. This wants to deny culpability at 
the same time as confessing ‘pleasure’. The vivid, intimate nature of this 
recollection, coincident with the disavowal of agency, strikingly communicates 
the complex push-pull of desire and repulsion, the closeness and detachment, 
experienced by both parties in their relationship throughout the book. And, while 
Berg’s troubling yearning for his mother does indeed initially motivate his 
parricidal drive – ‘how surprised Edith would be, her caressing eyes, so wide, so 
opalescent!’ (105) – and seem to confirm Oedipus, Edith’s desire for him inverts 
and complicates such an interpretation.  
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 As Sara Ahmed reminds us, disgust requires both proximity and knowledge for the recoiling 
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Came to a seaside town 
 
 
Here was a working-class voice from England quite unlike any other, 
which had absorbed the theatrical influences of John Osborne and 
employed the technical advances of the nouveau roman. Berg, to 
use shorthand, is a Graham Greene thriller as if reworked by a 
somewhat romantic Burroughs.20 
 
 
His parricidal pursuit brings Berg to a seedy seaside town, a setting which most 
startlingly resets and reworks the oedipal bones. While the oedipal frame is 
clear in the narrative’s conscious dramatisation of the myth, especially in terms 
of Berg’s desire to please and win his mother, it is disturbed, refused and 
somewhat subsumed by the degraded and excessive style of the seaside town. 
Thus, I turn to the ways in which the ‘grandeur’ or supposed universality of the 
myth is (over) particularised and laid low, in particular in the form of Judith as 
the mother substitute.  
Berg, whose outlook is a ‘Window blurred by out of season spray’ (1), 
although in a ‘minor seaside resort’ (116), has been read as set in Brighton, or 
at least somewhere nearby. Despite the label of ‘minor’ and the non-specificity 
of the book’s setting, Quin’s Brighton origins make it unsurprising that Gordon, 
among others, assume it is the ‘seaside town’ of Berg’s misadventure. This 
assumption has of course spawned links with Greene’s eponymous Brighton 
book, Brighton Rock (1938). Quin does not specifically mention this precedent, 
but comparison between the tone and setting of the two, and even some 
strikingly similar detail, does prove fruitful for thinking about the role and 
                                                 
20
 Gordon, introduction to Berg, Dalkey Archive edition, ix. While the comment about 
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representation of the English seaside town in Berg. For example, Berg’s 
attempted seduction of ‘some plump piece, only to be too late, or defeated by 
best friend’s giggles’ (45) is undeniably reminiscent of Hale’s attempted pass at 
‘a fat spotty creature’ whose pale, bloodless friend ‘screeched with 
embarrassed laughter’.21 It is Quin’s appropriation and distortion of this setting 
which speaks the ‘working-class voice’ ‘quite unlike any other’, and grounds the 
book: its kitsch artificiality is a context at once wholly English and unpretentious 
while at the same time her representation is something far removed from the 
social realism of the ‘angry young men’. 
Brighton, scene of an infamous mods and rocker clash in the mid-1960s, 
was a seaside town in decline. It was a shadow of its former self, a town ‘not yet 
come to terms with the fact that the old type of summer visitors and day-trippers 
from London were no longer coming to Brighton, but spending their holidays on 
package trips to the costa brava’ instead. 22  This decline, together with its 
geographical position ‘on the edge’ of England, made it ripe for literary 
appropriation as a liminal space. The seaside-resort, note Peter Stallybrass and 
Allon White, is placed ‘at the outer limit of civil life’ and is therefore an ideal 
setting for literature containing behaviour that transgresses social norms.23 This 
is evident in the literary tradition of the ‘Brighton novel’, with books such as 
Brighton Rock and Patrick Hamilton’s Hangover Square (1941). These 
narratives revolve around mania, meaningless violence and murder; action 
takes place in insalubrious pubs; characters live in grotty bed-sits; there are 
desperate, often tarty women, and men in cheap suits. So too Berg – as 
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Blomfield puts it: ‘Brighton, its tangy spirit in Berg so potently distilled’.24 It is 
indeed the assumed Brighton setting which gives the events of the narrative 
their particular flavour. More specifically, as with the mythic frame, the Brighton 
novel tropes – specifically cheap clothes and make-up – are vividly reworked to 
simultaneously both perpetuate their stereotypes and interrogate their veracity. 
A prime example of cheap clothes and make-up is Judith, who is not only 
Edith denied and restated, but also bears a significant allegorical resemblance 
to an off-season seaside town. Nathaniel’s lover Judith is the very opposite of 
Edith and her respectable Sunday hats. She is ‘attractive… in the artificial style’ 
(5), ‘her cheap but overwhelming scent [is] like incense’ (41), she wears high-
heels, and ‘behind the dyed hair and the well-powdered face’ (13) it is difficult to 
determine her age. Her first attempt to seduce Berg takes place in a room of 
high bad taste, cluttered with heavy Victorian furniture, stuffed animals, wax 
flowers and fruit, and ‘draped it seemed entirely in purple velvet, reminiscent of 
an Egyptian tomb’ (16). She goes away to make hot chocolate and re-emerges 
having:  
 
changed into a housecoat of shiny black material, rearranged her 
hair, now no longer bound by the net; her eyes carefully outlined into 
an oriental effect (17).  
 
 
As with the purple velvet of the room, the colour and texture of the housecoat 
are important. Both fabrics are cheap; bad taste attempts to suggest opulence, 
luxury, and to invite touch. In ‘Notes for a Theory of Sixties Style’, Angela Carter 
discusses the signification of clothing aesthetics in this time period. She says 
that: ‘Velvet is back, skin anti-skin, mimic nakedness… velvet simulates the 
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flesh it conceals, a profoundly tactile fabric’, and that ‘satin invited the stroke, a 
slithering touch’.25 Carter also claims that velvet and satin bring with them the 
implicit promise of easy sex. 
The underlying symbolism of such clothing colours interaction between 
Judith and Berg. Having an unfamiliar man in her room late at night does not 
faze Judith. Instead of changing into more modest clothing, she puts on the 
black, slithering, satiny coat which, presumably could fall open, and even if not 
is already highly suggestive of nakedness underneath by its very fabric. She 
has let her ‘dyed’ blonde hair down, unbound and freed it, a striking contrast to 
the covering of hair as a (religious) symbol for modesty; she has also outlined 
her eyes ‘carefully’ implying time and thought about impact.  Perhaps she uses 
kohl, a cosmetic that, according to Carter: ‘had the twin advantages of being 
extremely exotic and very, very cheap’. 26  Her face is ‘well-powdered’, 
suggesting she has much to hide, her dyed hair is a flag of artifice, and her 
scent cloys. These descriptions of Judith’s clothes and make-up present them – 
and therefore her – as false, cheap and tasteless. In this way her pretensions to 
the status of an assertive sex-symbol – ‘women’s clothes today [want to] say 
‘Look at me and touch me if I want you’’27 – are refused by the narrative, which 
reduces her style and seduction technique to the cliché of a desperate, 
predatory and aging woman. However, despite an initial residue of prudery (a 
hang-up bound up with his mother) Berg lusts after this tacky flaunting of female 
sexuality just as much as his father does.   
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Some critics have found fault with this kind of stereotyping. They claim 
that characters other than Berg himself emerge ‘not simply as shadowy, but 
sometimes as highly implausible’. 28  This criticism is interesting given my 
particular interest in shadows as signifiers across Quin’s texts. Not only does 
the coding of shadows design the reading process, I propose, but shadows as 
(over)design also figure an ambivalent realism that transforms realistic 
representativeness into something more excessive and subversive. Berg is not 
a traditional or social realist text, and as such the characters, including Berg 
himself, are not drawn in that kind of solid, plausible or ‘realistic’ manner. 
Instead, their representation acts to shadow and announce the 
uncompromisingly close focus of a different kind of ‘realism’: 
 
He saw the powder on her cheeks had dried into small particles 
round her nostrils, and her hair, a blondeness that made one wonder 
what colour she was elsewhere. An imitation pearl necklace encircled 
her flushed neck, a few of the beads chipped – decaying teeth 
against three circles of her neck, above these her scarlet mouth that 
yawned and yawned wider, nearer (83). 
 
The ‘decaying teeth’, the particles of powder, the ‘scarlet mouth that yawned’, 
are excessive details made strange. Such detail denies the reality or intimacy it 
also seems to want to convey and instead evokes disgust. While the description 
is clearly a sexual one – the dyed blonde hair questioning ‘what colour she was 
elsewhere’ together with the gaping ‘scarlet mouth that yawned and yawned 
wider, nearer’ suggest both Berg and Judith’s lust – it is also repulsive. The 
mouth extends in a silent, needy scream, ready to devour. Indeed, Judith’s face 
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as a whole is seen as if in a fairground, distorted mirror, frame by frame and in 
extreme close-up, its surface split into ridiculous fragments. Here she becomes 
a joke, little more than a debased, crumbling surface. Unsurprisingly, her 
peeling paint and imitation pearls recall an out of season and redundant seaside 
resort, a cheap, sorry and empty promise of pleasure.  
To me, the ambivalent realism of this theatrical and frightening, 
exaggerated description – for instance, the evocative detail of the ‘decaying 
teeth’ of the chipped beads against ‘three circles’ of her neck – is bound up with 
a particularly effective ambiguity. As with Edith’s strapping of Berg above, here 
again ‘disgust is deeply ambivalent’; it involves a simultaneous repulsion and 
desire, a lust for contact at the same time as recoil.29 Indeed, Ahmed’s concept 
of disgust is particularly pertinent for thinking about Judith because, as the lover 
of both Nathaniel and Aly – as the woman used by both – she figures a 
stickiness of contact between them which is ‘an effect of the histories of contact 
between bodies, objects and signs’. 30  Therefore, not only is Judith herself 
‘disgusting’, she also disturbs the boundaries between father and son 
themselves: their contact with her in turn figures a disgusting and ambivalent 
contact between them. This is evident in the way Berg’s attraction to Judith is 
actually fuelled by his father obsession, voiced in an unsent letter to Edith: ‘he’s 
been fucking another woman next door, and probably a dozen others besides… 
you’re better off without him, he seems a bit worse for wear’ (58). The letter 
ends with ‘meanwhile – well I’m going to fuck her too…’ (59). Berg’s lust for 
Judith, as a replacement mother-figure, is inseparable from his father’s: the 
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pursuit of his father is not only bound up with a parricidal drive, but also a 
somehow incestual one.  
Indeed, from the beginning the campaign to seduce Judith requires not 
Nathaniel’s death, but his continuing presence as voyeur and witness to 
confirm, or at least be subjected to hearing, Berg seducing Judith. While she is 
preparing the hot chocolate and slipping into her shiny housecoat, he slips next 
door, where Nathaniel lies slumped on Berg’s bed after a drinking bout, to 
check ‘had the bastard meanwhile lost all consciousness, cheated me in fact?’ 
(17). The imminent seduction will only have value if his father hears all through 
the thin partition that ‘separates’ the two rooms. This symbolic border between 
them represents the ‘sticky’ contact zone of their proximity – it signifies that 
Berg’s seduction of Judith is also a seduction of Nathaniel himself. 31  And 
indeed, behind the permeable border, Nathaniel lies, to Berg’s satisfaction, 
conscious and ‘heaving over the bed, mounds of vomit on the eiderdown, on the 
rug’ (17). In fact, his father’s continuing presence is so bound up with the 
seduction that Berg worries: ‘there was the possibility she would not prove so 
fascinating after his father’s death’ (66). Judith is the necessary go-between in 
the erotic tug of war between father and son. This tug of war requires a 
continuation and complexification, not dissolution, of the Nathaniel-Edith-Berg 
triangle into Nathaniel-Judith-Berg-Edith to drive plot and action. 
As such, this is a theatre of desire where identity is fluid, one which 
exploits the theatrical technique of mistaken identity – exemplified from the 
outset in Berg-as-Greb – as well as the transgression that this implies. When 
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Berg finally has sex with Judith the whole act for her is a comparison, ultimately 
an elision, between father and son. She says: ‘Oh Aly make it last, he never 
could you know’ (145) and ‘Nathy, oh Nathy my darling’ (146) while having sex 
with the same person (Berg junior). For Judith, the distinction between Alistair 
and Nathaniel Berg is blurred: she desires both men, or rather, desires them as 
if they are one man. This confusion between father and son is not only Judith’s: 
Edith too desires Berg to fulfil her fantasies as a better version of his father. But 
paradoxically, his mother’s desire for greater respectability is concurrent with 
her place as the woman in Berg’s life being further and further debased onto 
Judith. This sense of slippage between the two women is clearest when their 
words begin to overlap and collide: Judith’s ‘My God Aly you do look a sight, 
really you do, what’s come over you’ is directly juxtaposed with Edith’s ‘Oh look 
at your lovely new coat all that muck on your trousers too. Oh Aly I told you not 
to’ (158).  
However, the most exaggerated and dramatic case of elision and 
transgression is the homo-hetero-sexual, near incestual episode, when Berg 
performs as Judith. Here, the book exploits the theatrical techniques of 
(pantomime) cross-dressing and the bed-trick to make the sexual tension 
between Berg and Nathaniel overt. While hiding from the pursuit of his father 
and cronies, Berg tries on Judith’s clothes, enjoying the feel of nylons against 
his legs, then: 
 
Putting one of his [father’s] best auburn wigs on, he patted it into 
place, and arranged the fringe until it came well over his forehead 
and met his eyebrows. What about makeup? He went back to their 
room. 
      He handled the cosmetics tentatively, then slowly powdered his 
face, his hands shook so much that at first he made a mess with the 
mascara (117). 
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Berg’s disguise in her clothes and his father’s wig is completed by Judith’s 
make-up, while he fantasises ‘if only the navy were in’ (117). Indeed, he is ‘so 
taken up with his new appearance’ (117) that he does not notice the door open, 
just as Nathaniel (supposedly) does not notice that ‘Judith’ is Berg. Instead, he 
attempts to seduce ‘her’: ‘love come here, take those things off’ (118). Then, 
with Nathaniel’s ‘fingers running up his legs, further and yet further up’ (118) 
Berg thinks: ‘This is how it had been, with Edith, with Judith, how they must 
have revelled in it, giggling, panting, helping the old man’s hands, opening their 
thighs, unsnapping their suspenders, arching their backs, opening up 
everything, wide—wider’ (118-119). From this fantasising as his mother and 
lover, Berg then imagines producing ‘it [his ‘flowerless stalk’] in [Nathaniel’s] 
face… so he’ll remember to the day he dies’ (119). In this way, the narrative 
plays with the sticky and ‘disgusting’ or disturbing notions of performance, 
incest, transvestism and homosexuality before it recoils.  
 In this scene then, theatrical and carnival techniques abound. Berg, in 
auburn wig, powdered and mascaraed – a strange amalgamation of Nathaniel 
and Judith – triggers the climactic dramatic moment of ‘mistaken identity’; his 
private enjoyment of disguise is interrupted by Nathaniel’s dramatic pantomime 
entrance ‘behind’ him. This bed-trick substitution employs, sends up and 
refuses the heterosexual assumptions of the oedipal cliché. Further, layers of 
appearance and disguise at the level of content are complemented with an 
extravagance that places the attempted seduction in the realm of a comic 
carnival or theatrical farce where misunderstandings about gender play a 
central role. And indeed, gender is an area of radical uncertainty in the narrative 
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as a whole. Once taunted with: ‘he’s a cissy, just a common cissy; hasn’t got a 
dad, his mum pawns herself to pay the fees; silly cissy Berg, he’s so cold he 
can’t even crap’ (10) and a ‘Longing to be castrated’ (4), Berg is epicene. In this 
he is well placed in the realm of carnival, which is characterised by an 
ambivalence which transgresses ‘normal’ categories and boundaries, allowing 
‘the latent sides of human nature to reveal and express themselves’.32 Bakhtin’s 
notion of carnival is that it turns the world inside out: it is characterised by 
ambivalence and opposition, and carnival symbols always include within them 
an anticipation of their opposite. Thus it is a useful term for describing Quin’s 
techniques here, because of the excess, blurring, inversion and slippage of 
apparent binaries, and the transgressive humour which enjoys the shock of 
exposure, of creating discomfort and flouting taboo.  
It is this disgust and carnival, evidenced in Judith’s crumbling 
appearance and the mistaken identity of Berg’s epicene transvestism, that give 
Berg Quin’s distinctive ‘tang’. What’s more, the subversive humour and 
discomfort of the narrative, which disturbs boundaries between realism and 
fantasy, taste and disgust, makes the liminal seaside setting ideal. These 
qualities refuse a straightforward comparison with Greene’s Brighton Rock, 
despite definite similarities in mood and setting. Instead, this seaside town is 
made strange. The familiar facets of Brighton – the front, the pier, the beach – 
and of the Brighton novel – the sordidness, the floozy – are all there, but they 
are re-imagined and re-written. This is why, as Christine Fox puts it; ‘It is 
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impossible to see BERG as Ann Quin’s copy of Graham Greene’s precedent’.33 
In that book, she claims, specificity is crucial; the documentary effects provide a 
realistic backdrop in marked and effective tension with Pinkie’s casual violence 
and strange Catholicism. Quin’s minimal geography on the other hand – ‘the 
cliffs, the shore, the façade of off-white lodging houses, the hotels, all discarded 
props’ (29) – recedes well into the background. In this book, fantasy dominates 
and internal visions are mapped onto the outside world to create a largely 
imaginative landscape: ‘Crossing the park: a subterranean world surreptitiously 
risen; here a million star-fish pinned on the forelocks of a hundred unicorns 
driven by furious witches’ (132).  
Despite the particularity of its seaside setting, Quin’s strange and 
ambivalent realism is not bound by realistic specificity – it is rather perhaps its 
very over-specificity, its over-encoded detail, which marks it out. The writing’s 
refusal to hold detail in focus without transforming or subverting it resists and 
trips the reader up, creating a disquieting slipperiness and stickiness of 
narrative surface. It is this, to me compelling and engaging quality, that Robert 
Nye misses when he calls Berg: ‘chiefly remarkable for its evocation of 
Brighton… its emotional intensity nearer the early work of Graham Greene than 
the fashionable French new-wavers its author… imagined she was imitating’.34 
Thus Nye dismisses the tricksy surfaces of the book as derivative and 
inauthentic. However, as Fox points out, in fact the narrative sends-up issues of 
authenticity, precedents and sources: ‘Can it be that Robert Nye attributed to 
Ann Quin as an author the lack of authenticity she was in fact defining on the 
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page as the basis of her character’s adventure, and misadventure?’ 35  The 
book’s conscious declaration of its oedipal frame is one clear example of this: 
the way that the excessive, theatrical detail functions to make the ambivalent 
realism of Quin’s seaside town strange is another.  
 
 
Who changed his name 
 
 
Half in the light he stood, a Pirandello hero in search of a scene that 
might project him from the shadow screen on to which he felt he had 
allowed himself to be thrown. If I could only discover whether cause 
and effect lie entirely in my power (48). 
 
 
The slippage of character outlined above, in terms of Judith as a debased Edith, 
or of Berg as first seducing and then role-playing Judith in order to become and 
then have Nathaniel, is a merging and blurring that signifies radical uncertainty 
about the possibility of defining or articulating the self. The role of this question 
in Berg can be usefully thought about further, as this extract suggests, by 
considering the problem of what or who Berg is – this man with a changed 
name and constantly changing personas – to what extent thing and to what 
extent shadow, whether he or I, determined or free. 
          Here Berg is cast as an absurdist, fantastical Pirandello hero – in other 
words, again in terms of something or someone else. He looks for a scene, a 
reality, which might ‘project him from the shadow screen’ onto which he has 
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been thrown.36 This desire to escape is twofold. Not only is he literally placed 
behind the screen of the partition between the two bedsits, but he is shadowed 
and shaped by others; a Pirandello hero, a hero in a Greek play, Hamlet, 
Raskolnikov etc. In this, as in the image of the puppet casting a shadow on the 
screen, Berg is always one step removed and deferred. Furthermore, the failure 
of his desire for freedom from ‘the shadow screen’ recalls the larger role of 
shadows across Quin’s writing as a whole.  
          What he wants is to be ‘no longer the understudy, but the central 
character as it were, in a play of his own making’ (77). But, the over-determined, 
cacophonous and allusive narrative necessarily denies this, as it reminds us 
here. As a fictional character within an already written narrative, Berg, who 
figures an existential desire for power over ‘cause and effect’, is pitted against 
the causal and foreshadowed desires of the text. Indeed, the oedipal frame 
generates a trap: while he imagines an act that will establish his subject-hood – 
as if the death of his father could bring forth a heroically liberated ‘I’ from the 
subjected ‘son’ – parricidal fulfilment would in fact be another way of being 
determined. As he elsewhere suspects: ‘not even the most indulgent of all 
actions ‘‘I shall kill’ can make me declare ‘I am’’ (27). Paradoxically, he is 
instead defined by a failure to carry out ‘the most indulgent of actions’ (27).  
This endless deferral of both action and self-hood is further underpinned 
by a narratorial uncertainty which creates a procrastination of narrative 
perspective. In this, a fluidity of first and third-person perspectives throughout 
mirrors a shift from the certainty of supposed oedipal universals towards the 
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uncertainty of existential individualism. In Berg, ‘I’ has no fixed referent, it 
cannot speak the subject: 
 
But I don’t belong to anyone, therefore attachment to anything means 
betrayal, self-banishment, renounce self-continuity, self-
transcendence; the ego only there to give significance (32). 
 
In this, narrative names the speaking ‘I’ as a fiction, only there to give 
significance, not attached or belonging to anyone. Here, as with the ‘you’ 
remembered during the flogging by Edith, ‘I’ is exposed as a projection, an 
absence, and instead it is a space where the shifting ‘talk’ of the narrative 
happens.37 Berg’s cohesive, nameable ‘subject-hood’ is exposed as imaginary; 
nevertheless, he is the protagonist of the book and the place and focal point for 
narrative meaning and interpretation. 
           However, the speaking voice in and of the narrative is elusive, and at 
times third and first-person  merge so that the reader cannot establish from 
whose perspective the narrative focalises. What is experienced instead is a 
confusing proliferation of multiple voices, where both first and third-person make 
claims to interiority. Berg is ‘he’, ‘I’ and ‘you’ with varying degrees of distance: ‘I 
must go on, as before as planned. Disclosure of identity now would be fatal. 
Berg took hold of the old man’s arm’ (12). When anticipating a future guilt for 
parricide, he imagines court-scenes where the judging voice is another’s: 
‘Alistair Berg, alias Greb, commercial traveller, seller of wigs, hair-tonic, 
paranoiac paramour, do you plead guilty?’(56)38 The narrative does not disclose 
whether these various voices are oral (therefore aural), or not, so it may be that 
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Berg hears these various voices in his head. According to Stevick, Berg’s talk is 
scarcely ‘inner’ at all, it is rather like actual speech acted out in the theatre of 
the mind.39  
Indeed, speech aloud is not normally differentiated within the narrative 
either, in terms of conventional paragraphing divisions or speech-marks.40 This 
further confuses narratorial position: ‘You’re both to blame persecuting me like 
you do, both of you, oh yes I know. I like that, did you hear what he said Mr. 
Greb accusing us of God knows what’ (65). Here, the speaking ‘I’ shifts 
seamlessly from Nathaniel’s to Judith’s perspective, rendering the ‘me’, ‘you’, 
‘he’ and ‘us’ difficult to assign. This muddling is deliberate: the undifferentiated 
pronouns begin to articulate, or enact, a blurring of boundaries between who is 
who, what is remembered and what told, what is inner and outer, fantasised and 
real.  
For Berg in particular, as with the dream-like Brighton he inhabits, 
distinctions between internal sensory experiences and the outside world merge. 
His thoughts materialise: ‘waves of jazz, or a slow waltz crowded in upon the 
necropolis of cells, like hard-polished beads, one pull, how far would they roll?’ 
(7) as the narrative declares its techniques – ‘Threading experience through 
imaginative material’ (7). In this way, subjective experience of the material world 
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is so interwoven with fantasy that these become forms of intertextuality that 
cannot be unwoven. Such experiences happen when the protagonist is alone, 
mostly with nature, and are often experienced as a comforting 
depersonalisation, a kind of ecstasy and freedom from the awkward self-
consciousness he experiences in the social world. In them, he feels ‘welcomed 
by the natural order… because everything comprehended your significance’ 
(11):  
 
Aware of own shell, skin-texture, sun in eyes, lips, toes, the softness 
underneath, in between, wondering what miracle made you, the sky, 
the sea. Conscious of sound, gulls hovering, crying, or silent at rarer 
intervals, their swift turns before being swallowed by the waves. Then 
no sound, all suddenly would be soundless, treading softly, diving 
rocks with fins, and sword-fish fingers plucking away clothes, that 
were left with your anatomy, huddled like ruffled birds waiting. A 
chrysalis heart formed on the water’s surface, away from the hard-
polished pebbles, sand-blowing and elongated shadows (152).41 
 
Here, the edges of Berg’s imagination and almost of his physical body are 
experienced as if porous and fluid. The prose is infused with an ‘awareness of 
becoming part of, merging into something else’ (153). This effect is achieved by 
sound and image association. Not only does Berg’s ‘shell’ or outer body merge 
with the shells on the beach, but the soft sibilant ‘s’s both evoke the sea and 
blur the words and images together, as does the tracking of sound patterns – 
the movement from ‘swift’ to ‘swallowed’ to ‘waves’ – and part-rhymes – for 
example, ‘eyes’/‘sky’ and ‘fins’/‘fingers’. The narrative reminds us to listen to it; 
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to be ‘conscious of sound’. In this way, Berg’s mode of mind seems bound up 
with a poetics of slippage which the mind’s eye and ear are invited to track.42  
According to Mackrell, the evocation of this immersive and expansive 
experience is a particularly effective ‘technique… to render a faithful impression 
of the continuous and subjective present of Berg’s consciousness’.43 Indeed, 
this notion of a continuous present is central to the concept of time in the 
narrative as a whole, which refuses linear progress and hence also 
conventional notions of time passing. The seeming fluidity here in fact creates a 
kind of temporal stasis, a ‘frozen’ and ecstatic moment, where the description 
bleeds outwards rather than across, and Berg escapes the causal and linear, 
reductive, frame. Here, then, the extravagant narrative surface allows an 
escape from the determining structures of the intertexts. Instead of seeing 
himself in terms of someone else, the protagonist sees himself as without a 
frame, as dissolved into the surrounding, sensory world.44 
At the same time, the clear enjoyment of these surreal descriptive 
passages and their over-written patterning serve to presence an author. In 
addition, the emphasis on surface both names and effectively enacts the avant-
garde fascination with words as beautiful things at the same time as its excess 
parodies the value of such focus. This is neither the unconscious generation of 
a modernist écriture, nor the supposedly unwritten and transparent vernacular 
of social realist fiction. Instead, the surfaces and styles of Berg accrue 
emulsifying layers, adding to the several mythic and literary structures woven 
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through the text. The result is a thickened and overly emphasised, waxy 
surface, so evident in the initial description of Berg himself. It is a quality also 
present in sections that send up avant-garde or nouveau roman language use, 
where word-combinations declare their writtenness:  
 
He looked round, almost expecting to see someone shadowing him. 
The street, a ringless finger, curved past the closed doors, the 
curtained windows. Safe enough, at least for the moment. The leaves 
were sun-baked lizards stirring towards the sea that churned its chain 
of silver snakes, which would, if given half the chance, coil round, pull 
him out of this urban setting, vomit him on dry land (110). 
 
 
The imagery here is tactile and visually surreal: the reptile metaphors crackle 
and shimmer with life; the curves of the ‘ringless finger’, the ‘stirring’ of the 
lizards and churning chain of silver are highly sensory. The sound repetitions 
shadow and wind across this passage to enact the curving of the ringless finger. 
This elevated language reiterates the mythic framework of the book, it is a 
literary ‘nod’ established by allusions elsewhere: in Judith’s (parodic) longing to 
become ‘a Ruth, a Helen, Beatrice, Cleopatra. Woman, the mythical creature 
who warmly welcomes the part her lover hands her’ (67), and in Berg’s 
adolescent letters which included ‘the exchange of sonnets, in remembrance of 
Michelangelo, Rimbaud, Valery, Whitman, occasionally Milton; you, Lycidas 
sleeping in the river valley, head cradled only by grass and the wind; body lulled 
by sunlight’ (136).  
However, the word ‘vomit’ breaks the fairy tale-like reverie, interrupting 
the elevated and nostalgic tone with an ‘urban’ vernacular and exposing its 
artificiality: such nostalgia for the natural world is in quotation marks. This word-
level focus signifies a modernist refusal of the assumption that language can be 
transparent while exposing the focus on linguistic surfaces as a literary ‘trick’. It 
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is ‘poetic’ language which at the same time sends-up the highly crafted and 
inauthentic nature of its own narrative surface as stereotype, kitsch. Indeed, the 
debased artificiality of kitsch – present in the disgust, say, of Judith’s 
appearance or the vomit above, which in turn recalls Nathaniel’s drunken 
vomiting behind the partition – refuses pretension. Yes, the narrative knows 
modernism: there are references to T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land with ‘the past is 
an arid landscape’ (80), and to ‘Proust-like’ (136) letters. But, rather than 
providing a straight imitation of avant-garde style, the narrative maddens and 
transforms it. The resultant kitsch style – also evident in, for example, the 
unpretentious English seaside setting and bawdy epicene theatre – marks an 
effective mix of high and low literary tropes, which acts to resoundingly refute 
Nye’s comment that Berg pretends to a literary high ground.  
The excess of the writing is precisely the point: it performs the 
impossibility of linguistic transparency while maintaining the possibility of 
ascertaining signification. In this Berg’s mystical experiences seem to articulate 
something fundamental about who he is, but simultaneously dissolve him into 
his surroundings. Moreover, while throughout the narrative such character and 
linguistic slippage generates a sense of blurring and free-flow, it is at the same 
time playful and unambiguously crafted. In places, this excessive aesthetic 
surface has the artificially ornate tone of a send up, a performance, a distraction 
from real action, as in fact it is. Nevertheless, it also expresses nostalgia for and 
perpetuation of a modernist angst for a depth of meaning – in this it 
foreshadows the effects of excessive surface in Tripticks.  
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Intending to kill 
 
 
ACTION! Even now he was dragging on to the skin that covered the 
growth; I must tear it apart, bring it into sight, why hesitate any more? 
     The best opportunity would be when his father was drunk one 
evening. Yes wait until then, meanwhile maybe a perfect alibi should 
be worked out, for the perfect crime? No, no, hardly that, a slight 
mistake over the margin either way, so easy to make a mess of 
things, one small slip, something overlooked. Remember, nothing, as 
yet, had been accomplished anywhere near perfection. Consider, 
reconsider well beforehand, every point, down to the minutest detail, 
mark out all the angles. 
     He traced a geometrical design on the peeling wall behind the 
bed. Strategy definitely is needed, thought before action: hopeless to 
do anything in the heat of the moment (33). 
 
 
The narrative procrastination about who Berg is, is mirrored, extended and 
exaggerated by the continual and ultimately unresolved deferral of his parricidal 
act – the intention to kill never does become action: in both form and content 
then, this is a desiring rather than deciding text. To conclude my reading Berg 
and to further refute Nye’s charge of imitation, what I am particularly interested 
in here is how the hesitation and substitution of oedipal fulfilment engages with 
and extends beyond some of its key intertexts: for example, Hamlet, Nausea, 
Waiting for Godot, Watt.45 In fact, as I argue, the book’s echoing of these, as 
well as Oedipus, is precisely what reproduces, participates in and increases the 
absurd comedy of the repetitive, rippling exhaustion and persistence of Berg’s 
parricidal fantasy.46  
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In a way that recalls Hamlet (‘thought before action’) – and, indeed, the 
self-recriminatory blunders of Raskolnikov (the endless fantasising about ‘the 
perfect crime’) – Berg wastes opportunities. Rather than ‘ACTION!’, he remains 
caught up in detailed fantasies about the murderous act – ‘reconsider well 
beforehand, every point’ – moving into the realm of theatrical villain. He tells 
himself to: ‘pull him down, cut out the mole, split the hair, smash the brain, 
smother him’ (12); to facilitate a drowning – ‘accidents in baths were not rare; fill 
up until overflowing, slipped, knocked unconscious against the taps’ (51). But, 
there is a frustrating failure to progress and Berg berates himself: ‘Defeat the 
desire and act’ (40). He knows ‘that’s what it amounts to, decide rather than 
desire’ (41). Here, the narrative admits desire alone does nothing. But, it 
simultaneously remains stuck in a continual and absurd return to thinking about 
the difference between theory, or thought, and action, leaving Berg, and the 
narrative itself, trapped in a limbo of indecision.  
Indeed, this procrastination is over-encoded and shadowed by other 
texts. For example, parallels with Hamlet in the failure at parricide are clear 
when Berg names himself as: ‘I a ghost who walks abroad’ (60). Hamlet, an 
archetypal oedipal character, lets chances pass him by while caught in doubt 
and self-flagellation: Berg, too, misses ideal situations even as he waits for 
them. This absurdity is dramatised in the narrative: Nathaniel might almost wink 
at Berg, and certainly at the reader, when he says, ‘Here steady old man, nearly 
had me over then you know’ (51). The joke is on Berg’s failure to act. He wants 
to push Nathaniel over; he raises his hands, internally shouts ‘NOW!’, but 
nothing happens. Berg remains in a dreamlike state of inaction even when 
given opportunity to kill his father. This layering of Oedipus-Hamlet as the type 
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of speech or mode of continuity for Berg’s repetition of failed action traps the 
narrative in a continual return to earlier versions of a similar story. In this way, 
Oedipus is indeed rewritten as ‘an inherited script of early longings, and later 
prohibitions and forgettings. It refers to desires, not deeds, and it is neither 
fulfilled nor resisted’.47 
Hence, it is apt that within the narrative of Berg itself the gap between 
inaction and action is exaggerated and parodied by several instances of part-
repetition and deferral. There are three substitutions for Nathaniel’s death: Berty 
the budgie – ‘damn you, you know what you’ve done, killed the only thing I 
loved’ (63) – the ventriloquist’s dummy, and the dead ‘evil-smelling scar-faced 
bum’ (140) who Berg identifies as his father to the police: ‘Yes there’s certainly 
a scar where you said sir’ (163). The most drawn out and absurd of these 
substitutes is the ventriloquist’s dummy, which enables a bizarre kind of 
rehearsal or ‘acting out’ of the failed parricidal act. Nathaniel is excessively 
attached to the dummy: it wears one of his best suits and is one half of his 
double-act; it is a puppet that speaks with his voice and moves with his body. At 
the end of a frenzied and chaotic, drunken night, Berg ‘mistakes’ the dummy for 
‘the old man once more draped over the banisters’ (73-74) and resolves that 
‘this time once in his room definitely this time it would be accomplished’ (74), 
because he knows that ‘if I don’t do it now I never will’ (72). So, he strangles it: 
‘Accomplished. There he is down there, beside the bed, rolled up in the rug’ 
(75).  
At last, then, ‘action has supplanted idea and imagery’ (75-76) and Berg 
decides to leave. He gathers his things together, carrying the ‘body’ rolled up in 
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a rug under one arm, and brushing doubts aside: ‘Strange how light the body 
was, considering – well considering the old man hadn’t been just skin and 
bones’ (82). His exit is blocked by a Judith keen to flirt, and a carrier bag 
containing Berg’s ‘business materials’ – mainly hair tonic bottles – breaks. They 
slide together, sticky with the mucus-like tonic and Judith takes this delay as an 
opportunity to stick her tongue in Berg’s ear, to bite his neck and lick his fingers, 
squirming above him in grotesque sexual simulation. 48  With comic timing, 
Berg’s attempt to wriggle away sends Judith falling across the ‘body’: ‘Soon he 
heard her hushed voice, that child’s tone, intimidated, yet trustful, that twisted 
something deep inside him… ‘What’s in it Aly, it feels like a body, it isn’t, I mean 
you haven’t—Aly what’s under that ghastly eiderdown?’’ (86). Both are sexually 
disturbed, turned-on even, by the thought that Berg has killed Nathaniel. 
Judith’s conclusion that Berg has acted out of love, lust and jealousy renders 
him a hero in her eyes. However, again Berg is only the ‘chosen hero’ of this 
‘Greek play’ in so far as the audience appreciates the dramatic irony of knowing 
(or guessing at least) what the body really is.  
A shambling uncertainty in terms of what is known or not known about 
Berg’s ‘so-called action’ (75) continues the drama. Doubt as to the identity of 
the ‘body’ is further sent-up when Judith says, ‘Oh dear I nearly trod on it, I 
mean him’ (89) and the person in the left-luggage office, ‘cor it’s mighty heavy… 
What’s rolled up in it eh – a body?’ (101). This humour feels increasingly over 
determined and in quotation marks. It is nudge-nudged wink-winked to breaking 
point: to Judith ‘it’s all a myth’ (88), as the narrative declares itself a fiction (in 
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 The proximity of the (here supposed) death of a father with a love affair with a tenacious and 
sexually frenzied woman, where the couple later shack up in a sordid bedsit (as Berg and Judith 
do), calls to mind – though this could not have been intended by Quin as it was still yet to be 
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both senses) – ‘the old man had never been a flesh and blood character really’ 
(97). In a pantomime, the audience could shout ‘it’s not Nathaniel, it’s the 
dummy, have a look’, but here Berg’s (seemingly deliberate) failure to confirm 
his act generates both amusement and frustration. Further, even once he does 
admit the body is the dummy and not his father, and has retrieved it from the 
railway station, part of him cannot escape a need for it to be Nathaniel: ‘I’m still 
thinking, acting in terms of a dead body, yes, going on as though it had been 
something real’ (151). In this way the dummy haunts the narrative as a 
continual reminder of Berg’s failure at parricide, a futile symbol of his 
misrecognised intentions. 
The absurd comedy and futility of Berg’s procrastination is further 
exacerbated by the narrative’s nauseous disgust.49 This is confirmed in the 
tenor of Berg’s interaction with other people. He is faced with a concurrent 
desire for and sense of severance from the material, human world, which leaves 
him queasy: ‘I have complied up to a point, but there’s always been the 
contempt, the nausea, though hardly recognised as such at the beginning’ (39). 
Here, not only is the protagonist a ‘Pirandello hero’ struggling with the absurd 
pointlessness of his existence, he also feels contempt at the pressure to comply 
with the social world. In this, it is significant that (again) Judith is the site of the 
greatest repulsion as well as the greatest intimacy: ‘If she [Judith] now speaks 
the nausea will rise’ (144). This nausea is intimately bound up with ‘an acute 
attack of boredom, the futility of everything, especially the game of human 
relationships’ (144-145). Once the obsession with Judith’s sexual allure has 
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 Quin wrote: ‘Sartre said it all much better in NAUSEA – I mean the futility a man feels about 
his existence’ and ‘BERG turning out to be a comedy now’. Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 15th 
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begun to fade, their resultant domestic relationship provokes scorn: ‘Yes let’s 
have a proper meal, with a proper woman sitting opposite, with a proper plastic 
table cloth, a proper pink, with proper yellow cups and saucers, and a proper 
clock ticking over with the proper time’ (161). The repetition of ‘proper’ here 
bitterly ridicules domesticity, exposing the seeming reality of the detail and the 
everyday routine as a charade, a fiction. In turn, the unreality of this domestic 
‘trap’ creates a stultifying, sickening atmosphere from which Berg feels 
desperate to escape, a sense of claustrophobic futility which reverberates in 
Leonard and Ruth’s marriage in Three.50  
As with Antoine Roquentin in Sartre’s Nausea, Berg’s nausea comes from 
a sense of alienation from other people, as well as disgust at the material ‘fact’ 
of his own physical existence: ‘Berg scratched his wrists, four fingers that meant 
nothing to him in that moment’ (40). In this, he becomes acutely aware of the 
absurdity of his physical body: ‘every muscle straining forward, each finger 
tingled with blood; conscious even of the grey hairs, the dirt between toes, the 
wart near his navel, the mole under his left arm’ (31). By providing specific detail 
the description seems realistic; at the same time the grotesque absurdity of the 
overly-close focus – as with the gaping Judith – draws attention to its unreality. 
Thus Berg is alienated from his physical body precisely because he does not 
have one. It is an alienating nausea named when he looks in the mirror and 
notices: ‘with a slight nausea how yellow his teeth were’ (105). Indeed the mirror 
plays a key role:  
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 Quin speaks of her own sense of alienation from the ‘norms’ of: ‘certain societies, the sort of 
social spheres that I found myself in and suffered terribly, had nausea and vomiting,’ in 
conversation with Nell Dunn, Talking to Women, London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1965, 131. 
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He saw the reflection of his ashen face through the thick dust – 
animal fur – that softened the harsh contours (100). 
 
He caught sight of his reflection; Machiavellian to say the least, 
rather startling to see the surface revealing in fact so much of what 
he only partially felt. How macerated the cheeks were, fairly sunken 
in, making his eyes so huge, his neck mottled, stork-like (115).  
 
Such images are dehumanising. The startling ashen face with sunken-in and 
macerated cheeks; the protruding eyes; the mottled and bird-like neck; the 
animal fur adorning his face – all alienate Berg from himself and his humanity. 
They reveal not himself to himself, but a ‘Machiavellian’ reflection – as with the 
Pirandello and Greek heroes, Berg is again seen in terms of someone else. 
Although a mirror would appear to instantiate and confirm the myth of a 
coherent identity it in fact debunks this and instead dramatises the split between 
the ‘I’ and the ‘not I’.51 The ‘surface’ reveals ‘what he only partially felt’; its 
reflected mask contradicts Berg’s view of himself. As such, the image in the 
mirror is elusive and alienating, somehow removed from the seeing ‘I’.52 This 
split self proliferates the sense of fragmentation in the exaggerated and made 
strange detail elsewhere – in the disgust of the punishing Edith, for example. 
The disturbing unreality of the mirror, then, figures the wider sense of 
fragmentation, reflection, slippage and distortion found throughout the narrative. 
It also insists that Berg himself cannot validate or confirm his existence.  
 What Berg needs is to be perceived by another – this recalls the maxim 
‘to be is to be perceived’ where being seen confirms existence.53 Throughout, 
                                                 
51
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Berg requires a witness to delineate and confirm his presence, to shore-up the 
boundaries between his blurred edges and the material world. When left alone, 
his existence is under question: when others perceive him, ‘for them at least 
you exist, that you have done something which is having an absolute positive 
result, an instant response, from not only one person but three, possibly four’ 
(140). The necessity of this constant surveillance recalls Beckett’s Watt, for 
whom the ‘perception of another renders existence necessary and hence 
certain’.54 
The ultimate, necessary witness for Berg is his father (who in turn of 
course figures the reader). This witnessing frustrates a sense of time passing by 
refusing action and confirming the repetitive, cyclical structure of the narrative. 
Indeed, Berg concludes with Nathaniel’s watching presence: ‘Aly oh no, don’t 
not now, hush, listen, did you hear something? Aly there’s someone next door, I 
can hear them moving about….Aly love what are you staring at?’ (167). Both 
Berg and the audience know who this ‘someone’ is: ‘Funny thing is my new 
tenant now, the one who’s moving into the room you used to have, reminds me 
a little of Mr Berg [senior]’ (166-167). And so, at the book’s end, not only is 
Nathaniel still alive, but he is living and listening in the room next door, just as 
Berg used to. In one sense, Berg has replaced his father, he has literally ‘taken 
his place’, is living where he lived, ‘fucking’ who he fucked (and in the bed that 
he did it in). This slippage is foreshadowed by a distorted reflection where: ‘he 
fingered the receiver while squinting into the mirror. The close resemblance to 
the old man made him nearly drop the telephone’ (23). Thus Berg paradoxically 
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becomes Nathaniel while at the same time requiring his continuing presence as 
necessary witness. In this, at last as well as throughout, the linear progression 
implied by the oedipal drive (or traditional narrative structure) is replaced by a 
symbiotic and cyclical stasis, a failure to progress out of a situation at the same 
time as slight adjustments to it which render that continuation ever more painful 
and absurd.55 
Finally though, and in summary, this witnessing reminds us that Berg is 
about what and how we perceive when we are reading a literary text. More 
specifically, the book evidences and exemplifies the beginning of Quin’s 
insistence that the processes of reading and writing needed to change in order 
to respond to the world around them. This is evident in the ways in which Berg 
interrogates and rejects more traditional notions of literary form, structure and 
characterisation. Thus, my reading throughout this chapter has tracked how the 
book pits the oedipal frame against existential procrastination and uncertainty, 
to suggest that in this it tests out the possibilities of determinism and freewill 
within a narrative structure, precisely in order to contemplate how we might 
better figure subjectivity or agency. I have also proposed that the book further 
engages with questions about the possibility of an individual (or writer) shaping 
their own story by reanimating and playing with source texts rather than either 
denying or merely being derived from them. Furthermore, my analysis has 
begun to demonstrate and articulate the energy of Quin’s excessive, strange, 
disgusting, and alluring narrative detail to suggest that, when we pay close 
attention to it, what emerges is an ambivalent realism that is one of the key 
ways in which the writing disturbs notions of representation. And, most clearly 
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perhaps, both the performativity of the writing and the slippage identifiable in 
Berg across character, narration and description evidence just how, at this 
point, Quin is beginning to articulate and theorise her own reading effects.  
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Illumination 2 
 
Although it is a book haunted by a drowning, foreshadowing her own, final, 
journey into the sea, Quin began Three more than ten years earlier, while still 
living in her turret room at Lansdowne Road and working now as a secretary for 
the painter, Carel Weight, at the Royal College of Art.  
When London became too intense, she caught the train to Axminster, in 
retreat to the Burns’ Swain’s Lane cottage in Dorset, just in land from the coast 
at Charmouth. The cottage had no running water or electricity, but water was 
drawn from a well, there were oil lamps and a garden with an apple orchard. 
Here, she fantasised a Mellors in every farm labourer, walked for miles along 
the coast, holidayed with her then lover Henry Williamson,1 and spent time with 
Alan and Carol Burns reading Ezra Pound and talking. However, this friendship 
was not without the tensions perhaps inevitable between a needy young woman 
and a married couple. It is revealing that the book was originally to be dedicated 
to the Burns, but that they refused.2 Carol Burns explains it like this: 
 
I was chatting to Alan today about the time Ann and I rode horses 
along our lane. He said we were riding bareback, but this was not the 
case. I saw Ann's horse galloping ahead of mine with her saddle 
slipping sideways. As I tried to slow her down and catch her bridle, I 
fell off my horse and got mild concussion. In Ann's book, Three, she 
says the woman who fell only looked up when her husband arrived 
and she needed attention.  
 
Given the fact we started off in great form passing Alan at our wicker 
gate calling 'Tally ho!' to him, the day was a disaster. In the evening, 
Alan and Ann sat on either side of my bed tucking into a roast 
chicken while I had a beating headache and wanted to vomit!  
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 Instead, when published in 1966 it was ‘for Bobbie and Bob [Creeley]’. 
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This was one of many reasons why we didn't want Three to be 
dedicated to us.3 
 
Quin’s role as third to several of her married friends’ twos – also including 
Robert and Diane Sward, and Bob and Bobbie Creeley, for example – 
evidences an ambivalent desire to access and open up the perceived intimacy 
of two. As Sward wrote to me: ‘You ask “What role do you think sexual fantasy 
played in her writing?” Three, that’s it. Three. Three. Three’.4  
           But, Quin’s longing for intimacy was in tension with a simultaneous fear 
of being trapped by domesticity. When talking with Nell Dunn in 1965, she says: 
‘I would hate to think that they expected me to have a meal there every time 
they wanted’.5 Yes, a something stable and comforting was alluring, but this 
would, she assumed, inevitably become ordinary and compromised. Worse, a 
traditional domestic set-up could well interrupt writing: ‘I seek stillness, as that is 
the vital reservoir needed for creating, and only by living on my own am I able to 
achieve that’.6 Nevertheless, she knew that to share ‘one’s life can bring a 
whole area of experience. I’ve often thought what I really need is a wife’.7 This 
joke admits and ironises a continuing tension between the working (female) 
writer and traditional gender and marital roles, despite this supposedly being a 
time of greater gender parity.  
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Three, 1966: Role play in the shadow of death 
 
A man fell to his death from a sixth-floor window of Peskett House, 
an office-block in Sellway square today. 
He was a messenger employed by a soap manufacturing firm. 
 
Ruth startled from the newspaper by Leonard framed in the doorway. 
Against the white-washed wall. A wicker arm-chair opposite the 
Japanese table. Screen. Sliding doors. Rush matting. A mirror 
extended the window. Gardens. A bronzed cockerel faced the house. 
    What’s the latest then? Fellow thrown himself out of a window. 
Ghastly way to choose. But Leon hers wasn’t like that—I mean we 
can’t really be sure could so easily have been an accident the note 
just a melodramatic touch. No one can be blamed Ruth we must 
understand that least of all ourselves.1 
 
 
True to its collage form, Three begins with the fragment of a newspaper report 
about an unnamed ‘man [who] fell to his death from a sixth-floor window’.2 The 
fragment itself seems alternately shocking – ‘fell to his death’ – and absurd – 
‘employed by a soap manufacturing firm’, a mixture of specific and incongruous 
detail. This is juxtaposed by a narrative giving precise and vivid but isolated 
physical details of the domestic space that the book’s protagonists Ruth and 
Leonard are in, before it slips – without speech markers, qualifiers or much 
punctuation – into their interpretation of the man’s death as suicide: ‘Fellow 
thrown himself out of a window. Ghastly way to choose’.  
From discussion of this death, conversation moves on to ‘hers’ which 
‘wasn’t like that’. This other death, of an unnamed woman who nevertheless 
seems significant due to the intimacy implied by the non-specific pronoun, also 
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‘could so easily have been an accident’. Yet the fact of the note and the anxiety 
about blame very much implies it was not. From the start then, we are reminded 
that uncertainty and death inhabit the world outside the narrative as well as 
within.3 Further, the absence of commas in the phrase ‘we must understand that 
least of all ourselves’ momentarily interrupts comprehension as to whether it is 
the blame that can be attributed to them least of all, or the understanding. 
Uncertainty and death, then, are the destabilising core of this text, primarily 
coinciding in the problem of interpretation: ‘I mean we can’t really be sure’.  
More specifically, throughout the book, Ruth and Leonard’s conversation 
and action is haunted by the desire to interpret this particular death: the 
mysterious death of the book’s third protagonist, a character only ever referred 
to as ‘she’ or ‘S’. Whereas Berg continually returns to a fantasised but never 
carried out parricide, in this book the death has always already happened. 
Three ‘begins’ when S is dead and ‘ends’ when she is approaching death. The 
focus of the narrative as a whole, as with the opening lines cited above, moves 
between evocative and specific detail of the material world and various modes 
of reflection on S’s life and death. This establishes the pattern of a continual 
return to S throughout the book as well as on this opening page, which 
continues: 
 
He shuffled a few shells, pebbles, covered his ears with two. Used to 
wonder whether it was really the sound of the sea. I knew it never 
could be. Ever practical Ruthey. We should have gone with her Leon. 
She liked rowing out on her own. You went with her sometimes. Only 
once or twice then felt I intruded. But didn’t she ask you to go the 
evening before? We had shopping to do. And it was stormy in the 
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references to the ‘news’ include reports of famine, a tidal wave, the trial of a concentration 
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morning even she remarked how the clouds were low-lying 
mountains couldn’t be seen either (1). 
 
Here, Leonard attempts to shut out – he literally covers his ears up with the 
shells – their worrying about S with a whimsical reference to a childhood idea – 
‘Used to wonder whether it was really the sound of the sea’. This is dismissed 
by the ‘Ever practical’ Ruth who interrupts and deflates the fantasy to bring him 
back to discussing feelings of guilt and regret about S: ‘We should have gone 
with her’. Not only is the lack of speech distinguishers reminiscent of similar 
indeterminacy in Berg, but here it is specifically the conversation of a married 
couple that is written without distinction or space. This creates a sense of 
symbiosis at the same time as claustrophobia. Each utterance follows so 
closely at the heels of another that it implies an interaction shaped by 
interruption or attack, and also one in which things are unclear and need 
working out. This echoes the reading experience, which is disorientated: the 
momentum that lack of speech convention and run-on lines create, together 
with the continual return to worrying at the same event, dramatises the sense in 
which reading must inversely slow, circle and repeat for proper interpretation to 
happen.  
This focus on S establishes the pattern of the book as a whole. In 
particular, this third character emerges as a necessary part of the dynamic of 
the married two: together and alone, Leonard and Ruth are obsessed with S. 
She plays a crucial role in their marriage, and the mystery of her absence offers 
an opportunity for a uniting of the two that the third-ness of her presence never 
could. This happens in their conversations, which continually return to defend 
against blame: ‘We should have gone with her Leon. She liked rowing out on 
	

her own’ and ‘No-one can be blamed’. Here, imagined accusation about their 
role in S’s death poses a necessary symbolic threat against which they come 
together. In this, despite ambiguity surrounding whether she and Leonard had 
sex or not and the resulting anxiety felt by Ruth, S’s role as absent transgressor 
of their married two-ness in fact operates to glue their relationship together.4 
Indeed, S is the figure that shadows, the mystery that designs, the narrative as 
a whole. Throughout, the central preoccupations of the book – the threat of 
trespass; the death drive; the imprecision and resistance to interpretation, and 
the intangibility of the past – are focalised in the continual return to S. 
 
It is fitting, then, that to read Three is itself to perform a kind of trespass: to read 
and transgress upon other people’s diaries, to ‘listen’ to tape recordings and 
watch home-movies. This is reflected in the overlapping collage of different 
narrative forms. 5  Here, confused reminiscence is juxtaposed with intensely 
detailed experience; third-person narrative with journal entries and the free 
‘poetry’ of the aural transcript.6 The resulting combination of poetry, prose and 
lists, with third and first-person narration, are examples of a literary 
experimentation which moves this book beyond Berg. In many ways here the 
plot is simpler, but the energy of the writing resides in modes more consciously 
‘experimental’. While the present-absent voice of the third-person narrator, as 
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an absent transgressor, is directly dramatised by the similarly present-absence 
of Edith and S, in Three, the question of voice and perspective is highlighted by 
the intercutting of distinctly different narrative perspectives; in each of the three 
protagonists’ journals as well as a third (or rather fourth) person voice.  
The journal sections themselves consist of small excerpts from Leonard’s 
diary – in the form of a minimalist record of ‘facts’ – and a page or so of Ruth’s 
anxious prose, as well as large sections of S’s written and aural journals 
(listened to on tape). Not only are these various narrative forms knit together by 
their circling around the complexities of the three protagonists’ relationship as 
well as S’s supposed suicide, but the inclusion of S’s journals ensures that 
although absent from the narrative, her voice, and in this her presence, 
dominates.7 It is her voice and forms of expression, not Leonard and Ruth’s, 
which prevail. It is also S’s journal transcripts that are the most explicitly 
experimental: 
 
Mountains                                                                                     
appear. Move forward. When one is static.                                   
Retreat when approached.                                                                
Fold of hills. Held by shadows. Dead seas. Fortresses                        
of stone triads.                                                                                  
Armies  
of cromlechs. Face east. Sounds of hooves. Marching feet. Through 
white flowers                           
swept 
one way. Stones into shee Water endlessly stretches. 
Gulls moan. Flap 
cry across. But silent near. Around. The house.                                                                                                                         
Turn up stones. 
Separate                                                                                                   
plants.                                                                                                     
Leaves.                                                                                                    
Branches. These stir. Rotate. Forests stride in the night. Neglected 
orchards. Where blossom deceives. 
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 Again, this is an extended version of the way that Edith is able to dominate in Berg through 
her letters and influence, despite being bodily absent. 
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A composite of silhouettes in a yellow field (24). 
 
 
Here, line breaks juxtapose and separate ideas or images. But, rather than 
being motivated by poetic construction – patterns of metre, rhyme or sense – 
the breaks indicate moments of silence between the sounds Leonard and Ruth 
hear.8 Furthermore, registering the absence of sound with visual space on the 
page serves to presence S’s acoustic voice as well as the lacunae between her 
speaking. The effect of these pre- or inter-linguistic pauses calls to mind Natalie 
Sarraute’s description of pre-linguistic movements of thought as ‘sub-
conversation’.9 These half-formed thoughts and feelings can only be conveyed 
to the reader impressionistically, through unusual or repeated word pattern and 
image, or by focus on the sound and rhythm in and between words. Similarly, 
S’s impressionistic aural journals seem to have a free associative, pre-articulate 
momentum. In this, sensory impressions are recorded without communicating a 
recognisably inner self so much as mimicking spontaneous and improvised 
speech.  
                                                 
8
 The performative nature of this form calls to mind Quin’s admiration of the Black Mountain 
Poets, who sought to create poetic forms able to communicate direct experience and perception 
as closely as possible. In particular, she refers to Charles Olson and Robert Creeley, who edited 
the Black Mountain Poetry Review. Quin met Creeley in 1964 at a Calder event, and they 
remained life-long friends. Andrew Hassam claims that it is precisely Quin’s use of the diary 
form which evidences a broader ‘North American influence on the younger British writers of 
the time’ in Writing and Reality: A Study of Modern British Diary Fiction, London and 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993, 5. 
9
 Sarraute discusses these ‘numerous, entangled movements that have come up from the depths’ 
in ‘Conversation and Sub-conversation’, The Age of Suspicion, (Trans.) Maria Jolas. New York: 
George Braziller, Inc., 1963, 116. Her discussion is particularly relevant for thinking about the 
aural journal here because she discusses speech rather than writing. Quin read Sarraute in the 
early sixties. She said, of Portrait of a Man Unknown, ‘without being too profane it reminded 
me a little of my own work’. Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, undated letter, 1961. 
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This method not only perhaps calls to mind the ‘surrealism of 
contemporary reality’, as Hassam suggests, 10  it is also reminiscent of the 
automatic writing process of the Surrealists themselves, believed to convey the 
‘real’ processes of thought and thereby convey something closer to experience 
than reasoned and consciously shaped literature. Like automatic writing, in S’s 
aural journal ideas ‘[cut] into a flow of associations almost arbitrarily’ – for 
example blossom deceives – and this creates ‘displacements and metonymies 
which disembody the human and throw familiar objects into ominously 
unfamiliar perspectives’.11 Sensory impressions are made strange: they shift 
and metamorphosise – mountains move, forests stride – they are verbally 
photographed and rendered static – the sea is dead, stones become shee  
However, while the supposed ‘free’ association here recalls qualities of 
automatic writing, the simultaneous insistence on vocalisation maintains that 
these ideas are also ones articulated and ‘performed’ by the spoken word. The 
fictional journal here is as an aural piece that is always, albeit in a fractured and 
transitory form, a constructed verbal performance. Both description – ‘white 
flowers/swept/one way’ – and instruction – ‘bend closer’ – above demand the 
mind’s eye of an audience. The definite momentum of the writing here directs 
the reading eye to stir, rotate and separate leaves and branches, to discover 
what is behind or beyond the seemingly static image. Thus the conscious 
performance of this aural journal, which presences the speaking character and 
her audience, seems in tension with the apparent freedom of its form, as an 
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 Hassam claims that in the writing of, for example, Quin and Eva Figes: ‘the diaries 
[represented] the surrealism of contemporary reality’ – in this way he also draws our attention to 
the journal form as one pretending to represent reality, Writing and Reality, 5. 
11
 Peter Nicholls, ‘Surrealism in England’, Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls (Eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Twentieth Century English Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, 400-401. 
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overly self-conscious, and therefore unconvincing, narrative interruption. In this 
the disruption of the graphic surface draws attention to the device as device. 
Yet arguably here the writing also in fact ‘operates mimetically’ in that the 
mannered style of this fragmented self-performance is perhaps precisely the 
point.12 In this, S’s aural journal can be seen to exemplify notions of role-play 
and performance that are central to both the form and content of Three.  
 
 
Elongated shadows of Marienbad  
 
Went to see Bergman’s latest THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY – 
affected me like hell – felt like death when walking out; incest and 
ALL THAT BUT beautifully photographed and acted; very 
Ibsenesque – sins of the father etc., family searching for life/God in 
each other, through each other, and the twilight or pale sunlight of 
the Swedish landscape penetrating in its indifference: ‘God came and 
dropped down like a spider’; [I] like the way Bergman uses the 
mythical to get across the anguish of the present day, tho’ at times 
the symbolism is over-done the spilling of milk followed by a cut 
finger – the ending a bit melodramatic. Worth seeing if you ever have 
the chance’.13 
 
 
 
One example of this performativity is the way in which the narrative figures and 
engages with European cinema, particularly Last Year in Marienbad (1961). As 
Sylvia Bruce rightly points out: ‘with deliberation designed, Three, when viewed 
from the appropriate distance, resolves itself into a model of tautness and 
precision (sculptural, yet also cinematic)’.14 And, as the letter above – among 
many others – evidences, Quin was an enthusiastic viewer and analyst of 
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 Glyn White discusses a similar effect in B.S. Johnson’s Albert Angelo, Reading the Graphic 
Surface: The Presence of the Book in Prose Fiction, Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2005, 97.  
13
 Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, November 1962. 
14
 Sylvia Bruce’s piece on Three, unpublished manuscript, Carol Burns Papers, 1. 
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European art house cinema, and particularly impressed by directors such as 
Ingmar Bergman.15 As the following reading demonstrates, the techniques of 
this cinema – and in particular its ability to render scenery ‘penetrating in its 
indifference’ – do indeed influence and shadow Three, which compellingly 
mimics them in written narrative not only with the styles and stances of its 
cinematography, mis-en-scene and precisely directed performance, but also 
with questions of time, repetition, movement, sound and silence.  
As Andras Balint Kovacs identifies in his discussion of such cinema, at this 
time there was a particularly ‘sharp opposition between art cinema and 
entertainment cinema’. 16  For many viewers, the aspiration to art – as ‘the 
cultural Imaginary of the middle-class’ – too often ‘involved an internal 
distancing from the popular which was complex and often contradictory in its 
effects’.17 For Quin these complex and contradictory effects were precisely what 
appealed. In the letter above, her response is keenly aware of the strange and 
distancing – but to her pertinent – role played by form, structure and symbolism, 
for example her admiration of ‘the way Bergman uses the mythical to get across 
the anguish of the present day’. Through a Glass Darkly (1961) uses the 
romantic symbol of a shipwreck to represent fear, illness and loneliness. In 
Three, however, residual mythical tropes – evident in the romantic associations 
of the fortresses of stone triads and armies of cromlechs in the extract above – 
are overshadowed by the influences of art house film’s growing interest in 
representing non-linear time, and in eliding the distinction between what is in 
and outside a character’s mind. In the latter, the interior becomes exterior and 
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 She names him a key influence to Alan Burns, as I mention above. 
16
 Andras Balint Kovacs, Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema, 1950-1980, Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007, 115. 
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 Stallybrass and White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, 193. 
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the imaginary overlays the real to create a world changed and shaped by 
narrative perspective, a preoccupation evident in the imaginary landscapes of 
Berg. In this – to make a crucial distinction – Quin’s writing does not only 
appropriate late modern cinema’s techniques, but engages with and performs 
its ideas: the blurring of boundaries between fantasy and the real; the elision of 
past-present-future; a sense of inescapable role-play.  
More specifically, Three recalls Last Year in Marienbad, written by Alain 
Robbe-Grillet and directed by Alain Resnais. Quin makes several references to 
the film in letters to Carol Burns, and dismisses François Truffaut’s Jules et Jim 
(1962) (again, as she acknowledges, a narrative of three) as merely ‘a slight skit 
on Marienbad’.18 Marienbad is on the one hand the result of Robbe-Grillet’s 
nouveau roman obsession with close detail stripped of temporality, and on the 
other of Resnais’ new wave – ‘la nouvelle vague’ – continuum between the real 
and imaginary. 19  Three too is compiled of a juxtaposition of the confused 
momentum of often isolated and overly-close details with a real-imaginary 
continuum, as is Berg. Quin herself put it about the film: ‘a photo holds the 
image, is static, and therefore imprints itself more firmly by not having side-
effects, or the infringement of past and future, isn’t this was [sic] Last Year at 
Marienbad tried to bring off?’ 20  Not only does this identify a sense of 
impenetrability or internal distancing, it also makes a specific connection 
between the stasis of photographs and atemporality. In the film, performance is 
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 Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 26th May 1962. (Hereafter, for brevity, I will refer to it as 
Marienbad.) The film is also named as a key influence – ‘wouldn’t you know it ‘Last Year at 
Marienbad’’ – in Hall, ‘The Mighty Quin’. In her letters Quin variously refers to it by its U.K. 
title Last Year in Marienbad and U.S. title Last Year at Marienbad. 
19
 For further and highly detailed discussion of this particular split refer to Deleuze, ‘Peaks of 
Present and Sheets of Past: fourth commentary on Bergson’, in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 
(Trans.) Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: The Althone Press, 1985, 98-125. 
20
 Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 28th September 1962.  
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so slowed and stylised that it becomes fetishised: in the book, the language 
itself photographs, plays out and performs, rather than describes, scenes and 
selves. In both, mimesis is excluded in favour of performance and conversation 
is staged: both narratives are told through highly ambiguous flashbacks or 
versions of events, and disorientating shifts of time and location which serve to 
complicate rather than elucidate.  
This sense, not only of more than one competing ‘reality’, but of a further 
several ways of representing them, is compellingly evoked in the book by the 
plurality of narrative and journal forms. The journals not only present divergent 
realities because of a difference in character perspective, but the very range of 
forms they are presented in adds to our confusion and prohibits the creation of 
a coherent or master narrative of events. 21  Indeed, in both Three and 
Marienbad each character’s version of events is different and irresolvable. This 
resists our being able to establish which of the versions corresponds most 
closely with ‘actual’ events: thus, the competing imaginaries and voices 
complicate rather than elucidate. While the perspectives at times overlap and 
therefore seem to corroborate, they more often than not widely diverge to 
compete for our credulity. What is achieved is an almost phenomenological 
faithfulness to the different subjective experiences of the characters as 
individuals, which fragments, rather than coheres, the overall narrative. Both 
book and film remain necessarily polyphonic so that ‘the factual status of the 
past event is made uncertain in them and is subject to mental manipulation by 
the characters’: there is a sense in which ‘even the “past” and the “trauma” are 
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 A more thorough examination of the dispersive and disruptive effects and effectiveness of the 
various journal forms of Three can be found in Hassam’s Writing and Reality, 132-137, where 
he draws on comparisons with Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962), which Quin had 
read by this time. In particular, Hassam reminds us that written journals always foreground the 
construction and writtenness of the writing. 
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created by the mere textual process of the narrative’.22 In Three, the central 
traumatic event is S’s supposed suicide. However, the fluctuating narrative 
modes and disordered chronology mean that the status of this event becomes 
less and less clear as the narrative progresses: initially termed suicide, it is later 
possibly accident or murder, and even Leonard is implicated. Yet resolution is 
not possible because the narrative hinges on the continuation of ambiguity: it is 
specifically the unresolved nature of the trauma that binds the narrative, as it 
does Leonard and Ruth, together.  
The influence of Marienbad is particularly visible in the narrative’s strange 
momentum and uncanny characterisation. Here, the focus on detail slows 
perception in a splicing of movement, to the point where, as in Zeno’s paradox, 
there seems to be no progression at all.23 Similarly, in the third-person narrative 
sections – as with the party or group scenes in the film – the domestic scenes 
between Leonard and Ruth are strangely still and unreal. This is contrasted and 
made more noticeable by the interruptions of erratic acceleration. Often, a slow 
and dreamy scene setting – ‘Each held a corner of the room, cigarette smoke 
formed a screen between them’ – is interrupted by mania: 
 
They brought their chairs together when the television programmes 
started. She commented on women announcers’ clothes. He shifted 
around into more uncomfortable positions, hugged his knees, burst 
into sudden loud laughter. She knitted faster, dropped several 
stitches. There look what you’ve made me do I don’t see anything 
very funny in that. For a time he froze into one position, the flash of 
television and candles darted over him (50). 
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 Kovacs, Screening Modernism, 105-106. 
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 This splicing effect of Robbe-Grillet’s is clearly evident in the film, as well as in his book 
Jealousy (1957), which Quin had read. 
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As is dramatised here, the composition of such scenes is strange and unsettling. 
The dead-pan and undifferentiated – ‘they brought’ ‘she commented’ ‘he shifted’ 
‘she knitted’ etc. – list-like narration renders the characters’ actions mechanical 
and almost meaningless. In this they are dehumanised: still lives frozen and 
devoid of life one minute, barking out meaningless sound the next. The action in 
the scene – Leonard’s shifting into uncomfortable positions and Ruth’s 
accelerated knitting – is jerky, their ‘noise’ – his ‘sudden loud laughter’, her 
bitchy commentary – frenetic. Here, specifically with the knitting, where Ruth 
speeds up and drops several stitches, the form, textuality and crafting of the 
writing process, as well as the slippery knottiness of the reading and interpreting 
experience, is dramatised.24 Reduced to caricatures or automata like the guests 
in Marienbad, it is impossible to forget that Leonard and Ruth are unreal.25 Thus, 
both the knitting and automata write the constructedness of the narrative large. 
At the same time, the puppet-like figures contain enough of the real to evoke – 
aptly, given the automata here – an unsettling sense of the Heimlich and 
Unheimlich of the uncanny.26  
This uncanniness is enhanced by the statues in the garden: ‘Those 
ghastly statues of your father’s too disembodied pieces of bronze stone and bits 
scraps of metal you tried making into flesh and blood participators or audience 
of your little charades frankly grotesque Leon quite quite horrible ugh’ (7). In this 
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 I discuss knitting as a metaphor for the writing process at greater length in my chapter on The 
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particular Olympia, the automaton. ‘The Uncanny’, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
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there is a suggestion that the line between ‘disembodied pieces of bronze stone 
and bits’ and ‘flesh and blood participators’, between the manufactured and 
organic, is blurred. In a further move foregrounding the constructedness of the 
writing, the metamorphosis this implies – from lifeless to alive – is also a magic, 
an illusion that narrative itself performs. But here illusion is resisted: Leonard’s 
act of magical transformation fails, and even the statues’ position as audience 
serves to remind the reader that all that takes place in the narrative is ‘staged’, 
performed and watched. 
Similarly, one of the most memorable things about Marienbad is the 
visually striking garden of its stately home. This garden, which also contains 
several classical statues, is of a geometric design which has a cubist effect, 
leading on and splicing up our gaze into unfamiliar segments. This setting, filled 
with familiar things, becomes unfamiliar, made strange. Similarly in Three, 
Leonard and Ruth’s country retreat, ‘the Grey House’ belonging to his father, 
has a garden where ‘The shadows of statues on the lawns stretched to the cliff 
edge’ (3); ‘statues gleamed, elongated shadows across the grass’ (16).27 Quin 
consciously and carefully – the clue is in the repetition of ‘shadows’ which again 
foregrounds the reading process – directs our gaze. These statues cast long, 
distorted shadows, dramatising both our reading and the structures of the 
writing itself: it has a similar effect to ‘A mirror extended the window. Gardens’ 
(1, cited above), which leads the reading eye to the outer edges and almost 
beyond the frame of the page itself. As representatives of formality, both in 
terms of being constructed forms and of the authority of the past, these statues 
are shifting and incomplete, ‘broken, unbroken, unfinished’ (4).  
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 The insistent presence of shadows here, and their role in splicing the readerly gaze, is also 
reminiscent of the way shadows function in Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy. 
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Further, and in line with the distorting and eye-tracking effects of 
‘elongated shadows’ – a phrase we also find in Berg’s visionary experience on 
the beach – the statues in Three are often odd or perverse: ‘Hallucination 
Aphrodite Father’s favourite. Certainly not mine so grotesque didn’t even have a 
head I mean was it a man or a woman that thing sticking out of what looked like 
breasts?’ (9). Here again we find a parallel with Berg, as the interpretive 
potency of mythology is juxtaposed with the surreal and sexual – the 
‘Hallucination Aphrodite’ has a ‘thing sticking out of what looked like breasts’. 
Thus, rather than acting as an anchor of familiarity, these ‘classical’ statues 
represent something of the distorting effects of memory: their apparently familiar 
structures are in fact an illusion. In addition, the Hallucination Aphrodite is an 
irreverent transgression of lewd and classical. This statue, which represents the 
elevated individual held up on a plinth ‘above’ us – to retroflect us to the heroic 
past as we gaze up at it – is inverted as a grotesque, mobile, split, multiple self. 
In the garden of ‘the Grey House’, among the statues, there is an empty 
swimming pool. This space provides Leonard, Ruth and S with a theatre in 
which to perform. In her written journal, S records: ‘At my suggestion L made a 
platform, with steps leading from either side, in the empty swimming pool. We 
both write little scenarios which R half-heartedly joins in’ (66). On this ‘stage’ 
then, the three of them enacted dramas, usually in mime form, wearing masks 
and costumes to conceal their identities. S comments: ‘My favourite one with 
masks is just the three of us, two reject one, or one rejects two, or all three 
reject each other, or equally accept’ (66). This dramatisation of the emotional 
complications of the three-way relationship in the form of a ‘dumb show’ recalls 
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the role of the play within the play. 28  With this, the book again recalls 
Marienbad. The film opens with the performance of an overacted and 
overdressed, simplified melodrama, which provides a seeming interpretative 
framework or allegory for the more complex ideas in the film as a whole. In 
Three, the several scenarios played out on the stage provide a similar 
engagement with, and in the end critique of, the dumb show as a useful 
interpretative framework.   
           A further, fruitful parallel between the two texts is that both have three 
protagonists caught up in a supposed love triangle. As with S (indeed also with 
Leonard and Ruth when referred to in the journals), characters in the film are 
known by letter rather than name.29  In this way they are anonymised and 
always unreal or symbolic, like algebraic letters. In the film, a man, X, 
approaches a woman, A, claiming they met the year before at Marienbad, and 
that she is waiting there for him. A second man, M, who may or may not be the 
woman's husband, repeatedly asserts his dominance over the first man by 
beating him several times in a game. The repetition of the game seems to 
represent each man’s desire to win, but in fact figures a desire to keep on 
playing.30 In Three the on-going play for dominance and possession between 
the characters is also represented as at least a performance, if not also a game: 
‘A walks past B and C. A might turn. Stop. Shrug. Walk on. B and C watch. 
Perhaps follow A. Or separate. Possibly disappear together. Variations endless’ 
(21). This mime-show clearly represents possible moves in the relationship 
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 This recalls a similar use of dramatic technique – the presence of tropes and tricks of mistaken 
identity and bed trick comedy – in Berg. 
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 Robbe-Grillet’s Jealousy employs a similar technique with the character known as ‘A…’ 
30
 Again, this is reminiscent of Berg, specifically Alistair and Nathaniel Berg’s perpetuation of 
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between Leonard, Ruth and S, but it also insists on characterisation as being 
both a reading and a performance. In this the characters are: ‘Interpreters in 
isolation. Chameleons in company’ (21).31 
This is evident in the self-consciousness of the characters’ seeming 
rejection of but actual compliance with role-play:  
 
She certainly had talent for those mime plays for instance. Oh those I 
must say I never had much time for them. You joined in readily 
enough Ruth. What could I do remain passive outsider to all your 
games then? You seemed to enjoy them rather I thought. Well – well 
I’d hardly thought you were aware whether I did or not. They looked 
at each other, quickly away, at their drinks (6). 
 
Here, Ruth seems to criticise and reject participation in role-play but in another 
way she implicitly conforms to her role perfectly. During this kind of debate, 
Leonard and Ruth must remain ‘in role’. To do otherwise would be to expose 
the reduction of their married life from genuine interaction into mere function. 
‘Playful husband’ and ‘disapproving wife’ then, provide stereotypes of an 
unhappily matched couple for the narrative to expose and interrogate.32 So, if 
Leonard enjoys the mime, Ruth must disapprove: these are the positions that 
their ‘good-cop, bad-cop’ relationship insists on. For Leonard and S, 
participation in the games is both alluring and effortless: ‘if others are willing to 
play along, it becomes comparatively simple’ (61); these are ‘Games that would 
be difficult not to join in’ (135). Indeed, both the repeated mime plays and 
conforming to type that take place in Three suggest that the notion of choice is 
largely illusory. As S recognises, the role-play is in fact ceaseless: ‘R plays a 
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Berne, Games People Play, London: Penguin Books, 1964; see ‘Marital Games’, 80-95. He 
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role when he is with us. Except I wonder if it is not a certain role she plays with 
me, when we are on our own’ (142). The characters perform, they ‘play out’ 
selves, and these roles are as deliberate – ‘I hang over many desultory designs, 
toy with subterfuges’ (56) – as they are necessary. Here, role-play is not only a 
form redolent with theatrical technique: both the implied psychological fragility of 
the characters, and the fictional form of the narrative itself, require its on-going 
presence.  
 
 
Ménage à trois 
 
Quin showed herself to be admirably alive to the elusiveness of what 
happens between people, to what is lost in conversation, and to the 
possibilities of the English language for suggesting these little 
communicative lacunae. Her best writing hoarded words as if they 
were pebbles washed smooth by huge seas of experience.33  
 
 
More potatoes darling? Don’t mind. Yes or no? She stood beside him, 
over him. He leaned back, twisted his neck. If there are some left 
thanks no no more that’s plenty. How can you watch that programme 
just don’t know I don’t think it’s funny one bit. He pronged a potato, 
held halfway, and laughed until his eyes watered. She looked at the 
cat, made noises, clicked, sucked, her nose wriggled. Make the 
coffee Leon. When this is over ohhhhhhhhh ahhhhhhhhhh oh that’s 
good (15). 
 
 
 
Many of the parallels between Marienbad and Three then – in terms, for 
example, of role-play and the interwoven narrative technique – come out of the 
desire to articulate and represent layers of interplay between three protagonists 
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without attempting to reduce these into a linear narrative structure. I would like 
now to consider this effect in more detail, by focussing on the various and 
conflicting representations of marriage, intimacy and sex. In particular, I will 
consider further a point touched upon in my introductory section on Three, and 
this is how the dense, often actually seemingly lacunae-less, third-person 
narrative form might communicate ‘the elusiveness of what happens between 
people’, specifically in terms of a ménage à trois in which S, a single and 
sexually imaginative young woman, both disturbs and shapes Ruth and 
Leonard’s marriage.  
           The form and nature of their interaction is key in this. As with their 
opening conversation, in the extract above it is not only the omission of speech 
distinguishers for talking, but also the general paucity of punctuation, which 
makes the distinction between thought and speech blurred. This enacts a 
continuum between the real and imaginary, as well as evoking sub-
conversation. In this, the narrative is able to reach behind, beyond, before, 
underneath what is said, and into inarticulate sound. This technique demands 
that the narrative be read more carefully, that it be listened to – just like S’s 
aural journal. Here, there is certainly no lack of insight or observation into how 
people actually interact because of a lack of speech markers. Leonard and 
Ruth’s power struggle is fittingly expressed in this haranguing, threatening, 
noisy and visceral conversation. The crowding of sounds – the pronging, 
clicking and sucking, the extended ‘ohhhhhhhhh ahhhhhhhhhh’ – communicate 
much more than what is said. And, while the third-person narrator pretends at 
neutrality with minimalist description – ‘She stood beside him’ ‘He leaned back’ 
– the qualification of ‘beside’ as ‘over’ changes a more innocent, friendly stance 
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into one that threatens, as Leonard’s neck is twisted round. The third-person 
narrator does not pretend to get inside the characters’ minds, but the focus and 
brevity of its descriptions nevertheless add to the dialogue to heighten the 
sense of conflict. The form of this voice’s reporting claims impartiality, but at the 
same time it represents marriage as an inevitable and inescapable assault on 
each person of its two, and here especially on Leonard.  
           In her diary, Ruth writes of the state of their relationship as an ultimate 
denial of positive intimacy, where there is no room for generosity or fun: 
 
At least everything here around us has substance gives security. A 
home we have built up together. But lately I have felt almost an 
intruder. Why? I look at myself and see what I might be like in five ten 
years time. Will things be any different from now? The toleration 
politeness that brings a basic relationship a certain smoothness in 
day to day living. But never laughter (124).  
 
 
Ruth’s depiction of their married situation is bleak. The passage, taken from the 
only, brief extract from her journal in the whole book, is typical of the despair 
she voices there: she also admits envy of S’s freedom. Here, the tone of 
resignation admits that the substance and security implied by the materials of 
house and home are illusory. The humourless ‘smoothness in day to day living’ 
remarks upon a surface with no substance behind it, and the toleration and 
politeness evoke unhappiness more clearly than any strongly negative terms 
could. This situation, despite her inevitable part in it, alienates Ruth and she 
feels ‘almost an intruder’. Rather than love or even empathy, Leonard and Ruth 
are bound by routine.  
For S too, as Leonard and Ruth realise: ‘there was a need in her for 
security yet at the same time she rebelled convent family everything 
contributed’ (117). S stages her so-called rebellion against marriage by belittling 
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it. She reduces their marriage to exactly the kind of routine identified above, to 
‘habits they parcel up/ hand to each other’ (102). Such observations confirm the 
general tenor of their habitual action and conversation, which accumulate to 
present a horrifying and stultifying domesticity in which they are trapped: ‘She 
picked the plates up, rattled them together, scraped the remains and put them 
down for the cat’ (15) and ‘Have you been tidying my desk Ruth? A bit 
someone’s got to tea’s getting cold do come and sit down and stop fluttering 
around honestly you’re like an old woman sometimes Leon’ (85). Leonard and 
Ruth’s lack of humour, genuine care or compassion is horrible, as are the 
endless and petty negotiations about whose turn it is to pour various beverages 
and the stilted mealtime conversations, which build to create a repetitive 
structure that allows no way out. This sort of claustrophobia is evident in a 
scene where they bathe together: 
 
There we are hot enough love? She nodded, stripped quickly, looked 
at herself in the large mirror above the bath. He splashed about, 
whistled, used sponge, back-scratcher, a large round yellow bar of 
soap. She knelt in the bath, adjusted her plastic flowered hat, arms 
slid down, hands slapped the water until it lapped over her belly. She 
wriggled about, explored herself with an oval bar of lilac soap (43). 
 
 
As with the descriptions of Edith and Judith in Berg, this close focus and 
superfluity of detail renders the bathing grotesque. Rather than creating a sense 
of positive closeness, it serves to deny intimacy. It is excessive and unable to, 
or more to the point, it is unconcerned with communicating reality. The 
magnification of sound in the splashing, whistling and slapping, the back-
scratcher and plastic flowered hat seem like the sound effects and props of a 
performance. However, at the same time, the mundane setting and ordinary 
routine recalls, for example, James Joyce’s description of Leopold Bloom’s 
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morning routine in Ulysses, where the refusal of the allure of illusion similarly 
denies intimate acts intimacy by rejecting the comforts of mystique. Likewise, 
the bathing above communicates the inescapable proximity of married life, 
devoid of the mystique of lovers’ intimacy.  
Ideas about martial intimacy as claustrophobia are further problematised 
by the role and representation of sex. Isolated and insular, Leonard and Ruth 
lavish love and sensual caresses on things other than each other – he on his 
orchids: ‘he parted leaves. Thrust through. He poked about with his little finger. 
He murmured with pleasure, sometimes sighed’ (12), and she on her cat, Bobo: 
‘She looked at the cat, made noises, clicked, sucked, her nose wriggled’ (15). 
This displacement of affection onto plants and pet, recalls Judith and 
Nathaniel’s similar obsessions with cat and budgie in Berg. Across both texts 
the transferral of love away from the other of the relationship serves to 
exaggerate its dysfunction. Here, Leonard and Ruth seem incompatible in every 
way: sexually and intellectually, in taste and preference. Despite a willingness to 
explore herself with the lilac soap – and scenes where she ‘Touched herself […] 
licked a finger and rubbed a nipple’ (76) – Ruth repeatedly refuses Leonard’s 
sexual advances towards her, always attempting deferral: ‘Just tired so 
exhausted after everything’ (16); ‘don’t darling not now’ (51); ‘perhaps tomorrow 
– tomorrow darling’ (52).  
When they finally do have sex, it is horrible: ‘He twitched several times, 
then sank down. She lay motionless, tears ran into her mouth’ (79). There is 
nothing intimate about this. For both, sex has become something more 
reminiscent of death than vitality. This association is unpleasantly consolidated 
in Leonard’s later rape of Ruth: 
	

 
He pulled her dress up, slid the underwear apart, and went into her 
quickly, as she cried out, her arms above, hands clawed the wall. Her 
body sank into the bed, as he moved above her. Not like this oh God 
Leon not … He panted as he strove faster, deeper. You’re hurting oh 
Christ it’s hurting me don’t – no Leon are you mad? She tried 
bringing her legs together. His knees pressed them further apart, his 
hands planted either side of her arms. She dug her nails in until her 
fingers were covered in his blood. Going to fuck you fuck you fuck 
you until … She screamed out as he went deeper in. She tore at his 
hair, face. He paused, turned his head away, began again, moved 
faster, until her bare thighs, belly smacked against him, and the 
springs of the bed creaked. Her body limp, head alone moved, 
twisted, came up, sank back, her mouth open, but no scream came 
(127-128). 
 
This disturbing and violent scene is the ultimate acting out of the dialectic of 
antagonism that underpins their marriage. It both disrupts and magnifies the 
desire for transgression elsewhere in the narrative: ‘belly smacked’ echoes the 
‘hands [that] slapped the water until it lapped over her belly’ in the bath; 
‘screamed out’, followed by ‘no scream came’, recalls the inarticulate sounds at 
the mealtime above.34 These echoes integrate the violence and shock of this 
act with the fabric of Leonard and Ruth’s married lives. The rape provides relief, 
no matter how abhorrent, from the continuing sense of violent disappointment 
and longing between them. In this way, the transgression works to dissipate 
narrative tension. The resulting sense of relief, together with both the voyeurism 
of the witnessing and collusion in the elsewhere sympathetic portrayal of 
Leonard, works to figure the reading act as an implicated one. 
        Anyway, the narrative elsewhere implies, there is something sexy about 
forceful intercourse and violent language. When Leonard says ‘I want to fuck 
you’ (88), Ruth recoils in horror. S’s sexual fantasies, on the other hand, desire 
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violent titillation: ‘Pretend I’m tied to the bed… Whip me with your hair… his 
chest burnt with a cigarette… When will you fuck me next?’ (142). There is a 
distinction here between resigned sex and more active ‘fucking’. While her 
pretensions to gentility prevent Ruth from enjoying sex, in contrast S revels in 
performing filthy practices. This echoes the difference between Edith and Judith 
in Berg. Both Ruth and Edith are restrained, or at least dishonest, whereas S 
and Judith revel in a carnivalesque sexuality and baseness.35 For Ruth, the 
threshold of shame and embarrassment is low. She covers up trying on S’s 
clothes – ‘Picked up the clothes and pushed them into a cupboard’ (13) – 
because of the titillation this activity brings, and is dishonest about 
masturbation: ‘just got rather hot in the night’ (77). However, as Stallybrass and 
White remind us: ‘disgust always bears the imprint of desire. These low 
domains, apparently expelled as ‘Other’, return as the object of nostalgia, 
longing and fascination’.36  
In Three, S is the ultimate object of nostalgia, longing and fascination. She 
is the desired ‘Other’ for both the content and form of the narrative as a whole. 
Moreover, this desire for her transgresses ideas about disgust and gender: she 
is sexy to both Leonard and Ruth. Leonard voyeuristically watches her on film in 
an attempt at intimacy. He sits alone in the dark with his hand over his face after 
watching: ‘A girl, naked, emerged from the sea, hair over her face’, who ‘danced 
away to edge of the sea, where she flung towel and mask down, dived into a 
huge wave, bobbed up, hair and seaweed caught in spray’ (90). Although in fact 
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 This idea of the relationship between social status and disgust at sex can be developed by 
reference to Stallybrass and White’s discussion about the bourgeois rejection of the carnival in 
Chapter 5 of The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, 171-190. They point out that the 
carnival’s revelling in base activity results from a high threshold of shame and embarrassment.  
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 Stallybrass and White, 191. This inescapable connection between disgust and desire recalls 
Ahmed’s similar interpretation, which I discuss in relation to Edith and Judith above. 
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dead, here S is strikingly alive, as is Leonard’s desire for her. For Ruth, the 
attempt at closeness is figured by wearing her clothes and beads. In one scene 
Ruth ‘Undid her [S’s] dress, put a dozen necklaces on, some draped over her 
breasts. In front of the mirror she pulled her breasts up by holding several 
necklaces above her neck’ (12).  
The covert, sexualised tenor of this act is confirmed by evidence 
elsewhere – in Ruth’s masturbation after reading her diary, as well as the desire 
for intimacy when S was alive. S’s aural journal records that when in bed with a 
bad period Ruth pleaded: 
 
Do stay with me. An orange light 
interior of some exotic flower 
hovered 
over walls. Smell of heavy perfume 
Bodies. Hers. Only the shape moulded from the sheet. Will you 
brush my hair? 
Long 
Thick 
over shoulders (112).  
 
The desire for physical contact in this request for hair-brushing – itself a sensual 
and stimulating act – is embellished in the scene by the scent of heavy perfume, 
the interior of the exotic flower (which recalls Leonard’s fingering of the orchids), 
the dimmed light, and the body shape moulded on the sheet. These details 
imply a room fusty with the smell of naked bodies and sex. But something about 
Ruth’s ‘heavy’, seemingly one-way desire for S is obsessive, unpleasant almost, 
especially when framed as morbid and sexualised role play by dressing up in 
S’s clothes and jewellery.37 In her actions both before and after S is dead then, 
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and Berg’s titillation over what they assume to be his father’s dead body. 
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Ruth insists on a potentially unwanted intimacy, a transgressive desire which in 
turn violates and infects the very closeness she craves. 
Thus, the book connects sexual desire for S with the act of trespass. This 
is most evident in the triangular trap in which it is caught: a husband-wife-other 
triangle that seems to replace the father-mother-child triangle of Berg. But the 
emphasis, or problem, does not simply shift; it multiplies. The transition from 
child to adult is not clear cut, and instead the child-image bleeds into grown-up 
sexual fantasies: ‘But suppose a nightmare? Scream, run over, fling myself on 
L’s bed’ (67). For S, Leonard is father figure and lover: he both replaces and 
plays out the father-fantasy figure, simultaneously offering parental security and 
sexual intimacy. Movement away from the child-image is further resisted and 
complicated by recurring memories where S recalls time spent with her father in 
‘the conspiracy of not being his daughter’ (68).38  
Further, it becomes clear that S specifically and consciously desires to 
push at, to test and transgress the limits of Leonard and Ruth’s married 
relationship: ‘a situation I long to wade in right up to the very limits of 
imagination if possible. Gain another level, and added dimension, preferably 
bringing them both with me’ (62). For each she usurps the other, and their 
three-way relationship is inevitably an unequal and temporary thing, bringing 
with it an undercurrent of threat, paranoia and suspicion, which unbalances and 
disrupts the narrative. While alive, S was the third which threatened the couple’s 
two. Her desire to ‘wade in right up to the very limits of imagination’ symbolises 
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– and this is confirmed in the narrative by Ruth’s sexual inhibition – the menace 
of the unknown, or of new and uninhibited behaviour. S was aware of her 
position of power over Ruth as usurper, ‘yet at the same time there was pity, 
yes pity for what I saw in her eyes, and her desperate clinging to us’ (125).  
Such desperation is evident when Ruth compulsively listens to a section of 
the taped journal which she believes is both significant and hurtful because it 
implies, to her mind, a sexual encounter: 
 
Was it like this with  
Never before. Not like this. No one has touched me ever 
Never never 
Like this. Before. Like waves.  The coming.  
Slowly. Dual roles 
realised. Yes yes  
yes (114).39 
 
 
Ruth is already anxious about their relationship, and here she re-plays the tape, 
listening and fast-forwarding until she finds the particularly ‘painful’ section, the 
‘proof’. But, the ambiguity and uncertainly of the events in S’s aural journal 
resists her desire for clarification. Further, the circular form of a spool of tape 
both complements and exaggerates the repetitive nature of Ruth’s action. This 
not only renders it obsessive and absurd, but also communicates the fragility, 
the fallacy, of her desire for clarity and understanding. The fragments of tape 
she hears and skips past in her quest for ‘confession’ are not quite exact 
repetitions of earlier on in the transcript and this slight difference creates a 
divergent emphasis that ironises her obsessive behaviour. Ruth hears the 
repeated section of tape differently each time because she listens both to cause 
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 This section is partially repeated on 118: ‘Was it like this with/Never before like this. Before. 
Like waves. The coming./ Slowly. Then the rush of it. Demanding more. But without asking./ 
Dual roles. Realised. Yes yes/ Yes’.  
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herself pain, and in her desire for the ‘truth’. Her repeated act is an attempt to 
inject meaning into her life by mastering the situation regarding S and Leonard: 
‘hell hell if only I knew – knew’ (117).40 What actually happens between Leonard 
and S remains, of course, unresolved. It is unclear whether references to sex 
between them are imagined or real, and when S describes having ecstatic and 
often violent sex in her diaries it is unclear whether this is with Leonard or 
someone else. Indeed, throughout the narrative, there is an awkwardness and 
sense of longing between them which smacks of frustrated desire more than 
anything else: S records this unease: ‘In the sand/dunes/our fingers/touched. 
Accidentally. He sat up’ (104).  
  Leonard’s journal further serves to mystify rather than elucidate this 
ambiguity. Its tone is excessively flat, implying the repression of feeling in favour 
of an undifferentiated record of events: 
 
October 18th   Boat found capsized. Coat identified. Also                                                                 
  note in pocket looks like suicide                        
October 19th   Two hours questioning by police sergeant.                     
  River and coastline dragged.                   
October 20th   R in bed all day.  Translation completed.  
October 21st   Dinner with the Blakeleys. A good hock (41).       
 
 
The monotone here is typical of a journal in which events are recorded 
seemingly at random and presented as if without qualitative difference – ‘looks 
like suicide’ ‘coastline dragged’ ‘good hock’. The flattened tone in response to 
the central event of the narrative denies expectations of personal ‘voice’ and 
emotional engagement in diary writing. Instead, this journal form wants to give 
knowledge neither of Leonard, nor of his feelings about S’s death. However, at 
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 This absurd repetition in an attempt at mastery, or progress, recalls Albert Camus’ ‘Myth of 
Sisyphus’ (1942, trans. 1955) which Quin had read. 
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the same time, despite its form and surface, this journal seems ‘less about 
preserving facts than about asserting, even performing, a self’.41 Furthermore, 
the reader suspects that Leonard’s performance here is in fact false, and we 
read instead for clues with which to challenge or confirm this. But what kind of 
self is performed? It pretends to be one that does not differentiate between – or 
care about – the experiences of being questioned by the police and dinner with 
friends. The role is a callous and shallow one: the commendation of the hock 
seems out of place, insensitive, as does his attitude to Ruth’s illness, as ‘R in 
bed all day’ is juxtaposed with ‘Translation completed’. But the performance 
becomes unconvincing when it comes to the dispassionate record of S’s 
suicide. Here, the apparent lack of emotion does not ring true. Leonard’s 
reported intimacy with S, his videoing of her, and his secretive watching of that 
video elsewhere belie his apparent dispassion. Indeed, the journal itself 
exposes its minimalist form as a self-conscious performance: it is full of ‘little 
black marks’ denoting ‘Far more personal’ (42) events that Leonard takes 
pleasure in refusing to explain.  
 
 
To jeopardise a bourgeois stronghold         
 
There is a sense in which, then, these representations of marriage, sex and 
intimacy are again, as with the echoes of Marienbad in the book, always bound 
up with questions of role play and performance. More specifically, I have 
suggested that the portrayal of the desire for intimacy in Three exposes 
claustrophobic, transgressive and violating effects. To think about how such 
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representations of attack and transgression within the narrative might also be 
the point at which the book connects with its cultural and political contexts my 
reading here considers S’s criticism of the institution of marriage as well as the 
function of the vandals who trespass into the narrative. What emerges is that 
while the interrogation of class clearly places the book in its broader British 
social context, its excessive styles and experimental forms refuse this critique 
as being aligned with social realism. 
For S, nothing is more in need of attack than matrimony, she is ‘Pursued 
by a compulsion to jeopardise such a bourgeois stronghold. So often scorned 
before, but soon understood, almost succumbed to: an ambiguous luxury’ (61): 
her desire to trespass onto this apparently safe and solid territory is bound up 
with it being ‘a bourgeois stronghold’, ‘an ambiguous luxury’. Indeed, the book’s 
blurb claims that ‘Three is an incisive exploration of the emotional and sexual 
undercurrents of British middle-class life’.42 While this appraisal overplays the 
importance of class, it is true that the trappings and expectations of the British 
class system have a significant role to play. S’s reduction of Leonard and Ruth’s 
lives mocks them. Whereas they are imprisoned by being middle-class and 
limited by all its nice things and nasty prejudices, she positions herself as an 
irreverent outsider, exposing and rejecting the trappings and hierarchies of 
social position by ironising them. Her listing (and ridicule) of Leonard and Ruth’s 
plethora of gadgetry and objects implies and denigrates a nouveau-riche, 
bought attempt at status:43  
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 Dalkey Archive version: Leonard and Ruth’s class is not mentioned on the blurb of the 1966 
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 However, this simultaneously suggests that, despite pretensions to a position outside social 
norms, S instead remains caught up in ideas about old and new money, and therefore well 
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Sofa. Flora-impregnated. 
Chippendale chairs. Unchipped. Upholstered in blue. 
They call turquoise. 
Persian rugs. Second skins. For them. 
Warm napkins 
Silverware pawns. Salt-cellar dominates. 
Rooms soundproofed. 
Paintings 
not hung 
too small. Not small enough. But still-lifes she used to do. 
Burglar-proofed. 
China plates 
On the wall. Glass doors. Concealed lighting. White curtains (20-21).  
 
 
The description is mocking, the language over elaborate – ‘Flora-impregnated’. 
‘They call’ and ‘for them’ distances the speaker from those she describes.  
           Here as elsewhere, S’s appraisal of Leonard and Ruth’s emotional and 
domestic life renders it little more than a list of branded and luxurious, 
superfluous, objects as well as paid-for services – ‘specialists/ psychiatrists/ 
analysts/ masseurs/ osteopaths/ palmists/ clairvoyants’ (26). The narrative 
space given over to the things of their life implies a lack elsewhere – not only of 
their longed for child – and the sheer barrage of material objects and services is 
too much, and becomes ridiculous. The absurdity implied by such lists is 
complemented by the description of, for example, the guests at a dinner party 
who speak ‘with calculated eloquence. In French, in Italian. Cigars pampered, 
liqueur glasses stroked – the stems’ (57). Their behaviour is pretentious. These 
guests show off to each other: the French and Italian is used to impress, their 
actions pamper and stroke. They perpetuate bourgeois norms and rituals, at the 
same time the nature of the performance confirms that it is all for show, not 
genuine.  
           But, more interestingly perhaps, S’s attack and ridicule of middle class 
behaviour is mirrored and extended by the third-person narrative’s rendering of, 
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in particular, Ruth’s prejudice. When she denigrates Leonard’s father for having 
sugar in his tea – ‘why it’s almost a working-class habit’ (80) – the narrative 
mocks her attitude. In addition, throughout the narrative, her attitude seems to 
parrot a classist and stereotyped bigotry and paranoia:  
 
such peasants here too never can trust them tell them to do 
something and when your back’s turned have to watch while they do 
it and show them. Yes like beasts and how they stare too Leon have 
you noticed when we drive past that woman and her kids honestly 
given half the chance I think they’d quite happily see us dead? 
They’re all right if you talk to them. But what on earth can one say 
they wouldn’t understand just go on staring and once we’re through 
the gateway I can hear them laugh. Well at least they don’t muck 
about in the river and they’re certainly not to blame for those nasty 
obscenities put on my notices. That awful vulgar crowd from the 
holiday camp they’re the worst I do think the Council should do 
something about it (9).  
 
Cohen, in his discussion of the fear of vandals that emerged in Britain in the 
1950s and 1960s, identifies what he calls ‘deviancy amplification’ in an attempt 
to describe and explain the intensity of the media and middle-class distortion of 
the situation.44 In particular, Cohen describes the processes that lead to the 
sorts of attitudes captured in Ruth’s tirade above. He says that deviancy 
amplification is about expectation, reaction and confirmation. Put briefly, the 
problem (the working class adolescent – ‘peasants’), leads to societal reaction 
(involving misperception – ‘never can trust them’) and the escalation into 
stereotypes – ‘like beasts’ ‘who wouldn’t understand just go on staring’. 45 
Deviancy amplification also includes a distortion of terminology, where repeated 
and emotive phrasing provides a narrative for events that are yet to happen – ‘I 
think they’d quite happily see us dead’. 
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This sort of middle-class misperception and fear of working-class youths – 
amplified by the narrative’s obsession with transgression – drives both Leonard 
and Ruth’s anxiety about trespassers and their desire for a ‘Burglar-proofed’ 
home. Their anxiety is great. Not only do they put up notices, but it is Leonard 
this time who fantasises a wall of cut glass and electric wire to stop ‘them’ 
finding a way over: ‘I’ve plans to stop them bloody well will too get a high wall 
built all the way round that’ll put an end to their vandalism. They’ll still find a way 
over. Have cut glass on the top and wire yes that’s it an electric wire will soon 
cure them’ (10). This paranoia develops the narrative’s class-critique by 
engaging with the fear of youth culture in a broader historical context: the 
anxiety and negative expectation here participates in and enacts a wider 
dialectic of antagonism. According to Cohen, such class tensions were 
underpinned by the ‘recurrent theme of winning space. Territoriality, solidarity, 
aggressive masculinity, stylistic innovation… all attempts by working-class 
youth to reclaim community and reassert traditional values’. 46  But more 
important that their actual behaviour, he points out: ‘these groups have 
occupied a constant position as folk devils’. 47  And, these devils, these 
inarticulate beasts, are things to be feared, banned and barred.  
In the narrative, Leonard’s signs and fences are not enough to keep the 
trespassers out: 
 
Then they came. In the middle of 
                                                 
46
 Cohen’s introduction, x. For Cohen, the ‘moral panic’ that followed working-class youths’ 
need to win space largely focussed on style. Emerging youth styles were associated with deviant 
or publicly disapproved values: they were an outward and visible sign of the ‘us-and-them’ 
generation gap. Teddy boys, for example, wore style and brutality as a group identity: their 
attitude included a callous threat of violence which, while exaggerated by the media, was 
nevertheless there. It is interesting, but perhaps an aside, that Quin, a working class writer, also 
attempted to win or create space for 1960s writing through stylistic innovation. 
47
 Cohen, 10. 

	

a storm. One night. Waving torches. 
Throwing 
fireworks 
into the swimming pool. Stampeded 
round the statues. While he stood quivering. In the summer- 
house. In the dark. They screamed. Tore flowers out. She buried  
her face in cushions. Crying. Hands covered her ears. Then they 
left. When the storm passed. A trail of torn flowers left. 
Plants. Broken bronze pieces. 
Littered paths (103).  
 
The incident is relayed by S with a matter of fact tone, despite the destruction 
caused: ‘they came’ then ‘they left’. However, what happens is also confused 
and ambiguous – for example, who is the ‘they’ that screamed? S’s language is 
distanced from both perpetrators and victims and as such what happens 
remains unclear. What is certain is that Leonard and Ruth – and therefore the 
narrative as a whole – have been expecting ‘them’ to come, and when they do 
he stands quivering and she buries her face into a cushion, cries and covers her 
ears. As with Leonard’s earlier blocking out of sound with the shells, this 
signifies their inability to face or deal with reality. Further, this fear and 
distancing is also juxtaposed with an atmosphere of excitement and the 
ambiguity of this asks how much of the threat of trespass is imagined, created 
or provoked (or even desired) by Leonard and Ruth. The vandals’ arrival, at last 
– as with the rape scene – does seem to bring some relief.  
          However, the incident is more serious than it at first seems. Not only are 
inanimate objects violated and damaged, but also Leonard: ‘His blood. After 
they came/ down. Hurled themselves. Pieces of metal at him’ (104). At the 
same time, this violence is distorted and its ‘reality’ challenged by the partial 
repetition of the same incident in S’s written diary. In this account, during the 
enactment of a mime: ‘I noticed them first, half a dozen or so faces over the 
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edge of the pool’ (136). Then things are thrown down, ‘three of the statues 
moved’ and Ruth screams, followed by a flurry of movement: 
 
I couldn’t make out anything, hardly see, as earth, metal pieces, 
broken bits of bronze fell around. When finally I could see, L lay flat 
on the ground. He was being beaten up by three men, whose faces, 
arms, legs were whitewashed… They looked like clowns giving vent 
to years of repressed feelings, as they punched, and kicked L (136-
137).  
 
The repetition highlights the performative nature of the violence: as clowns 
waving ritualistic torches, the perpetrators are whitewashed, their real identities 
masked. They are not real, complete people, but a blur of faces, arms and legs. 
This cartoon-like, exaggerated violence again echoes and recalls the objects of 
moral panic, discussed variously by Cohen as folk devils and ‘actors on a 
stage’, but even more relevantly here as ‘images flickering on a screen. This 
was, after all, how they appeared to society: as processed images’.48  In a 
similar way, the characters in S’s journals are processed and uncanny images. 
The violence they enact is cartoon-like, the descriptions of it emphasise surface 
and flair above impact or emotion.  
          These trespassers (the masked unknown) haunt the reminder of the 
narrative, even calling to question the claims that S dies by her own hand. After 
the incident above, S is aware of a threatening, watching presence from across 
the water of ‘several of the men who had beaten up L. They played some game 
with knives on the sand, and beckoned me over’ (139). Their game is 
threatening; their previous trespass and attack confirms their capacity to carry 
out such a threat. However, simultaneously across the water, S sees a watching 
Leonard (the supposedly known). His presence there also symbolises the threat 
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of violent transgression. When ‘an unidentified young woman, with stab wounds 
in back and abdomen, was found yesterday by a lake near the Sugarloaf 
mountain’ (131) is read in context with, for example, Leonard’s rape of Ruth, or 
his killing of a crab – ‘L, still laughing, jumped on the crab and moved his foot 
several times, before looking down at the broken remains of shell, claws, 
greenish fluid’ (133) – his penchant for force implicates him against S.49 Once 
the uncertainty of her suicide has again been reiterated, this time by the 
discovery of the stabbed body, the possibility of murder hangs in the air. His 
violent actions imply that Leonard, as much as the men who attacked him, is 
capable of murder, and this further element of suspicion and uncertainty adds to 
the book’s frustration of expected revelation as the narrative reaches its close.    
 
 
The death drive 
 
 
Today the first signs of sharpness in the air. The mist rises up from 
the ground lying in thin frost. The boat is ready, as planned. And all 
that’s necessary now is a note. I know nothing will change (143). 
 
 
But finally, while the narrative’s representation and performance of violence and 
attack clearly evidences cultural interrogation in terms of both the critique of 
marriage and fear of violent youth, it is the ultimate transgression of a supposed 
self-killing which most haunts and shapes this book – it is driven by death – and 
I mean this in terms of its form as much as content. The book’s ending, with 
boat, plan and note certainly implies that the death is a premeditated act. And, 
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while the suggestion here that ‘nothing will change’ is reminiscent of Berg, S’s 
death is the absent and formative event which shapes and generates the 
energy of the text as a whole. Thus, I end my reading of Three by considering in 
what ways both the drive towards and act of death – for this text decides as well 
as desires – can be seen to both perform and theorise the relationship between 
experience and articulation, death and narrative structure. 
           Throughout the narrative, the desire for death is both ante and post 
‘event’. S’s death sends out pre-emptive echoes of itself throughout the text like 
an inverted deja-vu, as if it is something that has always already happened. 
This recalls Freud’s thinking in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, where he pits 
‘drives directed at self-preservation’ against masochistic drives that serve ‘to 
procure death’ and move the ego towards the desire for dissolution. 50  He 
concludes that the life drives will ultimately be dominated by the death drives, 
because ‘the goal of all life is death’.51 Put simply, life is a distraction, structured 
on a repetitive attempt at mastery, on the way to one’s own permanent absence 
in death. In the case of self-destruction, the self takes a ‘short cut to its life’s 
goal (to short-circuit the system as it were)’ and the attempt at mastery 
becomes synonymous with absence.52 According to Peter Brooks, deep within 
the plotting of literary texts themselves, we find that ‘at the heart of structures of 
repetition, the death drive is ‘found out’ by betraying itself in repetition’.53 Hence 
the narrative tradition of foreshadowing death, found, for example, compellingly 
in Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891), where Tess imagines her death-day: ‘a day 
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 Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writing, 
(Trans.) John Reddick, London: Penguin, 2003, 79. 
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 Ibid, 78. 
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 Ibid, 79. 
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 Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1984, 156. See also; Frank Kermode, ‘The End’, The 
Sense of an Ending, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, 3-34. 
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which lay sly and unseen among all the other days of the year’.54 This future 
event recurs with the regularity of a birthday, it is a date already somehow 
marked out from the beginning of her life. It is also a day foreshadowed and 
determined throughout the book by repeated signs and portents. The effect of 
this convergence of form and content results in a sense that throughout the 
book the death is already happening and already being repeated; it is not just a 
one off event.  
           However, while the death drive in Three might seem to imply a similar 
sort of determinist narrative structure, this determinism is somewhat denied by 
the writing and foreshadowing of death happening not only in third-person 
narration, but more compelling in S’s journals too. Throughout, it is S who 
narrates and foreshadows her own absence: ‘I become almost a shadow. The 
kind that extends up the wall, across the ceiling, dwindles gradually into other 
shadows. In my room. Theirs’ (62). Here, S simultaneously asserts and denies 
her presence: ‘I became almost a shadow’. Her metamorphosis from ‘I’ into a 
shadow that ‘dwindles gradually into other shadows’ is towards the absent 
signifier of previous presence. This dissolution is something S desires as a self-
determined act, in which she desires to become author and protagonist in the 
narrative of her life.55 Thus, her death will be an articulate act: ‘My certainty 
shall be their confusion’ (53). Here, absence from life is the necessary fulfilment 
of that life, because it is this that definitively shapes and presences it. S sees 
self-destruction as a form of authorship with her own life, an act she feels in 
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 Thomas Hardy, Tess of the D’Urbervilles. London: Penguin, 1979, 149. 
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 This connection between death and articulation is reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s claim 
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control of through repeated thinking about and planning the forthcoming and 
supposedly meaning-bestowing event. 56  Significantly, in this her death is a 
written performance of self-destruction – ‘to write it down would almost be like 
performing the action itself’ (139). Here the desire for dissolution is a desire for 
a moment of pure articulation, but also of performance, as if self-disintegration 
might also become an act of self-construction.57 
           This desire directly engages with the problems death places on 
articulation and serves as a trope for the relation of death to the writing process 
in general. In Over Her Dead Body, Elisabeth Bronfen reminds us that the act of 
writing only ever renders present a shadow of what is absent.58 She posits that 
the act of writing presupposes, or is itself an act that confirms, loss and 
absence, but that it also paradoxically negates that loss through partial 
presencing in the act of representation.59 Thus the very form of the written word 
is always a matrix of presence and absence, because writing necessarily 
absents what it names. In Three, S persuasively represents this matrix in her 
dominating absent-presence in both the language and structure of the narrative. 
In addition, not only does the presence of a text always denote an absence or 
negation of the writing subject, but in the case of death, there is a particular gap 
between language and the linguistic signifier. Death, as the dissolution of the 
self, can only be articulated in relation to the self, either in presence when 
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 For a consideration of further implications of the annihilation of the self in writing see 
Richard Poirier, ‘Writing Off the Self’, Raritan, Summer 1981, 106-133. 
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 For more on death as articulation and self-construction see Elisabeth Bronfen, Over Her Dead 
Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, 
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as the ‘sacrificial victim, offering herself up for the sake of her art’, The Savage God; A Study of 
Suicide, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, 33. 
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 Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body, 30. 
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representation is always also a moment of looking away, as I discuss in my Introduction. 




looking forward to death, or retrospectively in absentia, interpreted by the 
surviving subjects. Indeed, as Barthes reminds us, the expression of absence is 
a referent wedged between two tenses: ‘that of the reference and that of the 
allocution: you have gone (which I lament), you are here (since I am addressing 
you)’.60 To express absence functions to presence the other: presence and 
absence are simultaneously experienced and uttered. So when Leonard 
watches the video of S he experiences her presence and absence 
simultaneously, as when Leonard and Ruth hear her voice on the spool of tape.  
           The very circularity of this spool of tape serves as a reminder that even 
though Three seems to narrate (albeit somewhat backwards) a linear order of 
events, the split and repetitive forms of the book refuse and fragment this, and 
the narrative ends with S about to die even though she has been dead 
throughout. This ‘ending’ is foreshadowed by S’s repeated references to the 
lake in the middle of the mountains, which ‘they say’ will be visited on a 
tomorrow that never comes until she dies there.61 Her recurring desire to go to 
this lake – and its continual deferral – is a repetition that creates an incantation 
of the allure, an enactment almost, of self-destruction which fantasises about 
both its performance and effects: ‘How easy for a body to drift out, caught up in 
a current, and never be discovered, or for anyone ever to be certain’ (139). 
           As such, suicide functions as the point at which Three theorises about 
and interrogates the relationship between experience and articulation – but, 
most significantly, this is also always figured as a performance: 
 
I’m contemplating hanging myself. He whispered. He stood on a 
chair, and mimed an extraordinary grotesque scene, the longest I’ve 
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 Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse, (Trans.) Richard Howard. London: Penguin, 1990, 15. 
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ever seen him perform. I clapped enthusiastically when thinking it 
over. But touching his neck he stretched up from the chair. Ducked 
his head, until at last he jumped from the chair, his head rolling, 
tongue lolled out. He collapsed on the floor, laughing, and went on 
laughing, shaking from head to foot. They say one gets an erection 
that way. He shouted at R (138). 
 
Leonard’s ‘performance’ of suicide here is carefully directed, knowing. It 
includes a theatrical whisper, followed by the longest and most ‘extraordinarily 
grotesque’ scene S has ever seen him perform. The scene is an absurd parody, 
an enactment and exaggeration of suicidal fantasy elsewhere in the narrative, 
which is simultaneously laughable and horrible.62 Indeed, the refusal of pathos 
here in both Leonard’s performance of suicide and S’s description of it figures 
the resistant and deliberate nature of the suicidal act across the narrative as a 
whole. This resistant play is also manifest in the way in which the narrative is 
aware of but refuses to succumb to the potential relationship between the death 
drive and deterministic narrative structure. When S refers to her role as 
determined – ‘I have become the victim now, and from that there is no turning 
back’ (135) – this denotes an awareness of a structural determinism, but also 
suggests that the ‘role’ she is now playing is a chosen one.  
In this way, and in conclusion, it seems to me that Three ‘plays out’ 
suicide as a way of interrogating and rejecting the idea that written narrative is 
or should be determined by pre-existent patterns and structures. This challenge 
is posed throughout the book, from its engagement with the structural forms and 
techniques of Marienbad to the representations and performance of violent and 
transgressive sex, intimacy and vandalism. As such, by explicating its 
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 This ambivalence recalls Bakhtin’s discussion of carnival laughter as a reaction to life’s 
crises, where laughter can be a (meaningful) response to crisis. Blomfield talks of Quin’s 
‘characteristic brand of grim and self-mocking humour, a humour – to her friends now 
unbearably painful – which even encompassed the image of her own death’, ‘Reasons for 
Existence’, 1. 
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engagements with cultural contexts, as well as discussing the effects of an 
increasingly experimental, disruptive narrative form, my reading of Three has 
established how this book moves on from Berg. More specifically, I have shown 
that the book’s questioning of marriage and class acts to mirror a simultaneous 
rejection of traditional narrative, as Quin’s writing knits form, content and 
performance ever more closely together. For many readers, the overlapping 
nature of the fragmented journal and third-person forms and repetitive, dense 
content of this book proved too much.63 However, as I have demonstrated here, 
the reach for articulation which takes place across this range of forms and 
expression in Three is in fact directly necessary and pertinent to its 
preoccupation with whether and in what ways it might be possible to write or 
figure both intimacy and death without completely absenting them. Furthermore, 
in this book haunted by a drowning, the tension between structural determinism 
and authorship, in terms of the relationship between the writing and act of 
death, seems particularly poignant, given that the author’s own fate was the 
same.   
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 In her piece on Three, Bruce laments that: ‘most of our reviewers seem to have considered 
that in their comments upon Three they must at all costs avoid further indulgence: a major 
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Illumination 3 
 
 
The knowledge that soon she would cross the border to a country, 
his country America, where once more she would feel a stranger. 
   And England? 
How distant it seemed now. Yet in moments a longing. 
   But for what? 
She had no sense of belonging there either.1 
 
 
I wonder about stillness in Greece – from what I hear: parties, all and 
every night on islands, dancing and singing in taverns, ouzo local 
brew 3d a tot how and when can I write ????????? Scott Fitzgerald 
said writing is like swimming under water holding your breath. Wish I 
could hold mine for longer!2 
 
 
Passages was written while Quin was living in America, but is very probably set 
in the Mediterranean of Greece. In the summer of 1964, she had travelled 
across Italy and the Ionian Sea, initially to Parga to stay with friends Jim and 
Valerie.3 Together, they travelled to Athens, Corfu, Ithaca and Kolymos, and 
bought tickets to Istanbul which they never reached because of the riots. 
Encountering this situation frightened them. Quin sent a postcard to Calder, 
which has a photograph of statues described as ‘Olympia. Centaur seizing a 
Lapithan girl’ on the front, and ‘S.O.S. £.s.d. needed – desperate. Istanbul riots. 
Please forward to: c/o L. Matheovdaki, 4, Seremeti, Corfu, Greece’ written 
messily in black felt-tip on the back.4 The contrast between photograph and 
words is striking: it conveys a desperate desire for flight from real circumstances 
against the classical backdrop of an idealised Greece. 
                                                 
1
 ‘Eyes that Watch behind the Wind’, A Signature Anthology, London: Calder and Boyars Ltd., 
1975, 136. 
2
 Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 20th June 1964. 
3
 The trip was funded by Henry Williamson, so he claims in Letter: Williamson to Carol Burns, 
30th July 1964, Carol Burns Papers. 
4
 Postcard: Quin to Calder, received 28th July 1964. Calder and Boyars manuscripts, Series II, 
box 52, folder 2.  
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This trip to Greece was just one among many at this time. Quin was 
peripatetic. During the early sixties, she not only retreated to Dorset and 
Brighton, but also travelled to Bantry in Ireland, to Italy, Paris, Amsterdam and 
Scotland. Then, in the late spring of 1965, she sailed to New York to take up her 
Harkness Fellowship. On this first visit she met John Carter and started a brief 
affair with him. However, in all other ways the time there was not a success, she 
was increasingly frenetic and conflicted, and did not like this ‘whale’s mouth of a 
city, where people paddle—swim up sidewalks that are fallen ladders’.5 So, she 
went on to Placitas and then the Lawrence Ranch near San Christobal in New 
Mexico: ‘It really is a lovely lovely place’.6 During this time she stayed with the 
Creeleys, and met Sward, an American poet she later had a love affair with – 
one which initially also included his wife, Diane.  
At the end of that year Quin travelled more in America, spending time in 
the Bahamas and San Francisco – in a ‘crazy yellow house on a barge, just 
outside Sausalito, which is across from the Golden Gate bridge, and is really 
lovely – I guess it’s the nearest to my idea of living in a tower! Anyway it gives 
me that sense of stillness which I find necessary to do any writing’.7 Then, she 
settled for the next year or so in Placitas, New Mexico: ‘Mountains. Mesas. 
Space. Ah Space’.8 Throughout this time the relationship with Sward developed 
and in 1967 she lived with him in Iowa for a while before they returned together 
to London for a few months. However, when she travelled to Mexico in the 
spring of 1968, following him there in the hope he would divorce his wife, this 
did not happen. Instead, Sward started up a love affair with someone new and 
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Quin, devastated, returned to Placitas, before taking up a place for a month or 
two at the McDowell Artists’ Colony in New Hampshire. Then, in November 
1968, she again returned to London.  
In the early 1970s, Paddy Kitchen reflected: ‘I see how the last twelve 
years have been a pattern of conflict followed by flight and seclusion’.9 And 
certainly, Quin’s life was patterned by always moving on, by the endless search 
for a place she hoped at last would bring the often repeated desire for a longer-
term ‘stillness’ and ‘space’. However, staying still to write – or, as she put it, 
swimming under water and holding her breath – became increasingly 
unbearable and impossible. In the end, the search for somewhere or someone 
– lover, father-figure, brother – to ground her was an impossible task.10   
                                                 
9
 Letter: Kitchen to Carol Burns, undated. Carol Burns Papers. 
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 Eva Figes claimed Quin’s ever moving on was motivated by a search to replace the brother 
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Passages, 1969: The transgressive resistant paradox 
 
Passage. 
The action of going or moving onward, across, or past; movement from 
one place or point to another, or over or through a space or medium; 
transit. 
 
To move sideways in riding, the horse making controlled and 
exaggerated stepping movements. Also in extended use: to move from 
side to side or to and fro.1 
 
 
Saturday 
 
So let us begin another journey. Change the setting. Everything is 
changing, the country, the climate. There is no compromise now. No 
country we can return to. She still has her obsession to follow through 
and her fantasies to live out. For myself there is less of an argument. I 
am for the moment committed to this moment. This train. The distance 
behind and ahead. And the sea that soon perhaps we will cross.2 
 
 
Quin’s third book, Passages, ends with a ‘distance behind and ahead’ to ‘begin 
another journey’. But, this is both provisional – ‘I am for the moment committed to 
this moment’ – and uncertain – ‘the sea that soon perhaps we will cross’. For, there 
is ‘no country to return to’ and are, for the writing as a whole, only ‘unmapped’ ones 
ahead. The symbolic sea, which it is in fact not possible to cross, as Three 
illustrates, leads the writing on, as with both Berg and Three, towards an endpoint 
or resolution ever absent and deferred. This incomplete journey figures Quin’s 
conflict as a writer, as one who wants to pull forward and move on, but whose 
writing simultaneously expresses resistance to this. Its explicit journeying 
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 Selected definitions, Oxford English Dictionary. 
2
 Passages, Chicago and Illinois: Dalkey Archive Press, 2003, 112. Subsequent references will be in 
parenthesis in the body of the text. 
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substance and form make this the book which most clearly expresses this tension: 
it both moves through and resists divergent narrative modes and structures. But, 
this is difficult to know how to read: the aim of my analysis throughout this chapter 
is to negotiate such difficulty. 
A useful starting point is the way that, throughout, the book activates several 
meanings of the title, Passages.3 This is a narrative always in transit across and 
through different passages of text. Its storyline follows a woman and man’s quest 
ever ‘onward, across [and] past’ a Mediterranean landscape, in a search for her 
lost brother. The missing third recalls the position of the absent character, S, in 
Three. But, whereas there S dominates through her aural and written journals, here 
the brother is silent, positioned as a shadow always beyond the narrative’s reach. 
Instead, the book focuses on the woman and man’s ceaseless action of passaging 
onward, across, past: as a result, the brother is not much more than a device that 
motivates the narrative. Indeed, as Barber rightly identifies, in this book what 
matters is process rather than outcome; ‘the metaphor of the journey is made over 
into the very substance and form of the book itself’.4 
This ‘substance and form’ is divided into four sections, which shift alternately 
between two perspectives, broadly those of the woman and man. Hers is an 
impressionistic account of the sensory experiences along the way; his an 
annotated journal. The woman’s sections are formed of an interconnected chain of 
transitional passages that mimic, but are often in fact not, paragraphs. This 
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 Although it is not a direct source text, Quin was aware of Ed Dorn’s autobiographical Rites of 
Passage (1965), which she suggested that Sward read. Letter: Quin to Sward, 17th October 1966, 
Robert Sward Papers, Series 1.1, box 8. 
4
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episodic structure creates a simultaneous stasis and momentum, a stop-start from 
one arbitrary ‘place or point [in the narrative] to another’. In this way, the technique 
invokes the experience of a journey as the ideas metamorphosise through the text 
in a broadly linear trajectory. Further, the text is written with a detail that demands 
the reader is always aware of the passaging of ideas and images at word level.  
In contrast, the man’s journal requires reading of a different direction. These 
sections do not so much narrate the passing of time as they cross and mediate 
between different viewpoints and ideas, ‘over [and] through [the] space or medium’. 
Notes, reported speech, recorded dreams, cut-up techniques, sections taken from 
source material and diary entries are placed side-by-side.5 To read them our eye 
must sidestep to-and-fro across, as well as down, the page. This structure is 
‘controlled’ and ‘exaggerated’ like the passaging horse in the definition above, 
which Quin, as an experienced horse-woman, would have well appreciated. 6 
Throughout these sections, various types of text are held in parataxis and 
presented without clear interconnection: the possibility for a stable narrative 
perspective or linear reading action is denied. Instead, in the spaces and angles of 
reading between columns of text, the possibility for multiple and oblique meanings 
abides. This presents the reader with a maze that denies linear trajectory: the 
challenge is to find a meaningful passage through.  
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 This engages with a zeitgeist for ‘illustrative’, performative formatting. See also; Richard 
Brautigan’s 1967 Trout Fishing in America, B. S. Johnson’s 1964 Albert Angelo, and the slightly 
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In these ways, the title casts its interpretative shadow to interrogate and 
invigorate literary structure, and in turn, reading. Throughout, the notion of 
‘passages’ acts as a code which both constitutes and complicates the reading 
process. On one hand, connotations of the title seem to offer a guide for reading; 
on the other a clear route through is refused. The momentum of the title, together 
with the search storyline, seems to connect disparate ideas or pieces of text, but 
what exactly that connection is remains unresolved. Instead, the proliferation and 
inclusion of multiple aspects of the title act to confuse and frustrate the reading 
process. In his assessment of Passages, Hassam points out that here, with a 
narrative structured upon the proliferation of divergent echoes of its title, Quin uses 
the same technique as Robbe-Grillet in Topology of a Phantom City (1976), but, 
significantly, that she predates him. 7  Further, it seems to me, Quin’s method 
compellingly recalls Benjamin’s in The Arcades Project (written 1927-1940). It is 
not only that both writers foreground the activity of reading as a journey or search, 
but for both, the ‘passage’ is simultaneously literally a piece of text and a concept 
or space employed to suggest – but not fully explicate – the connections and 
openings between different ideas or places. Benjamin’s starting point is a textual 
passage taken from the Illustrated Guide to Paris of 1852.8  What follows are 
numerous and detailed meditations on the structure of the Paris arcades – the act 
of passaging through them, the passages and places they lead to – which acts as 
a device with which to describe the city’s historic and geographical constructions, 
and in turn the constructions of narrative itself. While there is no evidence to 
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 Hassam, 96-97. 
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 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, (Trans.) Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, Cambridge, 
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suggest Quin knew Benjamin’s ‘passage work’ directly, it is noteworthy that both 
use the same device to generate an interconnected montage to similar effect. 
In this way, ‘passages’ not only describes the movement and constructions 
of the writing, but also the action of reading it. This reading is necessarily self-
conscious and reflexive – it requires that the activity of reading itself be decoded. In 
response, my method is informed by Barthes’ theories of reading and textual 
analysis which emerged at a similar time. Drawing in turn on the ‘way[s] of 
proceeding’ 9  he employs in both ‘The Metaphor of the Eye’ (1963) and ‘The 
Struggle with the Angel’ (1971), I utilise his methodology because it seems to me 
that Quin’s writing here itself both anticipates and theorises such a reading. 
Barthes’ discussion – and celebration – of the pressures, complication and open-
endedness of the friction between what he calls the ‘two intelligibilities’ of 
‘sequential readability but cultural ambiguity’ provides a particularly pertinent 
frame. 10  My reading of Passages demonstrates how the book plays out and 
complicates the tension between readability and ambiguity, specifically in terms of 
its narrative sequencing and cultural preoccupations. This is a book always in 
oscillation between binaries: transgression and resistance, sexual subject and 
object, experiment and tradition – and, in particular here, the Hellenic/Judaic 
tension.11 This push-pull, of a text that wants to risk more than it is ultimately able 
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 Barthes, ‘The Struggle with the Angel’, Image, Music, Text, (Trans.) Stephen Heath, London: 
Fontana Press, 1977, 127. 
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to, is characteristic of the oeuvre as a whole: it is here that the transgressive-
resistant paradox of Quin’s writing is most deeply felt.  
 
 
The line of words 
 
 
His hands round the glass, veins pressed under hairs, lighter from cuffs 
to knuckles. Hands above his head, marking the design of some 
unfamiliar birds. Slant of wings to the slant of their bodies under, caught 
the light of falling. They turned from a straight course into a curved one, 
remained at the same height, wings on the convex side of their curving 
movements, moved in line. Lines 
 
   under his eyes, mouth. His mouth betrayed the eyes’ attention on the 
play we saw that night (16). 
 
 
The writing in the woman’s sections of Passages is characterised by slippage and 
continuity across the line of words and my reading here will track, consider and 
respond to this. It is a quality evident in the movement of the narrative here, as it 
passages round, under, above, under, between man and birds. 12  Across the 
trajectory of the words the two become closely associated, the line(s) slanting, 
falling, straight, curved, moving together. The connecting instance, when the man’s 
action gestures the movement of the birds, is proliferated by repetitions and 
patterns in the language. Words repeat and vary so that the descriptions become 
inextricable – the hands that curve round the glass mark the birds; their movement 
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into line is in continuum with the lines on the man’s face. Birds and man are thus at 
first ‘coincidentally’ and then inextricably aligned.  
However, the seemingly chance gesture that connects them – ‘hands above 
his head, marking the design of some familiar birds’ – is also one which marks and 
declares the text’s design and fabrication. The birds move in an ordered chain, 
they turn and slant; so too does the line of words that move with and weave around 
them. Furthermore, to the knowing, watching reader, this focus on the particular 
shapes of the birds’ movement – ‘slant of wings to the slant of their bodies’ – 
announces a source text. In his acutely observational notebooks, Leonardo da 
Vinci describes the structure of birds’ wings in detail in terms of their anatomy and 
function during flight. He spends some time on the ‘lines of movements made by 
birds’, saying that ‘they enter the wind with a slanting movement from below and 
then place themselves slantwise upon the course of the wind’.13 Quin herself said 
of da Vinci’s notebooks: ‘God wot fine things these are: beautiful descriptions […] 
Have actually taken notes down and used some of his descriptions in my own 
work, juxtapositioning the words (shhhhh you’ll be the only ONE who’ll know what 
a ‘fraud’ I really am!)’.14  
As a result, the extract above manages to be both overtly written – not least 
in the way it employs and juxtaposes da Vinci’s words and phrases – and 
seemingly transparent, as if communicating a similarly acute observation. Indeed, 
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 da Vinci, Notebooks, (Ed.) Irma Richter, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, respectively 97 
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the Times Literary Supplement review praises Passages for precisely this kind of 
mimetic effect. For that reader, the ‘juxtaposition of precisely caught experiences’ 
together with ‘the confused overall shape of the story’ ‘suggest exactly the 
reactions of the traveller whose senses acquire a new responsiveness to detail’.15 
And certainly, the woman’s sections do primarily seem to respond to precise 
features of the unfamiliar landscape. Out of a train window, she observes: ‘valleys 
grown wider, deeper, where rivers continually change their position. Bases of the 
hills bent back towards the course of the river. Lights, signs from cities, villages, 
towns I know only from maps, brochures’ (7). On one level, this does indeed seem 
to be what is seen. The prose is responsive to and evocative of its surroundings, 
and the resulting accumulation of minutiae mimics the wide-eyed observations of a 
traveller, albeit one with a poetic, written turn of phrase – these hills are ‘bent 
back’. However, to the attentive reader familiar with Quin, the crafting of the 
imagery is even more obvious than this. The woman also supposedly saw the 
‘Rain walked designing its own shadow’ (7) out of the train window, with the very 
same phrase that haunts the letters and fiction of this time.16 Moreover, the shadow 
– the key symbol of both reading and design in Quin – almost immediately then 
repeats: ‘Shadow thrown on a long wall’ (8).17 
In this way, certain images or figures within the descriptions – the line and 
movement of the birds here – are imbued with apparent significance, as if aiding 
our interpretation towards a meaning beyond the words on the page. However, 
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what this writing technique actually does is elevate linguistic artistry in such a way 
that all too often the reader cannot penetrate beyond the movement and 
relationship of the textual surface of the words themselves.18 The resulting partial 
and ever-evolving repetition of already written words and phrases both disrupts 
and invigorates the sequencing and readability of the prose.  
The effect of this method can be usefully interpreted and illuminated by 
Barthes’ analysis of linguistic contagion and syntagma in ‘The Metaphor of the 
Eye’. This essay, written in response to Georges Bataille’s erotic book Story of the 
Eye (1928), claims that it is not a story of characters, but a story of the object itself 
(the eye), which moves: 
 
from image to image, in which case its story is that of migration, the 
cycle of the avatars it passes through, far removed from its original 
being, down the path of a particular imagination that distorts but never 
drops it.19  
 
In a similar way, it seems to me, the woman’s sections of Passages do not tell a 
story about the characters or their search, rather they move from image to image 
enacting a linguistic quest for revitalized narrative forms and expression. This 
quest is evident in the interrelated sequencing that characterises these parts of the 
book. The example of the movement of words and birds above not only (happily) 
coincides with Barthes’ use of the concept of migration, but their alignment also 
corresponds with his term ‘syntagma’. This, he says, means ‘the plane of 
concatenation and combination of signs at the level of actual discourse (e.g. the 
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

line of words)’ – or in other words the seriality of the prose.20 As with Bataille’s eye, 
Quin’s words here pass through a cycle of ‘avatars’, migrating between images and 
ideas that are distorted but not dropped. Further, Barthes point out that, while the 
metamorphosis of such avatars act by ‘demolishing the usual contiguities of 
objects and substituting fresh encounters’ they simultaneously insist on ‘the 
persistence of a single theme’.21 In the case of Bataille, the ‘narrative is simply a 
kind of flow of matter’: the writing is driven by the search for ever invigorated forms 
of linguistic interchange.22 This is certainly similar to the narrative technique and 
effect of the woman’s sections in Passages, which are driven by a similar impulse 
of change and continuity, transgression and resistance.  
What is more, according to Barthes – and this is where his analysis is most 
pertinent for my reading of Quin here – the point of Bataille’s book is that it is a 
restrictive form whose purpose is to bring out the terms of the various metaphors. 
In this way, neither text is concerned with realistic story or content: both are 
literature of and about a transgressive technique which succeeds by freeing ‘the 
contiguities of terms’ so that metaphors liaise and cross and ‘The world becomes 
blurred; properties are no longer separate’.23 Barthes describes the resulting ‘wavy 
meaning’ by concluding that ‘the whole of Story of the Eye signifies in the manner 
of a vibration’.24 Similarly, the word-level syntagma in Passages is an interwoven 
prose which inextricably and inexplicably connects disparate elements of the 
narration. The result is indeed blurred, the language spills over and exceeds itself, 
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its properties cannot remain separate. This effect can be found throughout the 
woman’s passages, for example in an extract where again the man’s gesture 
seems to set the chain of syntagma going: 
 
Grains in wood his fingers traced, she entered. Land many oceans 
spilled into. The way landscapes entered a room. Rooms she went 
through, corridors. Doors she opened onto carpets that grew towards 
trees, branches through walls, windows (69). 
 
Here, the experience oscillates between the real and imagined such that the 
narrative perspective is not so much an observation of the scene, but a blurring 
and communion with it.25 Her movements enter and open into the scene. She 
passages along corridors and through doors. The rooms she goes through grow 
towards trees, their branches through walls. This movement is ambiguous, for 
example when ‘she entered’, does this mean the scene where ‘his fingers’ trace 
the grains in the wood or the land oceans spill into? The construction of the 
narrative here resists interpretation. Its characteristically minimal, pared down and 
often incomplete sentences are difficult to navigate, their subjects and objects often 
impossible to determine.  
As with the ‘line of birds’ extract above, the transformative power of the 
writing here is created by the slippage and manipulation of its verbal chain. In it, 
descriptions blur into each other to the point where it becomes hard to follow their 
sense. Each focal point is effaced in favour of the next: land, landscapes, room, 
rooms, corridors, doors, and so on. The vibration in this extract is created by 
simultaneous coincidence and divergence of sound and meaning repetitions: for 
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example, the juxtaposition of ‘corridors. Doors’. In one sense this proximity is 
mundane – in life, corridors and doors often do come together. However, the 
surrounding content, together with the stuttering of the sound repetition – see also, 
for example, ‘line. Lines’ above – makes the familiar strange. Similarly, while the 
proximity of ‘land’ and ‘oceans’ is common, the verb ‘spilled’ is perhaps 
unexpected. This disruption of ordinarily expected phrasing or word grouping and 
ordering is further enhanced by the supposedly parallel action of landscapes 
entering a room. The almost naturalism of the preceding sentence implies that this 
too happens. Yes, branches can (eventually) grow through (crumbling) walls, but 
the implied momentum of the surrounding content makes the idea strange, 
fantastical. In this way the language suggests new or unexpected meanings and 
resists the reader’s desire for clarity. This technique, it seems to me, is a good 
example of how Quin’s writing in Passages disturbs ordinarily expected linguistic 
associations to disrupt and invigorate language, making it stutter into new 
meanings. 
The vibration created by this ‘blurred’ and ‘wavy’ meaning – the chain of 
morphing syntagma – can, I have argued, be interpreted in terms of Barthes’ 
reading techniques. But, what does it mean to further describe the jarring, insistent 
partial repetitions across the verbal chain as stuttering? In answer, I propose that 
the sequencing and sounds of the words stutter because often roughness and 
disruption replace smoothness and flow. This stuttering generates alternative 
meanings rather than invoking pre-existent ones.26 Most significantly, the straining 
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of language that takes place in this is simultaneously bound up with sound and 
meaning patterns. The creative effects of this stress and strain are articulated by 
Deleuze when he speaks of writers who, as he puts it, ‘minorize’ language: 
 
they make the language take flight, they send it racing along a witch’s 
line, ceaselessly placing it in a state of disequilibrium, making it bifurcate 
and vary in each of its terms, following an incessant modulation.27 
 
 
A minor use of literature makes language ‘take flight’ and sends it ‘racing along a 
witch’s line’: it destabilises and fragments language by dividing and varying its 
terms. These qualities, which result in an ‘incessant modulation’, recall the 
invigorating and blurring effects of Quin’s line of words in, for example, the ‘line of 
birds’ extract. More precisely, for the ‘branches through walls’ extract at hand, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s further discussion of ‘minor literature’ identifies the 
‘deterritorialization of language’ as one of its key characteristics.28 They describe 
this deterritorialization as an unexpected, disruptive use of language whereby it is 
either falsely enriched, or exaggeratedly pared down.29  
Thus, not only the strange use of ordinary words in the example above, but 
also the disruptive effects of sound across the syntagma, can be said to 
demonstrate how Quin’s prose vibrates, how it ‘take[s] flight’. As Deleuze and 
Guattari describe, this quality is integral to minor literature, which not only makes 
the familiar strange, but requires that its author become a ‘sort of stranger within’ 
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their own language.30 ‘Land many oceans spilled into’ is an apt example of this in 
two ways. The unusual and jumbled sentence construction, beginning with the 
(seeming) object – which lacks the expected definite article – and ending with the 
verb and preposition, reads as if written by someone foreign to the language.  
Further, as I suggest above, ‘spilled’ is not only unexpected, it is not quite right: as 
elsewhere in the woman’s sections, ‘Unmade roads curled above chasms’ (11) and 
‘fish [are] unchained at the water’s edge’ (7). Repeatedly, unusual sequencing and 
unexpected words interrupt the readability of the line of words. In this Quin writes 
as if one foreign to her own language: the language stutters and vibrates, resisting 
our reading but always luring it on.   
 
 
A woman’s eye 
 
 
Visual impressions remain the most frequent pathway along which 
libidinal excitation is aroused […] It is usual for normal people to linger to 
some extent over the intermediate sexual aim of a looking that has a 
sexual tinge to it.31 
 
 
Do if you possibly can go & see Marat/Sade it is fascinating – a dream 
within a dream (well mine anyway!)32 
 
 
One of the most significant claims of Barthes’ reading of Bataille, as I consider 
further below, is that the form of the narrative is the very basis of its transgressive 
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content: this symbiosis is also something we find in Passages. More specifically, in 
Quin’s book the sexually transgressive content primarily takes the form of, and is 
always something watched by, the culturally ambivalent figure of the female voyeur 
– a figure who both exemplifies and amplifies the function of voyeurism elsewhere 
in Quin’s writing; the necessary witness in Berg for example, or the violating 
watching in Three. The female voyeur in this third book, as I demonstrate in the 
following reading, more successfully and compellingly foregrounds the persistent, 
morphing metaphor of the seeing eye/‘I’ as a symbol for implicated, sexually tinged 
looking, as well as for the reading process itself. 
As Patricia Waugh outlines in her book, Harvest of the Sixties, Peter Weiss’s 
play Marat/Sade, put on during the RSC Theatre of Cruelty season in 1964, 
presents a battle between two opposing ideological positions that were pertinent to 
the time. The play pits the position of the rationalist French Revolutionary 
Girondiste Jean Paul Marat against that of the libertarian individualist the Marquis 
de Sade. This was relevant to the 1960s British social context, Waugh claims, 
because it connected with the quarrel between ‘rationalist’ social planners and 
‘libertine’ counter-culturists. She also points out how, in the aftermath of Auschwitz, 
Belsen and Hiroshima, the play connected with the broader context of a world 
where reason had ‘failed’.33 While in ‘Jew on the page’ below, I consider more 
broadly how Passages engages with this larger historical context, here I am 
interested in the book’s figuring of sexual desire, or libertinism – indeed in practice, 
Waugh remind us, ‘The visual impact of the play tended to emphasize desire over 
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reason’.34 In Quin’s book, the representation of sexual as well as narrative desire 
also emphasises visual impact. In this, the female voyeur figures the ‘libidinal 
excitation’ of ‘the intermediate sexual aim of a looking that has a sexual tinge to it’, 
and the lingering nature of this looking activity is both described and demanded by 
the vibrating form of the narrative itself.  
Against the stereotype of the violating and objectifying male gaze, it is a 
female voyeur in Quin’s book who watches and enjoys other women be subjected 
to sadistic sex. Yes, this kind of male gaze is present in scenes such as the 
sexualised violence of the man’s ‘retinal fantasies’ about a small beggar girl who 
with ‘legs wide apart, danced around me’ (51), but what is unusual and subversive 
here is the more frequent gaze of the female watcher. This act of looking is also an 
experience of arousal,35 and afterwards, of participation:  
 
That part I entered, where I returned. Again behind the glass I saw 
 
what did I see, for when that scene reappears it merges with a dream, 
fallen back into slowly, connected yet not connected in parts. So what I 
saw then was as much a voyeur’s sense. And since has become 
heightened. Succession of images, controlled by choice. I chose then to 
remain outside. Later I entered, allowed other entries. In that room a 
series of pictures thrown on the walls, ceiling, floor, some upsidedown. 
Only afterwards could I see things. More so now in specific detail (24). 
 
Here, the narrating ‘I’ returns to and enters a place, where, screened behind glass, 
she previously saw something with ‘a voyeur’s sense’. This ‘sense’ is both ‘in the 
manner of’ a voyeur and literally in the act of looking, the ‘sense’ of sight. In turn 
this foregrounds the reader’s eye, which, from various different positions, watches 
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the watching narrator. Moreover, what the woman sees ‘since has become 
heightened’. It is a scene which then she chose to remain outside of, looking in, but 
later ‘entered [and] allowed other entries’. As became clear above, the narrative 
momentum here – of a sequence of ‘connected yet not connected’ images – is 
typical of the chain of syntagma of the woman’s passages. What is more, as with 
the ‘line of birds’ extract, these images are not so much in succession as looping, 
and this momentum both directs and interrupts the readability of the prose: the 
narrative here circles and returns to a purposefully undefined moment – ‘that 
scene’, the ‘then’ – from several angles.  
This confused and nonlinear time-structure in Passages adds to the sense 
of distance created by the voyeurism. It is an effect that can be usefully thought 
about further with reference to Bruce Morrissette’s discussion of nouveau roman 
forms, where, he claims, a central aspect of their literary experiment is temporal 
non-specificity.36 He describes this effect as a blurring of ‘associative time’ and 
‘completely restructured time’. The blurring of the former, where memories are 
revived by the shifting states of a narrator or character – to cite an example from 
Quin: ‘behind the glass I saw/what did I see, for when that scene reappears it 
merges with a dream’ – with the latter, where the narration makes ‘impossible’ 
loops in time’, creates a ‘new fictional topology’ characterised by narratives where 
actions bend back upon themselves.37  As Morrissette further points out, these 
structures are closer to music than previous literary time patterns. Not only did 
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Quin regularly listen to jazz musicians such as Thelonius Monk and Miles Davis; 
she was more directly influenced by the music and writings of John Cage.38 It is 
unsurprising then, that she described the technique in these sections of narrative 
as ‘moving towards words and then from them v. much like jazz improvisations’.39 
With this technique, the spectating eye above is further distanced. The writing 
there assumes multiple positions and distances from the central, but absent, event 
– again reminiscent of Three. On the one hand the narrative seems to 
communicate an uninterrupted confusion of thought, dream and memory; on the 
other its looping repetition creates the sticky web of a constructed pattern of 
associations.  
Indeed, it is precisely the stickiness of these associations which is important 
for assessing the transgressive potential of the female voyeur here. In Barthes’ 
discussion of Story of the Eye he pinpoints what he claims to be the crux of its 
eroticism: its chain of metaphors always carries a residue that ensures a unifying 
substance across different versions of the same idea. This ‘contagion of qualities’ 
lies at the root of Bataille’s eroticism:  
 
In this way the transgression of values that is the avowed principle of 
eroticism is matched by – if not based on – a technical transgression of 
the forms of language, for the metonymy is nothing but a forced 
syntagma, the violation of a limit to the signifying space.40  
 
Barthes’ point demonstrates the close relationship between linguistic and erotic 
transgression. In Passages, not only do we find ‘technical transgression[s] of the 
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forms of language’ in the ‘forced syntagma’ of a vibrating and stuttering, 
deterritorialized prose that characterises the woman’s sections, but Quin called this 
her ‘pornographic book’, implying a transgression of values whereby the sex would 
be plentiful and risqué.41 In fact, its sex scenes are few and their artificial manner 
reminiscent of nothing more than clichéd erotic set-pieces. However, as Barthes 
points out above, in Bataille’s book the transgression of values is ‘matched by – if 
not based on – a technical transgression’. In Quin’s writing too, the desire to 
transgress norms manifests more in formal experiment than narrative content. 
Thus, whether or not her erotic content is transgressive is not necessarily based on 
how explicit the sex scenes are, but rather on the violence of the ‘forced syntagma’ 
of her prose. Further, the contagion of such over-determined and highly patterned 
writing calls to mind Ahmed’s theory of disgust where certain ideas get stuck 
together through a history of association.42 As such, the chain of metaphors carries 
a residue, a contagion, which acts to infect any new association: ‘Such objects 
[ideas or words] become sticky or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and 
social tension’.43  
What is more, in Passages, the figure of the female voyeur is a potent sticky 
and erotic symbol that evokes social tension and cultural ambiguity by the 
simultaneous continuation and disruption of the idea of voyeurism. All of Quin’s 
writing asserts that looking is an important part of sexual arousal, but it is only in 
this book that it is done by a woman. In particular, the nature of the looking here 
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disrupts the border that exists and is created between watcher and watched. This 
is because the voyeur is both separate from – watches from a distance – and 
participates in – is implicated by sexual arousal – what they watch. Thus, while the 
border between watcher and watched is a barrier, it is also a blurring and point of 
contact between the two. As Ahmed identifies, sticky surfaces connect as much as 
they distance: they are ‘boundaries that allow the distinction between subjects and 
objects’ to be ‘undone in the moment of their making’.44 For example, in the extract 
above, the watching woman tries to remember, can see ‘More so now in specific 
detail’, a sex scene shortly revealed as one where: 
 
the three 
 
   lay there, their legs, arms linked in the formation of a dance. Under 
the chandelier they moved slowly. He in the middle hardly moved, 
watching the two women circle. Their backs arched, breasts thrust high, 
forward. The leather strap he passed through suspenders. Black 
slithered across white, between the less black. His head raised, then 
bent. Arms spread out from the white sleeves. He balanced a whip in 
each hand. The girl strapped to the chair. Her head swayed over the 
back, hair hung down. Legs apart, fruit placed between. Sound of whip 
meeting flesh, into a rhythm, slow at first. Merged with the music, as she 
danced on the table, danced with her shadow, bent back as though to 
perform a backward somersault, while the other woman behind 
stretched out both her hands as if to catch the flying figure (25).45 
 
The sex here is closely directed and choreographed. Three actors merge and 
dance together, their movement sways, bends, arches, slithers: at the same time 
the scene is in slow motion. The props – whips, suspenders, fruit – are all there. 
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Further, the presence of the watcher, which presences the reader, together with 
the nature of the scene seen – the ‘legs apart, fruit placed between’ – renders this 
a premeditated and intentionally performed theatrical act.46  
While Quin herself described this as a ‘gt. orgy scene more or less ending 
1st pt. of book’, 47  this sadistic dance is actually rather tame. Indeed, for one 
reviewer, these gratuitous – but ultimately rather static – sex scenes are 
disappointing: ‘the temperature of even the most torrid moments of sex passages 
never rise above 4 degrees’.48 However, this appraisal in fact misses the way in 
which these erotic scenes are directly reminiscent and parodic of the formulaic and 
structured eroticism of writers like Bataille and Sade, whose transgressive literature 
flouts tableaux, parody and pastiche: all of which are employed here too. In 
addition, although Anais Nin’s ‘erotica’ – Delta of Venus (1977) and Little Birds 
(1979) – was yet to be published, it had been written much earlier, in the 1940s, 
and its caricatured and theatrical sexual content is arguably echoed in some of the 
techniques of Nin’s other fiction, which Quin had read.49 To me it is clear that the 
sex scenes in Passages are a conscious play with such staged and formulaic 
writing. 
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In addition, as Carter points out, the supposed acceptance of female as well 
as male promiscuity in the sexual liberation era of the 1960s brought with it a 
ritualising aspect. Here, libertine sex was an ‘act’, a rite of passage: ‘In this period’, 
she says, ‘‘promiscuous abandon’ seemed the only type of free exchange’. 50 
However, this abandon simultaneously forgets that ‘pornography [itself] must 
always have the false simplicity of the fable’, because it ‘deals in false universals’.51 
In this way, supposed greater sexual freedom also renewed sexual stereotypes. It 
is therefore unsurprising that Quin’s book emphasises the fable-like and distancing 
quality of staged eroticism. Here, the female voyeurism of the erotic scenes in 
Passages evokes, interrogates and rejects the ‘false universals’ of the male and 
female in terms of watching sex. The resulting sex scenes both enact and parody 
representations of eroticism and sexual desire. Their purpose is bound up with the 
mythologizing and distancing of sex. While it is true that the result is rather 
formulaic, it seems to me that this is precisely the point. There are plenty of places 
where Quin’s writing is obscenely sexual – (again) Leonard’s fingering of the 
orchids in Three, for example, or the endless hammering in ‘Never Trust A Man 
Who Bathes With His Finger Nails’. Here, as Stevick rightly puts it: ‘the 
phenomenal world tends to appear as if charged with sexual energy’.52  
In Passages, however, the purpose of the framed and watched sex scenes 
is something quite different. As ever, Quin’s greatest innovations and 
transgressions lie in their interrogation of pre-existent narrative structures and 
stereotypes; but here, the ambiguous position of the female voyeur also acts to 
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convincingly interrogate cultural stereotypes. In the scene above, the man is 
distanced from his action by using a whip to hit the girl’s flesh; he is also distanced 
by his position as voyeur as well as participant in the scene. Further, as he looks at 
the two women, the narrative’s female protagonist watches them being watched by 
him. Her watching action creates a further layer of distance but it also in turn 
further objectifies them and, by implication, herself.53 Traditionally, as Mary Ann 
Doane points out in her interrogation of stereotypes of the female spectator of 
cinema, this group has been assigned a certain ‘naiveté’: ‘a tendency to deny the 
processes of representation, to collapse the opposition between the sign (the 
image) and the real’.54 In this way, according to Doane, a distinction has been 
made, not only between supposedly active male gaze and passive female image, 
but also between an assumed objectivity of the male gaze compared to the 
‘longing, overinvolved female spectator’.55 Indeed, she identifies all too ‘recurrent 
suggestions of deficiency, inadequacy, and failure in the woman’s appropriation of 
the gaze’.56  
While the sex scene above does merge ‘with a dream’, suggesting a 
collapse between the imagined and real, the spectator there also (initially, at least) 
remains very much apart from what she watches: in this sense the woman in 
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Passages can be said to successfully appropriate the male gale. This sense of 
distance is enhanced by the succession of images being behind glass – in turn this 
evokes the cinema screen, a further distancing effect. Indeed, throughout these 
sections of the book photographs are repeatedly taken and looked at; mirrors are 
looked into; scenes framed by windows. The distancing and framing of the gaze 
which results foregrounds the figure of the spectator. This is a figure in which, 
despite the insistence of distance, Doane claims; ‘there is [also] a curious 
operation by means of which the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ of discourse are collapsed’.57 In 
Passages the position of the spectator, together with the shifting narrative 
perspective, problematises and collapses boundaries between ‘I’ (or eye) and 
‘you’, voyeur and reader, seer and seen.  
 
However, this is not to forget that in Passages, as in Berg and Three, the looking 
always happens both ways – there is always the paranoiac feeling of being 
watched as well as the arousing act of watching: 
 
I think we are still being watched. He stood back from the window. 
There’s a man on the corner—been there all morning I think he must be 
a Government agent or security police—do you recognise him? The 
sunglasses unmistakable. I could not be certain. He did not have a 
beard. And yet the suit, yes (70).58 
 
 
As the woman and man travel ever onwards, there are figures who ‘must be’ 
Government agents lurking outside their hotel, guards and police who ‘must be’ 
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bribed, officials who try to obstruct their search. The book describes a volatile 
situation: ‘political situation here is intolerable. There’s no hope unless a revolution 
starts. Bloodshed under clear skies. Such a climate brings murder/war crimes 
easily’ (35). This threat of violence is generated throughout the narrative by the 
rumours of shootings and torture, and stories of prisoners who have been ‘beaten 
with truncheons on the face and head’, and ‘taken to the terraced roof of the 
building for ‘special treatment’’ (78). In this climate, the search for the brother 
inevitably results in a series of interrogations by police, ministers, soldiers and 
officers. The resulting tension, between the paranoia of being observed, 
interrogated and pursued and the arousing act of voyeurism, is indicative of a shift 
from watcher to watched that increasingly becomes the perspective of Quin’s later 
writing, as my reading of both Tripticks and The Unmapped Country attests. In this 
trajectory, the ambivalence of watching in Passages marks a tipping point.  
 
 
Myth in the Margins 
 
To make an order out          I would like to exhaust the limits of the 
of myth/the past                                         possible (92). 
 
 
Have also been reading quite a bit: a fascinating book about the 
Mormons + their ‘prophet’ Joseph Smith (what a ‘phoney’ he was – wow 
– he had about 40 ‘plural’ wives). Also equally fascinating a book I 
actually bought on Pueblo Gods + Myths. Strangely enough I had been 
reading Jane Harrison’s book on Greek Religion, and had been thinking 
how very similar the rituals, the ceremonies/respect/fear for the 
‘underworld’ was to the Indians sense of it all; anyway the book [on 
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Pueblo religion] draws comparisons with the Greek legends, so it all 
seems to tie up with some of my own conclusions.59  
 
 
So far in this chapter I have focussed on the woman’s sections of narrative, for the 
remainder, I consider the form – most notably the question of the strain ‘the myth in 
the margins’ places on sequential readability – as well as a significant aspect of 
representation – the cultural ambiguity of the figure of the Jew – in the man’s diary. 
What interests me here is the reading effect of the myth in the margins, not least 
because much of the mythical content in these sections continues the book’s 
preoccupation with seeing and the eye. This analysis will engage a further aspect 
of Barthes’ reading methodology, in order to develop a way of meaningfully reading 
across and through the parallel columns of text and cut-up techniques that 
comprise the man’s sections of Passages. 
The letter above evidences Quin’s broad and pervading interest in myth and 
religion; from Mormonism, to Pueblo gods and myth, to Jane Harrison’s 
anthropological reading of Greek religion. More specifically, as the oedipal parody 
in Berg and the grotesque classical statues of Three attest, their author was not 
only well versed in, for example, stories of Greek mythology, but also saw them as 
essential for interpreting the modern world. While myth is not solely confined to the 
margins in Passages, it is in the parallel structures of the man’s journal that the 
alignment between myth and modernity is most evidently acted out. Here, diary 
entries are accompanied by notes containing excerpts of myth so as to ‘make an 
order out of myth/the past’ as well as to test ‘the limits of the possible’. This tension 
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(visibly here) enacts the transgressive-resistant paradox of Quin’s writing as a 
whole, as well as challenging and invigorating the reading process. Indeed, the 
structuring of these sections, which refuses a linear sequentially between past and 
present, is ideal for considering questions of sequential readability and simultaneity 
in Quin’s texts as a whole.60 
While Barber’s review has it that ‘The tremendous energy of Passages 
derives from its extraordinary alliance of classicism and chaos’;61 for others, the 
book is unjustifiably disrupted by the fact that much of the myth in the margins is 
comprised of a close and unacknowledged paraphrasing of Harrison’s 
Prolegomena to the study of Greek Religion (1903). Nye, for example, objected 
that the book is ‘too rigorously informed by’ this source text ‘choice bits of which’, 
he says, ‘float about undigested in [Quin’s] text’.62 While it is an exaggeration to 
say that the excerpts and ideas from the Prolegomena just ‘float about undigested’, 
Nye’s objection has a point. Harrison’s descriptions and interpretations of ancient 
Greek artefacts are indeed often taken out of context and are always without the 
visual aid included there. Instead, in Passages, the excerpts are placed side-by-
side or one after the other with journal entries without explicit connection or 
relationship, and we must wonder at the reason for this. Faced with texts which 
seem unrelated, the desire for narrative comprehension makes us seek similarities 
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but the simultaneity of the layout on the page does mean that we are left to rather 
‘improvise an order of reading’ than ascertain one.63  
But, even once we do improvise an order for reading these fragments of 
text, the narrative itself remains in a resistant parataxis – or disequilibrium – and 
this means that our reading is always an ambivalent one. Thus, the reader here 
must always be prepared to, with Barthes, acknowledge and negotiate the 
difficulty, or indeed ideally, to ‘savour [the] friction between two intelligibilities’:64  
 
 
Drawing of a third Sometimes she talks in her sleep. Names I don’t  
Siren’s eye by  know. Some secret language. She says I talk  
two strokes only,  Hebrew in my sleep, yet I only know a few words 
without the pupil : in that language. There are moments when she  
the sightless eye, looks at me startled, not really seeing me, perhaps 
eye in death/  thinking I am someone else. The walls shift in  
sleep/blindness.  patterns, colour, shapes behind her head, and I  
think I am somewhere else. At home perhaps, 
when the murmurs are Mother’s, made from her 
bed, the light shining from the kitchen, stopping in 
a blade of light at the foot of the bed. How I hated 
mother then. Day after day (and nights, long 
Image of myself   nights) of pain. Windows closed. Curtains pulled, 
as Bar-Lgura, the thin-walled box rooms. Death, the smell of it, of 
Semetic [sic] demon sickness permeated everything. Nurses, doctors 
sitting on the  came and went, she thought they were family. I 
roof and leaping  took her hot drinks and thought of pissing in them  
down on them all . (37).65 
 
As our eye passages to-and-fro across the page here, there are plenty of what 
seem to be connections between the two columns of text. The annotations on the 
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left do appear to comment on and give meaning to the memories narrated on the 
right, where the Jewish man narrates the experience of watching his mother dying. 
The accompanying notes in the margin include a description of a drawing which 
illustrates the sightless eye of a third siren, as well as the narrator’s self-
identification with the image of Bar-Lgura, an occult Semitic demon. The content of 
the parallels and sequencing here imply a reading between Hellenic and Judaic 
traditions. For example, a connection is suggested between the ‘Drawing of a third 
Siren’s eye’, taken from a description in the Prolegomena, and the mother’s 
death.66 In this way, the imagery and connotations of ‘eye’, ‘sleep’ ‘blindness’ and 
‘death’ do seem to connect the marginal notes with the journal text. But, in the 
extract above, it is unclear what the exact relationship between marginal note and 
journal is meant to be, whether interpretative or incidental, and consequentially we 
are left unsure as how to read it.  
What is more, such eye-sleep-blindness-death connotations echo across the 
man’s journal sections to seemingly guide, and then in turn again frustrate, the 
reading process. The closed eye of the siren above evokes the myth of Medusa – 
in terms of her blindness as well as the death that seeing her brings. Fittingly in 
Passages, the Medusa story is represented in a dream: she is indeed encountered, 
as she only can be, while the man’s eyes are closed. The description of the dream 
(as well as its ‘cut-up’) is accompanied by an excerpt from Harrison describing a 
‘black-figured olpe’, which depicts the slaying of Medusa by Perseus. The 
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descriptions of Medusa in the dream(s) in the man’s journal narrative focuses on 
the ‘evil’ power of her eyes. The narration of the ‘Dream’ begins:  
 
Medusa entered my room. I felt uneasy, certain she had only evil 
intentions. I had the revolver ready. I could just see her eyes, great 
glowing ovals; I would aim at those – just two shots (102). 
 
 
This singular narrative passage is followed by several more of the ‘Cut-up dream’ 
which begins: 
 
Medusa entered a room that opened out onto the balcony. I had evil 
intentions. She had the revolver ready. I saw three women, great 
glowing ovals, on a mattress, in an arc (102).67 
 
Narration of the dream in the cut-up continues with a grotesque and almost fairy-
tale sexual fantasy, involving two ‘monstrous guardians’ and a girl, all of whom 
have ‘large warts covering their bodies’ (102). This development of the scene is in 
turn the cut-up of another dream.68 Both dreams here begin with the entrance of 
Medusa, whose ‘evil’ eyes must be annihilated. The metamorphosis of ‘her eyes, 
great glowing ovals’ into ‘three woman, great glowing ovals’ recalls the syntagma 
of the woman’s narrative sections: the eyes are in turn ovals that become 
women.69 Not only this, but the evocation of the Medusa story also calls to mind 
Derrida’s meditation on the act of representation in Memoirs of the Blind, which 
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must take place during the suspension of the gaze.70 Similarly, it is only ever during 
the suspension of the gaze that Medusa can be encountered. In this way, her story 
is a literary one which interrogates the relationship between looking at and 
(re)presenting. Further, the ambiguous relation of the cut-up to the ‘original’ version 
here calls attention to Quin’s writing process.71 In this, partially repeated content is 
complicated rather than elucidated by the paratactic juxtaposition of the three 
versions of the story. 
In addition to the echoes between the two textual examples above then, the 
unresolved parataxis of their different textual fragments means that it is not 
possible to ascertain what kind of interpretative value either content or structural 
similarities may have. Is there any meaningful or useful relationship between the 
closed eye of the siren and the man talking Hebrew in his sleep? Or between the 
Medusa story and the man’s dream? A coincidence of ideas does not necessarily 
illuminate the meaning of either content. And what about the differences that 
remind us these may be merely juxtaposed or incidentally connected texts? More 
often than not, the marginal notes problematise, rather than aid, the desire to make 
sense of the narrative: their paratactic relation resists the desire for narrative 
progress and understanding. For many readers, such resistance closed down 
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possibilities of reading and enjoyment.72 But for others, myself included, the activity 
of negotiating the difficulties created by this parataxis is actually precisely what 
frees up and invigorates the reading process so that: ‘the effect of the diary 
sections [...] – even where it fails to explain motive or predicament in the ordinary 
sense – does suggest a different order of experience’.73  
In this way, while the interpretive relationship between the texts in Passages 
remains unclear, the structure of the journal could be said to ‘suggest a different 
order of experience’ and thus successfully interrogate the supposed mimesis of 
experience as narrated in a linear narrative. Here, the reading effect of the 
unresolved tension, rather than its resolution, is paramount. Barthes’ ‘The Struggle 
with the Angel’ provides a similarly open-ended textual analysis of Genesis 32: 22-
32 that allows for – and indeed celebrates – on-going ambivalence and friction 
between different ways of making the text intelligible. There, he describes how, 
when what exactly is going on in a text remains ‘oblique, readability is diverted’.74 
Similarly in Passages, the parallel structure of the man’s journal sections diverts 
readability by confusing our sense of how to proceed. In addition, for Barthes 
precisely what is interesting about reading the Genesis passage is its ‘abrasive 
frictions, the breaks, the discontinuities of readability, the juxtaposition of narrative 
entities which to some extent run free from an explicit logical articulation’.75 This 
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response, it seems to me, is directly relevant for the experience of reading Quin’s 
text: here too the friction, discontinuity and juxtaposition of the man’s journal 
sections refuse a more logical or coherent form of articulation or description, which 
would anyway only be reductive, and demand that the experience of reading 
remain crucially open and ambivalent. 
 Significantly, by reading and rewriting Harrison’s own re-reading of Greek 
myth, Passages is already involved in an open-ended reading process. Harrison, a 
progressive feminist scholar and close associate of Virginia Woolf’s, wrote the 
Prolegomena to redress ‘a fundamental error in method’: ‘the habit of viewing 
Greek religion exclusively through the medium of Greek literature’.76 Instead, her 
writing offered the first anthropological interpretation of Greek mythology. The 
structure of this discussion is based on a search for the (hidden) patterns and 
meaning of artefacts, and in turn the practices and beliefs they delineate. In 
particular, as Bowlby points out, Harrison insists on the ambiguity of myth in 
relation to the female body.77 For example, in pre-patriarchal communities, fertility 
rites centred on women’s bodies and nature. More specifically, Greek religion was 
able to reinterpret pre-patriarchal beliefs in terms of its own mythology, while 
maintaining the intensity of feeling and loyalty granted the earlier rites. As a result, 
Harrison’s writing already engages with the process of interpreting, describing and 
enacting narrative and cultural evolution: the Prolegomena participates in a 
reinterpretation of Greek myths as already themselves being ‘modern’ 
developments of older beliefs. 
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In this way, I propose, the retelling and repositioning of myth also engages 
Passages in an ever on-going and evolving reading process. This assertion is 
supported by Quin’s reading of books such as H.D’.s Helen in Egypt (1961), which 
demonstrates her knowledge of other avant garde appropriations of mythic stories, 
as well as of these source texts themselves.78 Helen in Egypt, a modernist poetic 
recreation of the Greek version of the story, has an experimental paratactic 
structure somewhat similar to that in Passages. The several sections of the book 
intercut illustrative reasoning about Helen’s situation with passages of poetry. The 
two texts act in tension with each other: although there are similarities, they are 
also highly different in both content and form, and the relationship between the two 
remains unexplained.79  
Thus, in similar ways, the Prolegomena, Helen in Egypt and Passages aim 
to open up the reading process and free their source texts from static meaning. 
This technique was also one employed by the nouveau roman, which, according to 
Morrissette, appropriated mythic parallelism precisely to draw attention to the 
processes of narrative evolution. In particular, the juxtaposition of classicism and 
chaos there insists on ‘the transition from modalities of ‘plot’ to those of structure’.80 
Yes, mythic content can link contemporary scenarios and concerns to ancient or 
seemingly archetypal models, but more importantly there is a productive and 
illustrative counterpoint between the modalities of myth and nouveau roman texts. 
The plotted patterns of the former are contrasted with the chance arrangements of 
what Morrissette calls ‘unmotivated synchronicities’ in the latter. In this, the 
                                                 
78
 Letter: Quin to Robert Sward, August 10th 1966, Robert Sward Papers, Series 1.1, box 8. 
79
 See H.D. (Hilda Doolittle), Helen in Egypt, New York: New Directions Books, 1961. 
80
 Morrissette, ‘International aspects of the ‘Nouveau Roman’, 157. 



seeming chaos of the nouveau roman juxtaposes with the classicism of myth as a 
claim to narrative progress and development: thus, the direct contrast with myth is 
precisely what frees up the writing process.  
However, while Morrissette’s interpretation here is valuable, it perpetuates 
an assumption that myth itself is static, that it fixes or structures representation and 
interpretation, that its archetypes deny agency or change. If this were true, the 
characters in Passages could indeed end up being reduced to: ‘components of 
archetypes which role forces a certain fate upon them’.81 But, as Bowlby reminds 
us, while myths might seem to be unchanging archetypes, they in fact ‘alter their 
possible or likely meanings according to the changing cultural contexts in which 
they are retold’.82 She explains her decision to use ‘mythologies’ in these terms: 
‘because, unlike ‘ideology’ or ‘theory’, the word implies a narrative movement of 
telling and retelling that at once sustains and changes the likely or fabulous ideas 
and stories in circulation’.83 For Passages, it is helpful to think about this in terms of 
the search for the brother, which recalls the Antigone myth. Antigone, daughter of 
Oedipus and Jocasta, is obsessed with securing a respectable burial for her 
brother, Polynices. Antigone breaks a law forbidding her to mourn or bury him and 
after she has been caught and tried for these, commits suicide. In the book, the 
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man says of the woman ‘She’s playing Antigone’ (34). 84  The remark connects with 
the idea of an archetype: the woman plays out the role of suffering sister, here for 
the effect of alluring other men. However, as Judith Butler points out in her 
reinterpretation of the Antigone myth, this is a character whose grief is an 
ambiguous act of defiance which cannot be reduced to an only a symbolic one. In 
this the myth specifically refuses readings that want to reduce it into fixed 
archetype and abstraction.85  
In some ways then, the myth in the margins in Passages does create an 
ironic counterpoint between intentional pattern and seemingly chance 
arrangements: its parallel lineation suggests a spontaneity and simultaneity of 
association and composition, but at the same time the journal form is restricted by 
the construct of its structures and cut-ups. In this, here, as elsewhere in Quin, the 
writing resists what it at the same time tries to enact: to push beyond the confines 
of what went before by virtue of being steeped in it. More specifically, rather than 
being a contrast with static archetypes, it is the continuing alliance, or back-and-
forth, between classicism and chaos, myth and innovation, that is revealed as an 
essential part of the writing and reading processes. The resulting multifocal and 
ambiguous reading experience is always an evolving and invigorated one. To me, 
this is the most persuasive way that the myth in the margins defies sequential 
readability and embodies an argument for a radical change in both narrative 
structures and reading processes. 
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Jew on the page 
 
 
Jewish couple next door. Her large nose, dark hairline above the mouth, 
slender body. He shorter, plump, coughs a lot at night. They walk one 
behind the other in the park opposite the hotel. Their tumbled bed in the 
morning.  
 
The American couple opposite play cards, watch television all day, half 
the night. Their neatly made beds in the morning (30).  
 
 
Strange kind of insular feeling one has in this country, cut off from all the 
violence, wars etc. Films of Vietnam, the Congo, Israel etc., followed by 
the guy who does the weather forecast ‘our immediate concern is now 
the weather’.86 
 
 
The presence of the ‘Jew on the page’ is a paradigm example of how Passages is 
actively engaged in reading and re-reading significant aspects of its cultural and 
literary precedents. Thus, finally here, I assess the interpretative role and effects of 
this most politically and historically charged aspect of the book’s content, to 
consider how the narrative participates in and interrogates stereotypes of the Jew 
in British fiction; and in addition, how this culturally ambivalent content might further 
figure and complicate the readability and transgressive-resistant paradox of the 
book’s experimental form. What emerges out of both my and the narrative’s 
(re)reading of representations of the Jew, is the veracity and difficulty of the 
connection implied above – between the assumed otherness of the ‘Jewish couple 
next door’ and ‘insular’ and ‘cut off’ position of Britain in the 1960s.  
More specifically, in this letter, Quin claims that the most urgent Jewish 
question of the time (Israel) is one of the situations – together with those in the 
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Congo and Vietnam – treated as distant and distinct from ‘our immediate concern’ 
in ‘this country’. The wry inverted commas communicate her heightened 
awareness, having recently returned from America, of the British tendency to 
distance itself from world politics. However, this awareness is somewhat 
undermined, and her own tendency to British insularism somewhat confirmed, by 
letters to the Jewish Carol Burns, where Quin, albeit unwittingly, evidences and 
perpetuates a casual anti-Semitism as she jokes about ‘yids eating and farting’.87 
While this repeats a phrase Carol had herself used, when the comment comes 
from a Catholic writer’s pen, it is deeply ambiguous if not offensive. Concurrently, 
Quin felt herself to be philo-Semitic: both the book and letters from the time are 
fascinated with Jewishness. This ambivalence is interesting for two specific 
reasons. First, because it seems to participate in a similarly ambivalent position to 
that of the longstanding British literary fascination with the figure of the Jew; 
second, because of the book’s 1960s context.  
 For me, the stereotyped description of the Jewish couple above makes for 
uncomfortable reading. Without wanting to overemphasise, any stereotyping of 
physical Jewish characteristics seems dangerous and loaded. Given the timing of 
Passages – written in the same decade that the widely reported Eichmann trial 
took place in Jerusalem 88  – we must ask how deliberate or unwitting the 
implications of these seemingly brief and almost throwaway remarks are, as well 
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as what their purpose might be. The short, plump, coughing male Jewish body, for 
example, recalls nineteenth century stereotypes about the degenerate, rather than 
what Max Nordau called the ‘muscle Jew’. The former stereotype was a feminised 
character with a weak and inferior physique subservient to his intellect.89 Further, in 
the example above, the man’s feminisation is heightened by the contrast with the 
woman’s stereotypically male (and Jewish?) characteristics of a large nose and 
dark hairline above the mouth. This stereotype of the otherness of an unattractive, 
hairy Jewish woman recalls, for example, the ambivalence towards Honor Klein in 
Iris Murdoch’s The Severed Head (1961), who the protagonist initially finds 
repulsive and unfeminine, but later irresistible.90 
While in Passages the narrative’s remark on this Jewish couple is clearly as 
figures of interest, intrigue and difference, what is less clear is whether they are 
objects of repulsion or admiration. If their physical characteristics do not make 
them appealing, arguably the tumbled bed in the morning does. This implies a 
warmth and intimacy that is emphasised by contrast with the American couple’s 
passive television watching and neatly made bed. The Jewish couple might be 
physically unattractive, the narrative implies, but they are also passionate, and in 
this way appealing. Of course, however, the appeal of the implied passion of their 
tumbled bed can be seen to itself enact another stereotype, which is that of the 
animalistic passions of the exotic other.  
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The ambiguity of this attraction/repulsion reflects what scholars such as 
Nadia Valman, Bryan Cheyette and Tony Kushner have argued is a wider, and 
specifically English, attitude towards Jews. They find a continuing ambivalence 
towards the figure of the Jew in the English literary imaginary, in which anti and 
philo Semitism become indistinguishable. As Cheyette put it in his 2011 article 
‘English anti-Semitism: a counter-narrative’: ‘perceptions of Jewish Otherness […] 
are deeply ingrained in British culture’.91 In illustration, he offers a story about 
Martin and Kingsley Amis that exemplifies this position: ‘Both father and son […] 
considered Jews to be ‘exotic and different’. As a result, Martin Amis ended up 
liking Jews whereas Kingsley Amis disliked them. One should not underestimate 
this statement’.92 It is not so much the professed like or dislike of the Jewish figure 
that is important here, but the problem inherent with both father and son’s 
positioning of the Jew as wholly other. Zygmunt Bauman has called this ‘practice of 
setting the Jews apart as people radically different from all the other’ 
‘allosemitism’. 93  This position ‘is essentially non-committal […] it does not 
unambiguously determine either hatred or love of Jews, but contains the seeds of 
both’.94 It seems to me that not only is this allosemitism, or radically ambivalent 
attitude towards the (perceived) other, present in the attitude towards the Jewish 
couple above – as well as throughout Passages – but that it also characterises 
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 Cheyette, ‘English anti-Semitism: a counter-narrative’, Textual Practice 25(1), 2011, 23. Howard 
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Barber’s review of the book. He calls the man ‘a satyr, maimed by his own duality – 
in a sense, by his alien Jewishness’.95  
Indeed, this kind of ambivalent stereotype comes informed – and probably 
somewhat shaped – by fictitious assumptions about the Jew perpetuated in the 
nineteenth-century English literary imaginary: Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist (1838) 
and George Du Maurier’s Trilby (1894) are obvious examples here. More 
specifically, a significant instance of this tradition can be found in George Eliot’s 
Daniel Deronda (1876). 96  This book, although championed by many Jewish 
readers at the time, has since been criticised for perpetuating nineteenth-century 
stereotypes in, for example: the sensitive, feminised Daniel Deronda; the brilliant 
but unnerving Herr Klesma; the pawnbroker Ezra Cohen; the prophetic Mordecai; 
and the tragic Jewess, Mirah Lapidoth. All are figures of simultaneous desire and 
repulsion or pity, and all are placed always slightly outside of and in tension with 
British culture itself.97 Indeed, a similar attitude pervades into many early twentieth-
century examples. For example, the fascination, despite disgust, with the Jew next 
door in Woolf’s The Years: ‘‘Damn the Jew!’ he [North] exclaimed. The thought of a 
line of grease from a strange man’s body on the bath next door disgusted him’.98  
Against this background, it is clear that some of the representation in 
Passages – for example the Jewish couple above – to some extent participates in 
such allosemitism. It is, for example, certainly something we again find in the 
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 Barber, ‘The Human Sorceress’, 5.  
96
 This was a book Quin had read. Indeed, the title for Quin’s last and unfinished book, The 
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female character’s attitude to the man’s Jewish, heritage. 99  Her ambivalent 
fascination is evident as one minute she criticises ‘you and your middle-class 
Jewish upbringing […] never a step out of place that’s your trouble’ (89), the next 
she admires it:  
 
She envies my Jewish blood, no reason, at least 
she said there wasn’t any specific one. Envy for 
the historical sense of it all, a meaning for feeling 
persecuted? Strangely enough I’ve felt more 
Jewish with her curiosity that I’ve ever felt before. 
Though usually I feel no more Jewish than 
    
    lover 
         husband 
Can be any one of brother 
these, according  father 
to whim/projec-  guardian ‘The scape-goat stood all skin and 
tion. What is it/  prophet         bone 
shall it be for  mystic  While moral business, not his own, 
today   writer   Was bound about his head’. 
    addict 
   = demi-god  
   = beast   Hebrew Conception: 
The scape-goat was not a 
sacrifice proper :  its sending 
away was preceded by 
sacrifice. 
    
‘And the goat shall bear upon him all their 
iniquities into a land not inhabited’ (37-
38).100    
  
 
Here, the attitude and expectations of the non-Jewish woman are placed in 
parataxis – and arguably in tension – with the thoughts of the Jewish man, as 
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perceptions of other and otherness are pitted against each other. His 
characterising himself as variously ‘lover’, ‘brother’, ‘prophet’, ‘mystic’ and ‘demi-
god’ delineates the range of roles supposedly available to him. However, when 
read in conjunction with both the three meditations on the scape-goat and the 
woman’s curiosity about him as Jewish, these roles seem narrowed down and 
recast in terms of religious inheritance. What is interesting here is that the narrative 
is explicit about what makes the man feel the most Jewish, and this is the woman’s 
curiosity about him. This notion of the otherness of the Jew as being something 
itself cast by others – both within the narrative here, and without, in terms of the 
man as a character written by Quin – recalls Sartre’s discussion in Anti-Semite and 
Jew (1965), which claims that the Jew’s identity as ‘a Jew’ is always something 
given to him by others.101  
Thus, by figuring the woman’s curiosity as reductive, Passages can be seen 
to raise and engage with important questions about where representations of 
Jewishness (in British fiction) come from: it asks who exactly the other is in such a 
representation, and points out how a fascination with otherness actually serves to 
skew representation. Moreover, my suggestion that the narrative problematises 
stereotyping here is confirmed by the woman’s ‘Envy for the historical sense of it 
all, a meaning for feeling persecuted’ together with the three-fold representation of 
ideas about the ‘scape-goat’, both of which, through mimicry and repetition, 
interrogate the idea that the Jewish role in history is fixed. Such an assumption is 
in fact based on a stereotyped, outdated and mythical idea of the Torah as 
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unchanging and legalistic, as well as an eschatological view in terms of the Jew as 
eternal victim after the holocaust. 102  In turn, this kind of misrepresentation 
perpetuates the misconception of a perceived tension between the supposed 
flexibility, spontaneity and progression of Hellenism against an assumed strictness 
of conscience of Hebraism. 103  It is worth noting that in Passages myth and 
Jewishness are both read as creative, evolving and responsive positions. 
The problem, then as Passages itself suggests, with the woman’s ‘historical’ 
sense of Jewishness is that it is framed in terms of a fixed mythology. In turn, 
Cheyette has considered this kind of misrepresentation itself in historical terms: 
‘We need to dismantle a view of anti-Semitism as a free-floating eternal hatred and 
locate discourse about Jews, certainly in the modern and contemporary era, within 
specific contexts and events’. 104  Given this, what happens when we further 
consider Jewishness in Passages specifically in terms of historical context? Written 
in the late ‘60s during an era of ‘liberal revolution’ at the same time as a critical one 
in terms of Jewish identity in a post-Holocaust world, the book is ideally placed for 
interrogating the position of Jews in the British literary imagination. In the 1960s the 
full facts of the Holocaust were beginning to come to light and, after the Suez crisis 
of 1956 and ‘the six-day war’ in 1967, issues surrounding the legitimacy of Israel – 
and by implication, Judaism’s place in the modern world and imaginary – were 
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highly topical: Tony Benn’s 1970 response to Enoch Powell’s 1968 ‘rivers of blood’ 
speech consciously evoked the holocaust. Benn’s wording – ‘the flag of racialism 
that has been hoisted in Wolverhampton [Powell’s constituency] is beginning to 
look like the one that fluttered 25 years ago over Dachau and Belsen’ – is, for 
Kushner, evidence of gross misappropriation.105  This kind of misrepresentation 
was exacerbated by a pervasive, casualised prejudice against Jews at this time in 
British culture, as Muriel Spark’s story ‘The Gentile Jewesses’ (1963) evidences. 
Here, a character claims that to admit Jewish heritage would be ‘bad for 
business’.106 The narrator adds: ‘she would have been amazed at any suggestion 
that this attitude was a weak or wrong one’.107 This echoes and perpetuates earlier 
attitudes described by George Orwell in ‘Antisemitism in Britain’ (1945), where he 
identifies a pervasive anti-Jewish prejudice concurrent with a refusal to admit to 
anti-Semitism.108 Furthermore, he points out that the implication that anti-Semitism 
in fact lies within British liberalism is something widely denied. However, according 
to Cheyette: ‘the history of modern and contemporary anti-Semitism [is in fact] part 
of the history and culture of the liberal nation state’.109 This suggests the wider 
culture of a simultaneous perpetuation of and resistance to anti or allo Semitism, 
which it seems to me Passages provides a fruitful and complicated example of. 
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What is more, and to conclude, it is precisely the ambivalent representation 
of Jewishness in this book which most compellingly figures the transgressive 
resistance of Quin’s writing here. This is certainly writing which wants to move 
beyond what has been written before, and yet remains steeped in it. My reading 
has shown that the narrative attempts to move beyond stereotyping Jewishness, 
towards an interrogation of the attitude which positions the Jew as wholly other: 
yet, at the same time, it seems in some ways to contribute to and perpetuate such 
stereotyping. In this way the book provides a way of thinking about Jewishness in 
post-1967 literature, which Cheyette identifies as being a current area of neglect. 
Indeed, the woman’s fascination with the Jewish man arguably participates in the 
book’s wider voyeurism and titillation of looking at the other, and in this way the 
narrative seems to take an allo-Semitic stance at the same time as exposing the 
implicated nature of that position. Moreover, the tension of thus being stuck 
between two positions is one which echoes throughout the book, in the vibration 
between classicism and chaos, for example, or between observational and overly 
written representations of the outside world in the woman’s sections. Not only is 
the reading effect of this duality something the layout of the man’s sections of 
narrative vividly performs, but the larger scale oscillation between structural and 
thematic binaries is also one staged at word level, in the morphing and stuttering 
line of words. To me, it is precisely this perpetuation of momentum and denial of 
closure – whether this is in the book’s end to begin another journey, the narrative’s 
compelling re-energising of myth, or the problematic and problematising 
representation of the Jew – that both thinks about and contributes to an activity of 
unresolved (re)reading by disrupting and diverting interpretation. Therefore, it is 
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essential that Passages refuses to make sense of or resolve its ambiguities – an 
aspect which moves it beyond the thinking of Berg and Three – and the resulting 
muddied and muddled readability is a quality ever more vital to the processes of 
Quin’s writing as a whole. 
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Illumination 4   
 
At 8 m. on the 27th November 1969, the ICA hosted a ‘Writers Reading’ event.1 
Beforehand Quin was, according to Carter (her then lover), nervous about the 
thought of reading from and exposing what she saw as the weaknesses of 
Passages. But, in the event, rather than reading from that book, she gave a 
performance that signified more worrying problems. She sat wordless on stage, 
attempting E.S. (extra sensory perception) contact with people, with the aim of 
communicating universal love.2 Despite the times, these hippie notions caused 
considerable unrest, as well as hostility, among the audience. So at last, bowing to 
the pressure to speak, she answered some questions, badly, and gave a reading. 
But, rather than her own words, she read from John Cage: Silence replacing 
silence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this offering wasn’t enough to salvage the 
performance and the audience remained unimpressed. Quin responded differently. 
She did not say anything as she came down from the stage, just smiled. And when 
later on that evening she spoke about the event, it was still with a determinedly 
positive take on what had actually been a resounding disaster. Most significant was 
her conviction that in this experience she’d had ‘a break-through not a break-down, 
from my centre’, that it was now time for people to ‘stop role playing and find your 
centre’.3 
                                                 
1
 ‘Writers Reading’ event flyer, courtesy of Carter. 
2
 Alan Burns recalls: ‘she did her Quin thing, that is to say that she came onto the stage and looked 
at people, she wouldn’t say a goddam word! She just stared, she either implied or she actually stated 
that we sort of ‘think communicate’. Bryan Johnson was’ furious with her’’. Jonathan Coe, Like a 
Fiery Elephant: The Story of B.S. Johnson. London: Picador, 2004, 405. 
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This anxiety about the centre connects with the American setting of Tripticks. 
The late sixties were not only a period of personal crisis, as the narrative above 
begins to demonstrate; this was also a time of intense turmoil for American culture 
and politics. This was a time of race riots and the assassinations of important 
charismatic leaders such as Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, as well as of 
widespread protests against the Vietnam War. In addition, January 1967 had seen 
the ‘Gathering of the Tribes for the First Human Be-In’ in San Francisco and the 
ensuing fall out of the youth counter-culture. In response, those commenting on the 
predicament of America in the late-sixties, like Joan Didion and Hannah Arendt, 
voiced a desire for the rediscovery and restoration of the centre – an image which 
had striking resonance with W. B. Yeats’ poem ‘The second Coming’:4 
 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
  
[…] 
 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?5  
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Schocken Books, 2003, 188. In his book on America in the 1960s, Jay Stevens also makes several 
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LSD and the American Dream, London: Heinemann, 1988, 91-121.  
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 Yeats, ‘The Second Coming’, The Collected poems of W. B. Yeats, New York: Scribner Paperback 
Poetry edition, 1996, 187. 



Yeats voices the acute crisis following the First World War, with its ‘blood-dimmed 
tide’ and drowned innocence: the schism created by this lost youth will, the poem 
declares, decentre society. 1960s America too had a widening gyre and a centre 
that could not hold, its youth were lost, this time to a romantic rebellion couched in 
a pseudo-religious world view. But, what is most significant here is the belief that 
the poem’s modernist lament and unease could be seen as somehow voicing what 
was happening in a post-Second World War, affluent, post-Beat, and verging on 
postmodern America. Despite significant historical and cultural difference, both 
were caught up in a residual desire for the restoration of a depth of meaning 
beyond the broken surface. 


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Tripticks, 1972: Seeking the centre 
 
The final scene of Tripticks takes place in a church. After its protagonist has, 
shivering and scared, ‘Ghost-wormed’ his way in there to seek shelter,1 he sits 
feeling uneasy and cautious, wondering whether he has escaped the figure of 
inquisition that pursues him. While he admits that he can only ever acquire a 
‘moment-for-moment-truth’ about the situation, and can only approach reality ‘from 
an angle somewhat off-centre’, this does not stop his desire to expose ‘false and 
ideological constructs about the world and [let] reality emerge as it really is’.2 
Despite the narrative’s shifting and oblique surfaces, a desire for depth remains. 
But, while this is an important tension for reading the book as a whole, it seems 
perhaps ultimately denied by the book’s final paragraph: 
 
Sitting there brooding, I discovered a breathing space, but a space 
before the scream inside me was working itself loose. A scream that 
came from a long series of emotional changes. Fear for safety and 
sanity, helplessness, frustration, and a desperate need to break out into 
a stream of verbal images. The pulpit could become an extension of my 
voice, my skin, my dreams. Leaning over the wood, staring at the 
spluttering candles, the slanting eyes of the statues all around me, their 
shadows like kachina gods dancing in the walls of the earth. Earth 
moving out into the world. I opened my mouth, but no words. Only the 
words of others I saw, like ads, texts, psalms, from those who had 
attempted to persuade me into their systems. A power I did not want to 
possess. The Inquisition.3 
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 This ‘verb’ is surely a reference to the 1968 short story, ‘Ghostworm’. Above, Quin uses the 
conflation of ‘ghost’ and ‘worm’ to capture not only the necessarily secretive and invisible 
movements of the protagonist but also to insist on the insidious and haunting, gnawing sense of fear 
and the movement towards finality.  
2
 Tripticks, Chicago and Illinois: Dalkey Archive Press, 2002, 191-192. Subsequent references will 
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3
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The endless chatter of the book ends with silence, with a wordless, soundless 
scream. Sitting there brooding, breathing, breaking down, the protagonist opens 
his mouth, but voices nothing. This scream, the narrative claims, has been working 
its way up inside him for some time; it comes from fear, helplessness, frustration 
and desperation, from a compulsion to ‘break out into a stream of verbal images’. 
But, what break out instead are visions of the insidious, insistent words of others, 
spoken in the powerful languages of commerce and religion. These are not the 
voices in the head of Berg, but are external and all around. Further, rather than 
sounding or hearing these words, the protagonist sees them. This act of looking 
again figures and dramatises the reading experience – we too are looking at the 
words of others and while the protagonist is surrounded by shadows – as well as 
foreshadowing the book’s close.  
What our eyes rest on after the words of the final paragraph are ‘silent’ 
drawn images that work to reiterate the protagonist’s final experience.4 In one way, 
these drawings disperse the fear and tension of the words; in another, they act to 
enhance the polarisation between frantic speech and silent scream; between a 
dramatic and dynamic space, and the desire for stillness. For, while the protagonist 
looks for solace and comfort in a spiritual space, this is not what he finds. Instead, 
his fear and desperate desire for verbalisation are answered by the awful 
realisation that proper articulation might finally not be possible. Even in the 
supposed safe haven and other-worldly symbolism of the church he sees the 
machinations and endless verbiage of the dominant cultural system – ads, texts, 
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psalms – which, of course in fact includes religion within it.5 Not even a turn to 
religion or spiritualism can reconnect the protagonist to a more genuine, or more 
meaningful, self-expression. In this, the protagonist is denied his desire for 
meaning, stuck between the persuasive strength of an all powerful culture and the 
terrors of an inquisition. In this, the ending asks what lies outside or beyond this 
system, this linguistic surface, and fears it does not know. 
 
Quin’s fourth and final complete book was begun as a short story in 1968. Like 
Passages, Tripticks is a travel narrative. But, in place of Mediterranean trains, this 
protagonist drives a Chevy across the highways of America. While search 
predominantly motivates the former, here it is chase. The protagonist is pursued 
across the country by his ‘No. 1 X-wife and her schoolboy gigolo’ (7) – although 
actually, as he later admits, ‘who was chasing who I had forgotten’ (136). While the 
narrative does describe what is seen along the road, this is always focalised 
through and distorted by the protagonist’s thoughts, memories and fantasies. As a 
whole, these are composed of seemingly only loosely connected streams of 
narrative which take the form of paratactic paragraphs, lists, headlines, letters, an 
interview, and illustrations. Perhaps aptly for a road book, these speed past the 
reader. But, their momentum does not denote development or progress. Instead, 
the intercutting of these techniques creates a confusing and increasingly anxious 
narrative where it becomes impossible to distinguish what takes place in and 
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 Barthes talks about the anonymous ideology and systemic distortion in which everything is 
steeped, and which overlays everyday and individual life with the codes and conventions of those in 
power. See in particular his discussion of the Negro in French uniform, in ‘Myth Today’, 
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outside the protagonist’s mind. By the end, as we have seen above, he believes it 
is an inquisitor, rather than his ex-wife and her lover, who follows in close pursuit. 
Of all the oeuvre this book is the most difficult to read. It is not so much that, 
as with Three or Passages, plot is rather thin, but more that the prose of Tripticks is 
even more challengingly cacophonous and allusive than the other writing. While in 
Passages the reader negotiates between texts and perspectives that are given 
differentiated space on the page, here source texts – the words of others – are 
ubiquitous and inextricable, even though never quite fully incorporated. Often, the 
result does not make much syntactical or signifying sense. Indeed, one effect of 
this flattened and sometimes impenetrable surface is that it interrogates notions of 
depth. For example, the ending suggests that language has been levelled and 
commodified to the point where the signage and persuasion of adverts is now on a 
par with that of psalms. With this, the book declares itself part of a wider problem of 
articulation, linguistic ownership and penetrability. At the same time, this 
simultaneous lack of and belief in personal and autonomous articulation is the 
product of a consumerist culture supposedly founded on choice and freedom: ‘An 
unprecedented freedom, but a freedom only to switch channels’ (127).6 With such 
comments the book interrogates the cultural situation in late-sixties America. And 
throughout, the mimicry, splicing and reformation of the clichés of that culture are 
used to parodic effect to make this the most obviously and consciously politicised 
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of Quin’s books, the one that most unambiguously wants to mean something about 
the world beyond the text.7 
What is most persuasive, as my reading shows, is how the book’s critique 
moves beyond mimicry and into irony. 8 Here, the narrative’s mimicry and satire do 
not profess to stand outside, but are rather part of the world they critique. For 
instance, its use of the cut-up technique means that the book always consciously 
speaks with the voices and material of others that are clearly also a part of the 
critiqued world outside the text. In this it attempts to diagnose a cultural problem at 
the same time as being caught up in its symptoms – we might think of the 
representation of the Jew in Passages again here. But in Tripticks, the writing’s 
engagement with cultural questions is both more overt and more complicated: it 
most noticeably takes the form of a paradoxical pleasure in the consumerist world 
of surfaces at the same time as an anxiety about what is lost in this. As a result, 
the narrative displays a confused and contradictory allegiance to the world of 
materialism at the same time as the search for meaning, in other words, to both 
surface and depth: in this it moves beyond mere criticism of consumerism into an 
ironic mode that both enjoys and rejects it. This immersive but dissociated impulse 
is present above in the protagonist’s simultaneous sense of communion with his 
surroundings – ‘an extension of my voice, my skin, my dreams’ – and alienation 
‘from those who had attempted to persuade me’. 
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The ironic tone throughout is at once playful and knowing, anxious and 
nostalgic. There is a tension between the images that seem to be all that there is 
and the residual desire to think beyond and break though this surface. With this, 
Tripticks engages in a discourse about the desire for an authentic engagement with 
the world which remains despite a culture which denies it. Indeed, it is this paradox 
that reveals the book’s late modernist angst, placing it in a limbo between 
modernist and postmodernist concerns. The stance of Quin’s irony here is what 
Alan Wilde, in his identification of twentieth century ironic modes, terms disjunctive: 
nostalgic for a modernist anxiety about authenticity at the same time as realising 
that real resolution might no longer be possible.9 Here, the writing’s modernism is 
co-terminous with a sense of its own belatedness: but rather than being unable to 
move beyond earlier preoccupations, this is writing which returns to them. Indeed, 
it is this aspect which most firmly marks Tripticks as not a postmodern text, 
however much it might seem to be.10 This is not writing of the postmodernist ironic 
mode of assent, where, according to Wilde: ‘Yeats was righter than he knew. The 
center has indeed not held […] it has disappeared, taking with it the fulcrum on 
which the modernist dilemma turned’. 11  Quin’s is a text that remains on that 
fulcrum. It does not assent; it charts the degradation but not dissolution of the 
search for the centre. 
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 Wilde, Horizons of Assent, 45. 
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 In addition, the years of the book’s gestation were an important period for 
cultural thinking (especially of a disjunctive mode) – as confirmed by a range of 
presciently coincident and relevant secondary texts.12 These are all concerned with 
similar questions to those being asked by Tripticks: of the relationship between the 
individual and the system as well as of the changing relationship between surface 
and depth – in this it is the book which most clearly reflects and performs 
contemporaneous cultural theories. Significantly, as Arendt reminds us in ‘Thinking 
and Moral Considerations’, at this point in time the question of depth had become 
problematic because it was seen to be outdated, belonging to a notion of 
philosophy or metaphysics that had ‘fallen into disrepute’.13 As such, in late sixties 
America the very concept of ‘truth’ had become problematic. This – and here 
Arendt makes specific reference to the Vietnam War – was a context where ‘the 
facts’ were agreed upon by consensus rather than their being objectively true. 
Thus, the pursuit of truth or depth had become almost wholly sacrificed for surface: 
‘image-making had become global policy’ so much so that the stream of images 
became the reality and as a result, the relationship with history was being broken.14  
                                                 
12
 For example: R.D. Laing’s The Politics of Experience, 1967; Marshall McLuhan and Quentin 
Fiore’s The Medium is the Massage, 1967; Herbert Marcuse’s An Essay on Liberation, 1969; 
Theodor Roszak’s The Making of a Counterculture, 1969; Donald Winnicott’s Playing and Reality, 
1971; Arendt’s 1971 essays ‘Lying in Politics’ and ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’; Berger’s 
Ways of Seeing, 1972; Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 1972; 
Barthes’ Mythologies, 1957 (translated into English, 1972). 
13
 Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, Responsibility and Judgement, New York: 
Schocken Books, 2003, 161. 
14
 Arendt, ‘Lying in Politics’, Crises of the Republic, Middlesex: Penguin, 1973, 20. For further 
discussion of Arendt on image-making, lying and the consequences for history, see Cathy Caruth’s 
‘Lying and History’ in Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics, Roger 
Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz and Thomas Keenan (Eds.), New York: Fordham University Press, 2010, 
79-94. 
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Tripticks engages with precisely this problem: its narrative is both enthralled 
by and deeply despairing of globalised image-making, especially during the time of 
the Vietnam War. This is evident in a description of the Apollo moon landing:  
 
Two of our kind stand with their own four feet on the moon. Two 
earthlings representing both sexes (though they are men) all races 
(though they are pinkish-white beneath their white space suits) and all 
nations (though they are from the United States, as you might infer from 
the patches on their sleeves). How far, after all, is the moon from the 
earth? Precisely the same distance as Vietnam – across the living room 
(127). 
 
Here, the book’s disjunctive ironic mode is evident: the ‘global’ surface-image that 
the narrative ventriloquises and declares is undermined by the ‘truths’ given in 
parenthesis. The narrative is simultaneously part of what is happening – ‘our kind’ 
– and alienated from it – ‘earthlings’. As Wilde points out, it is precisely in the ironic 
mode that narratives most engage with their historical context and thus participate 
in the world.15 Above the result is funny and knowing, but it also exposes the way 
that television, as a media form representing dominant cultural values, distorts and 
flattens the news, to make everything seem equally important. With this, the 
narrative exposes a problem of historical and cultural truth in sixties America: it 
also interrogates ‘the words of others’ to express a modernist nostalgia for truth 
and seriousness. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Denise Riley’s illuminating discussion further demonstrates that while it may appear as 
disengagement, irony is in fact an expression of deep engagement, in her chapter ‘Echo, Irony and 
the Political’, The Words of Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000, 146-184. 
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The silent scream 
 
The clearest evidence of this nostalgia can be found in the book’s final paragraph, 
in the image of the silent scream. In illustration, my reading here considers the 
scream in Tripticks in conjunction with other representations of the scream, to 
propose that not only does this image foreground the activities of looking, reading 
and interpretation in order to interrogate the possibility of individual articulation; it 
also presences the narrative’s disjunctive nostalgia for the modernist quest for 
seriousness.  
It is clearly a significant image in Quin’s writing; it appears again in 
‘Ghostworm’ (also set in America and written at this time): ‘She entered a subway, 
silently screaming in the Inferno’.16 The dreadful irony of these silent, screaming 
mouths calls to mind iconic screams in the paintings of both Edward Munch and 
Francis Bacon.17 Moreover, Quin’s screams have specific similarities with each: 
they express the anxiety of the former and interrogate the act of looking as does 
the latter. As Frederic Jameson reminds us, what Munch’s scream particularly 
foregrounds and instantiates is the ‘atrocious solitude and [modernist] anxiety’ that 
the absent scream would have expressed.18 This absence is heightened by the 
‘gestural content’ of the painting, which, for Jameson – who wants to demonstrate 
                                                 
16
 ‘Ghostworm’, TAK TAK TAK NUMBER 6, London: Tak Tak Tak, 1993, 86. As I have already 
noted, the scream is an image with recurs in Quin’s writing; in Judith’s gaping mouth and the silent 
scream of Ruth during the rape scene – I discuss another signification of the scream in my chapter 
on The Unmapped Country. 
17
 Quin was ‘furious and saddened’ to miss the 1962 Bacon exhibition. Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 
5th July 1962. After the 1963 Bacon/Moore exhibition she wrote: ‘I could have happily stayed there 
all day’. Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, July 1963. 
18
 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1991, 16. 
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the redundancy of modernist angst – ‘already underscores its own failure’ because 
of the incompatibility between the aurality of screaming and silent medium of 
painting.19 Jameson sees this failure as proof that the affect of such anxiety is no 
longer appropriate in a postmodern world where, he claims, the alienation or 
degradation of the subject has been replaced by its dissolution and 
fragmentation.20  
However, the scream at the end of Tripticks expresses nostalgia for this 
angst and affect; it comes ‘from a long series of emotional changes. Fear for safety 
and sanity, helplessness, frustration, and a desperate need’ (191). Here, at the end 
of Quin’s last complete book, the otherwise ceaseless voicing of unease is 
silenced. The protagonist opens his mouth to express horror at the situation, but 
nothing comes out. He does not have the power to express his inarticulate pain. 
His wish to expose false ideologies and speak something more meaningful and 
real, however partial that articulation may have been, is denied. Significantly, this 
scream expresses a late modernist anxiety: there is a fear that the scream of the 
individual might no longer be possible at the same time as the belief that it might 
yet be recuperated or recreated. The writing contains a similar problem of gestural 
content to Munch’s painting: ‘I opened my mouth, but no words. Only the words of 
others I saw’. Communication is both possible, in the writing, and not possible, in 
speech. Here, the disjuncture is deliberate: it describes the reading experience as 
much as the protagonist’s by assuming we will be reading it silently – seeing the 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid, 13-18. The move from the anguish of a coherent individual to anguish about the possibility 
of a coherent individual at all recalls McHale’s description of the shift in the ‘dominant’ from 
Modernism to Postmodernism being from epistemological to ontological crisis. McHale, 
Postmodernist Fiction, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 9-10.  
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words – rather than aloud. At the same time, the insistent ‘I’ and ‘my’ voice of the 
protagonist throughout marks his final failure to voice not as dissolution, but rather 
as degradation of the subject. Despite his morphing and blurred ‘many names. 
Many faces’ (7) and many voices, this subject remains – ‘I somehow exhibited a 
remarkable adaptation to the peculiar surroundings, resisting burial under the 
constantly shifting roles’ (132).  
Like Bacon’s screams then, several aspects of the soundless scream here 
purposely foreground sight. This coincides with the way Bacon was being 
discussed at the time, by thinkers such as Winnicott and Berger.21 In his discussion 
of cultural experience in Playing and Reality, Winnicott considers the meaning and 
import of Bacon’s distorted faces. He concludes that the acts of the painter’s 
looking at and his painting of faces are bound up with a desire to be seen, to be 
perceived. He goes further, to connect this with the desire for understanding by 
postulating both developmental and historical processes which depend on being 
seen.22 This observation is crucial for thinking about the act of seeing in Tripticks. 
While the act of looking takes the more distanced form of an albeit implicated 
voyeurism in Three and Passages, in Berg, as I have shown, the need to both see 
and be seen recalls Berkeley’s aphorism linking perception with affirmation of 
existence. At the end of Tripticks, the protagonist not only looks but sees and is 
seen; yet here, this does not act to confirm as much as erode his presence. 
Crucially, what he sees are words – and in this, the act of watching in this book 
                                                 
21
 The connection between Winnicott, Berger and Bacon’s thinking is identified by Stonebridge in 
her recent article ‘The Perpetrator Occult: Francis Bacon Paints Adolf Eichmann’, Holocaust 
Studies: A Journal of Culture and History, Volume 17, Number 2, Summer/Autumn 2012, 101-120. 
22
 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, London: Tavistock Publications, 1971, 114. 
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insists on the way in which the acts if watching and being watched throughout Quin 
work to figure the watching reader herself.  
The potential violence of such perception connects with Berger’s discussion 
of Bacon’s triptych paintings in his piece ‘Francis Bacon and Walt Disney’ (1972). 
There he reminds us that the seeming isolation of each of the images is 
undermined by their always being watched by either a spectating person or indeed 
by the other paintings of the three. Moreover, the triptych form, where each figure 
is isolated in his own canvas and yet visible to the others, means these figures are 
always simultaneously both alone and completely without either privacy or self-
awareness.23 However, this anguished loneliness is distinct from the disjunctive 
anxiety displayed in Munch’s painting, because here the ‘worst has already 
happened’.24 The poignancy of Bacon’s screaming figures, Berger claims, lies in 
their ignorance of this fact. In contrast, the poignancy of Quin’s protagonist, while 
he is similarly both isolated and always watched, is not to do with his ignorance so 
much as a feeling of insignificance in the face of the endless words which in turn 
ignore and deny him.  
Indeed, the significance of the connection between Bacon’s painting and 
looking is developed by Stonebridge, who considers the paintings in terms of their 
post-Second World War context, and specifically in relation to the Eichmann trial. 
Looking, she proposes, is never balanced, passive or neutral; instead it is always 
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 Berger, About Looking, London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, Ltd., 1980, 114. 
That Berger is discussing Bacon’s triptychs is, of course, of particular relevance given the title of 
Quin’s book here.  
24
 Ibid. 



something implicated and participatory, something with inalienable moral content.25 
What is more, Bacon’s particular presentation of the gaping and disintegrating 
figures doubly foregrounds this quality of our looking – the figures are in glass 
boxes as well as the paintings themselves being framed and literally behind 
glass. 26  The glass in and over the paintings here is not only a mirror in a 
metaphorical sense: we are literally reflected in the glass we both look at and 
through, so that it is as if we are projected into the paintings themselves. Similarly, 
the protagonist in Tripticks is projected into and participates in the world of the 
words he looks at. The act of looking is intimately involved with his failure to speak. 
This is bound up with the words and images of others, onto which we must ascribe 
(or find a reflection of) our own meaning. This is either possible, in which case we 
take it on and become culpable, or not possible, in which case we are unable to 
find our reflection. At the end of the book, the agonised nothing which comes out of 
the protagonist’s mouth is replaced with the words of others in a way that seems to 
only reinstate meaninglessness. These words are all that remain for him to look at 
after nothing has come out of his mouth and his articulation has been silenced. 
With this, the soundless scream foregrounds the difference between a looking that 
remains on the world of appearances and the kind of seeing that penetrates 
beyond and questions it.  
                                                 
25
 Quin herself expressed an awareness of the moral content of Bacon’s paintings: ‘A photo, 
Michael had up on his wall, haunts me, of a baby born after Hiroshima. It looked so unreal, one 
couldn’t really believe such a thing possible, same reaction as one has, perhaps, to Francis Bacon’s 
paintings’. Letter: Quin to Carol Burns, 28th September 1962. 
26
 Stonebridge, ‘The Perpetrator Occult’, 17. See also; Vicky Lebeau, ‘The Arts of Looking: D.W. 
Winnicott and Michael Haneke’, Screen 50 (1) 2009, 35-36. 
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The moral import of the scene – its nostalgia for depth – is further reinforced 
by the melodrama of the visual extravagance of the candlelit church pulpit and the 
final, exaggerated fear of ‘The Inquisition’. Together with the signification of the 
scream, this melodrama alerts us to the crucial moral seriousness of Tripticks. 
Drawing on Brooks’ claim that melodrama is the principal mode for ‘uncovering, 
demonstrating, and making operative the essential moral universe in a post-sacred 
era’,27 we find clear a resonance with both Wilde’s assertion that the ironic mode 
actively participates in history, and Arendt’s claim that this was an era when 
philosophy and metaphysics had ‘fallen into disrepute’. Irony and melodrama may 
appear as flippancy, but in fact both have qualities which render them able to 
penetrate beyond the world of surfaces, to reach towards the real. On the one 
hand melodrama is clearly role-play, something acted out that has no real feeling 
beyond its overstated surfaces; at the same time it specifically dramatises the fact 
that something is always lost in attempts to signify, capture and perform the real.28 
In this way its necessary falsity is bound up with the belief that its exaggerated 
surfaces might be precisely what allow it to reach beyond. 
Moreover, the confused and contradictory allegiance to both depth and 
surface in Tripticks – evident throughout the book’s content, language, structures 
and irony – is precisely what energises my reading here, which moves through a 
discussion of the book’s parodic mimicry and critique of American culture to return 
to the question of the desire for the sacred, as well as the corruption and 
                                                 
27
 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination (1976), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, 15. 
28
 The melodramatic effect in Tripticks here can be compared with the use of role play and the 
dumb show in Three, which similarly dramatises, exposes and interrogates the relationship between 
surface and depth, performance and reality. 
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commodification of that impulse in drug culture. As with all of Quin’s books, the title 
holds clues which in turn guide, confuse and extend the reading experience: its trip 
is a drug experience as well as an actual journey across America; its verbal ticks 
and tricks abound in a narrative stuck on the words of others. Further, despite and 
even through its trips and ticks, in both its homophone and structural allusion to 
triptychs – a set of three writing-tablets hinged or tied together; a picture or carving 
(or set of three such) […] chiefly used as an altar-piece29 – Tripticks foregrounds, 
ironises and interrogates the act of looking itself as well as the desire to see 
beyond the surface and into the centre of things.30 
 
 
A stream of verbal images 
 
 
We look at the present through a rear view mirror. We march backwards 
into the future. Suburbia lives imaginatively in Bonanza-land.31 
 
 
Days were nights. Dreams were reality. Reality seen through a rear-view 
mirror. No sense of time (139).32 
 
 
If the silent scream marks the culmination of the book’s anxiety; the narrative that 
precedes it is one which voices and enacts the turmoil of the protagonist’s ‘long 
series of emotional changes’. This turmoil is largely created by his relationship with 
                                                 
29
 Selected definitions, Oxford English Dictionary. 
30
 A middle section of letters to and from the protagonist is flanked on either side by the blurred 
first/third person narrative of his journey across America. 
31
 McLuhan and Fiore, The Medium is the Massage, San Francisco: Hardwired, 1967, 75. 
32
 The ‘retro-visor’ is also a motif for visual and verbal play in Brooke-Rose’s Thru, as White points 
out in ‘Reading the Graphic Surface’, 128. Indeed, Brooke-Rose’s book begins: ‘through the 
driving-mirror four eyes stare back’, Thru, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975, 1. 



and experience of American culture, which takes the form of a simultaneous 
repulsion and desire that in turn pervades the book’s cultural critique, as my 
reading across both of the following sections demonstrates. One of the most potent 
symbols of this, as I explicate here, is the representation of screens – and 
specifically television – in Tripticks. The narrative’s ambivalent portrayal of this 
symbol works to foreground and question the prevalent role and position of the 
visual image. Moreover, it is an issue both made literal and interrogated by the 
form and function of the illustrations included in the book.  
Tripticks is a road book set in America: ‘It was when hitting Highway 101 I 
noticed they were following’ (10).33 The protagonist drives a Chevy, his ex-wife and 
her lover follow in a Buick: ‘as soon as I climbed into the Chevy they began the 
chase again’ (19). Cars, as symbols of American prosperity, call to mind the 
supposed connection between car-travel and (consumerist) freedom – between the 
individual ‘free spirit’ and the commercial system she buys into. The road theme 
and continual verbiage also recalls, of course, Jack Kerouac’s infamous On the 
Road (1957), although this is more likely as criticism than homage.34 Nevertheless, 
much of Quin’s book’s reality is also seen through the front windscreen and rear-
view mirror of a car, and accompanied by a protagonist’s relentless ‘I’ drawl. Its 
scenes are also seen in and through a variety of other screens, from a two-way 
mirror (10) to IBM computers (53), to the television – ‘tube’ (52) or ‘boob tube’ 
                                                 
33
 This recalls a further meaning of the title: Hall tells us that ‘Tripticks […] is a US name for an 
AA motor route’ in ‘The Mighty Quin’.  
34
 Quin had written: ‘simply hating ‘On the Road’ – what a lot of sentimental rubbish and so tedious 
how it goes on and on in this phoney pseudo ‘isn’t life crazy but it’s life man’ sort of fashion’. 
Letter: to Carol Burns, 17th August 1961. 
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(53).35 This foregrounds not only the act of looking but also the focalisation of the 
gaze in and through glass, which, as with Bacon’s paintings, is always a surface in 
which the viewer is also implicated, that is both see-through and reflects back. This 
surface magnifies, filters and distorts what the protagonist sees: ‘faces, glass faces 
behind me, twisted into grotesque shapes by the Pacific winds’ (12). Thus the 
narrative looks through various screens at American consumer culture. These 
screens complement and extend the mirrors and windows that dominate the 
looking experience in, for example, Berg. Indeed, the voyeur in Passages also, of 
course, sees an erotic scene through a glass screen. 
The stream of (verbal) images that the protagonist sees here is bound up with 
his automobile-driven momentum. The car, from which much of the narrative 
looking is done, is not only bound up with American culture, but necessitates the 
speed and momentariness of the gaze. In Ways of Seeing, Berger points out that 
the density and speed of visual messages, and more specifically, of publicity 
images, in modern society means that they belong to ‘the moment’: ‘We see it as 
we turn a page, as we turn a corner, as a vehicle passes us’.36 This pace leaves no 
room for proper reflection.37 For Berger, this is part of a bigger problem and has to 
                                                 
35
 Many scenes are even seen through the ‘screen’ of memory, as the protagonist remembers life 
with his No. 1 Ex-wife in an attempt to construct a clearer sense of himself. Freud reminds us that 
memory is always ‘tendentious’ and often screening another, more important memory behind, in 
‘On Childhood Memories and Screen memories’, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VI (1901): The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 
(Trans.) James Strachey, London: The Hogarth Press, 1958, 45. 
36
 Berger, Ways of Seeing, 129-130. Berger points out that while it is usually we who pass the 
image, we get the impression that publicity images pass us – in doing so he draws attention to the 
experience of passivity in relation to the images, which seem literally active as well as acting upon 
us. The experience of reading Tripticks dramatises this apparent momentum of images while we, the 
viewer here, remain static.  
37
 Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the flow of images on a screen exclude thought: ‘sustained 
thought is out of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush of facts’, 127. See 
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do with images and ideas being subsumed into the dominant system and then 
used to make the same general proposal. As the protagonist realises at the end of 
Tripticks, he can, at best, only ever access a moment-to-moment truth or 
understanding. This is not a culture with fixed meanings, or even fixed 
connotations, but of constantly negotiated and changing truths.  
The undifferentiated stream of images experienced thorough the windscreen 
on the road is paralleled by those of and on the television, in various motel rooms. 
This, as the repeated television watching in Tripticks suggests, was indeed the 
‘age of television’: further, in America at this time; ‘the most popular TV shows 
revealed a nostalgia for a simpler, rural or small-town way of life’.38 Quin’s narrative 
is clearly both aware and dismissive of this trend when the protagonist declares: 
‘Burn Down Peyton Place, and inhale deeply stretched time with red eyes’ (8).39 
Given the representation of television elsewhere in the book, as I demonstrate 
below, the imperative to burn Peyton Place reads as cynical and critical of the 
culturally impoverished shows of its ilk. This critique engages with the problem of a 
situation where – as Adorno and Horkheimer put it – television, film and radio no 
longer bother to pretend to be art, as if their being big business alone can justify 
‘the rubbish they deliberately produce’. 40  Indeed, they argue that the ‘culture 
                                                                                                                                                     
also; Benjamin’s argument that information inhibits proper thinking and creativity, ‘The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Illuminations, 211-244. 
38
 David Farber and Beth Bailey, The Columbia Guide to America in the 1960s, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001, 57. 
39
 ‘Peyton Place’; a best selling book as well as prime-time small town soap opera, aired in the mid 
to late 1960s. 
40
 Adorno and Horkheimer, 121. 
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industry’ inevitably leads to the ‘impoverishment of aesthetic matter’.41 Thus, the 
call for the destruction of this kind of rubbishy aesthetic matter in Tripticks works to 
draw attention to the problem of a dominant culture in which not only taste, but also 
self-awareness – which provides crucial distance and perspective – seems to be 
lost.  
Such criticism is reinforced by the injunction to ‘inhale deeply stretched time 
with red eyes’: watching too much television will make our eyes sore and red, our 
vision (or ability to see) blurred and impaired. But more than this, looking at the 
television screen has the power to distort and extend time, just as the rear-view 
mirror, according to the quotations above, might seem to reverse its direction. 
Screens, in this reading, have the power to manipulate our experience of time 
itself, by creating a continual moment-for-moment fragmented but inescapable 
momentum. This reinforces the idea that cultural experience at this time was no 
longer so much about content, as the medium by which it was experienced.42 In 
Tripticks, not only does the eye look at what is on the screen, it inhales it, like air or 
drugs, and absorbs it in a far more pervasive and insidious manner than ‘just 
looking’ would. Television is depicted as ubiquitous and diffuse, in the very air that 
we breathe. Not only this, but it is a drug with a doping and levelling effect:  
 
I lay on the under-sized Queen bed and watched the tube. The 
everywhere check, if you push-me pull-you, all wired for a trance in the 
wilderness. It will be there through good and bad in the empty hours, 
                                                 
41
 Ibid, 124. Robert von Hallberg says it was as if the fate of American culture hung in the balance 
‘so powerful was the sense that television would abruptly change national taste and sensibility, as it 
surely did. The idea of national taste is now almost anachronistic’, American Poetry and Culture 
1945-1980, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1985, 194. 
42
 The idea that the medium itself had become the message is the main argument of McLuhan and 
Fiore’s book The Medium is the Massage. 
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just when you need it. Sounds made visible, a missile’s white clicking 
teeth, a dolphin’s voice-prints pick arsonist and Nasser on phone. The 
sound ‘ga’ helps make a conviction. A mental patient relaxes. ‘Ah’ says 
the President, the big-sky man hemmed in ‘every man his own furnace’. 
Hottest prospect is a fat male genius says a post-graduate historian. 
The issue is as old as freedom, ‘In my day we all had faces’. Mere 
millionaires don’t count now. Monsters of Moonport, the biggest 
discovery since Columbus. The frenzy of youth manipulated by the 
viewers’ communication that puzzles, excites and involves. Worth a risk, 
change the channel with real foes on every side looking for a wedge, 
while cavorting cops aim low, clicking shutters, cut and faint. Ban the 
Germ Mediterranean style towards the doomsday bug. No withering seal 
limbs, upsidedown biology. We can see you on 15 Caribbean islands 
caught in the crossfire’ (52-53).  
 
The comfort of television is available everywhere and will be there, so it claims, 
‘through good and bad in the empty hours, just when you need it’ ‘all wired for a 
trance in the wilderness’. This trance is not an energising or creative experience, 
but a passive one where the protagonist lies down on the bed, the stream of 
images passing before his eyes. Here, it is not made clear whether the ‘mental 
patient’ who relaxes here is on the screen, or whether it is meant to be a term of 
the protagonist’s self-irony.  
What is experienced on the television are ‘Sounds made visible’, and it is the 
words of ‘others’ that we see: ranging from missiles to dolphins to the President. 
The experience here is represented in terms of a cut-up mixture of quotations and 
clichés. 43  The resulting rapid, list-like prose mimics the speed – here time 
accelerates rather than being stretched – of the stream of sounded and visible 
images. It also ironises the lack of differentiation and distinction that television 
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 Alan Burns claims: ‘I know she wrote the book entirely through cut-up’, ‘Blending words with 
pictures’. More specifically, according to Hall in ‘The Mighty Quin’: ‘the end product relies heavily 
on cut-ups from ‘Time’, ‘Life’, television commercials and Yankee sex and criminology pulp’. He 
adds, apparently directed by Quin: ‘The emotion dictated the content which dictated the form’. 
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culture makes between the serious and the banal; for how can the meaningless 
sound, ‘ga’, make a conviction about anything? Indeed, this lack of differentiation 
recalls von Hallberg’s claim when talking of poetry about the ‘fabric of society’: 
‘anything goes with anything else, so evened out are expectations now’.44 The 
irony above – turned on, for example, the big-sky man, the fat male genius and the 
‘real foes’ being fought off by cavorting cops – is aware of such evened out 
expectations and has both a funny and serious point: as well as displaying 
representatives of dominant culture, television also represents it.45  
But it is not only mainstream culture that is absorbed, performed and exposed 
by television here: nothing seems to fall outside its gaze. Even the counter-culture 
movement – the ‘frenzy of youth’ above – is ‘manipulated by’ the communications 
that puzzle, excite and involve it in ideas about politics and cultural critique.46 In 
this, not only does the word ‘frenzy’ imply an unthinking rashness, but the stance of 
this representation reveals how rejection of the mainstream was simultaneously 
being subsumed and ‘manipulated’ by the distorting influence of its media. As a 
result, the counter-cultural critique of society was both filtered and shaped by the 
mainstream. This coincides with Didion’s claims in ‘Slouching Towards Bethlehem’, 
which chronicles the counter-cultural movement in Haight-Ashbury in late-1960s 
San Francisco. Her investigation finds disorder and dysfunction – ‘frenzy’ – as well 
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 Hallberg, American Poetry and Culture, 190. 
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 Marcuse criticises this situation, where cars, television, gadgets, etc. are a fundamental part of a 
political system which exploits the producing classes of its society by their desire to own and use 
them,  An Essay on Liberation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 11-13 
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 Stevens describes mainstream America’s perplexity at the 1967 ‘Gathering of the Tribes for the 
First Human Be-In’ in San Francisco: ‘one moment they were playing baseball and attending sock 
hops and the next they were racing down the Negro streets at dawn, screaming, hysterical, naked, or 
at least that’s the way it seemed’, Storming Heaven, xi 
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as a crucial lack of ‘centre’. What is more, while it supposedly scorned the soulless 
materialism of mainstream culture, in fact, she says, the movement was ‘less in 
rebellion against society than ignorant of it, able only to feed back certain of its 
most publicised self-doubts, Vietnam, Saran-Wrap, diet pills, the Bomb’.47 It is this 
passive mimicry she most despairs of. The passage above mimics, and therefore 
critiques, a similar impulse by regurgitating the most publicised criticisms – the 
missile/bomb, the landing on (and claiming of) the moon, the place of Caribbean 
crossfire (Cuba) – which even includes ‘anti’ movements – ‘Ban the Germ 
Mediterranean style towards the doomsday bug’. Thus, the implication in both texts 
is that this frenzy of youth does not think or penetrate beyond a surface, mediated 
interpretation of things; that it fails to look towards centre or depth.48  
Furthermore, it is not just that the protagonist repeatedly watches television, 
but more that the episodic narrative technique of the book seems to draw on the 
experience of watching commercial breaks. McLuhan and Fiore remind us that the 
structure of adverts provides an essential insight into the medium of television; 
most significantly because adverts have no time for linear narrative form or story-
lines.49 And, to some extent, the narrative form of Tripticks acts out and seems to 
be implicated in a similar stream of verbal images to the experience of watching 
adverts, where the screen-focussed gaze is bombarded with messages about what 
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to buy: ‘Why not see for yourself a different big scene (for a nominal extra charge) 
that whirls you as if you were on a carousel’ (24). This comment has a double 
effect; it contains a cynical joke about the power of advertising at the same time as 
being caught up in its whirl. 50  Moreover, this connection between screen and 
purchase is something that is, according to Bowlby, endemic in consumer culture. 
What is more, as she points out, in the act of watching the cinema (as well as 
television) even the pleasure of ‘just looking’ is something in fact already paid for:51 
in Tripticks, the protagonist’s viewing experience, through car and in motel 
television screens, is also always a pleasure paid for. In this way, the stream of 
images here perpetuates, exaggerates and thus interrogates the experience of 
being bombarded by advertising – and indeed, the inherent connection between 
the culture industry and money that this ultimately implies. 
 
But if the stream of verbal images on the road and on the television in Tripticks is in 
this way disorientating, what are the effects of its stream of actual visual images? It 
is surely no coincidence that this book preoccupied with images is also the only 
one of Quin’s to include actual pictorial illustrations throughout.52 Not only do Carol 
Annand’s pictures evoke the pulp fiction feel of the written narrative – stories of bad 
women and shadowy men, dodgy motels and suspenseful close-ups, an unknown 
pursuant always over your shoulder:53 they also echo the written narrative’s wider 
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thinking about the visual image. When talking about her process in an interview 
with Alan Burns, the illustrator says:  
 
I tried to make a visual narrative run parallel with Ann’s narrative. I used 
the same Cut-up technique she used. I drew from commercial sources, 
clichéd images from Time magazine, American adverts and so on; sex 
images of suspenders and things, and pretzels and high-heeled shoes. 
The trouble is we didn’t start work together. The book was worked out 
as a literary text and I came in right at the end, after it had been agreed 
with the publishers. The ideal is to start together so that together you 
discover what you are doing, and you are continually swoping [sic] 
information, so that the whole thing is built up as one.  
 
Burns: So you end up not with an illustrated text but an integrated text? 
 
Annand: Yes. For example, because I came in late the type had been 
worked out and I was not allowed to break it up. The nearest I could get 
to an integrated book was to run small drawing along the bottom of the 
pages.54 
 
The problem Annand identifies is that although she used similar techniques and 
sources to Quin, because the illustrations were not commissioned or added until 
the type had already been worked out, Tripticks is not an integrated text. 55 
Moreover, while some of the images do seem to respond to, extend and ‘illustrate’ 
the written narrative; others appear irrelevant, tenuous and disruptive. Granted, 
some connections seem straightforward – the protagonist wears a Brooks 
Brothers’ shirt (7) and one is drawn (11), the twisted faces in the glass (12) have 
already appeared in illustration (11). However, such images could be said to close 
down and restrict the reader’s interpretation. Indeed, the cacophonous and 
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performative effect of Quin’s writing is often such that it arguably does not require 
pictorial illustration. Furthermore, where illustrations diverge from the written text 
this can create the confusion of what seems to be a rather irrelevant engagement 
with the writing. For example, the comment that ‘your ex-wife chipped in’ (118) in a 
narrative about marriage is flanked by a drawing of a bride and groom poised to cut 
a cake but instead hovering over a huge plate of chips labelled as French Fries.56 
This is clearly meant as a joke, but it does not quite work. 
However, while they may not, perhaps, always work to enhance or 
complement content, the pictures can be said to enhance and perpetuate the 
tension created by the polyphonic forms and structures of the writing. For instance, 
the protagonist claims that when his No. 1 ex-Wife’s father was younger he was ‘a 
dead ringer for Shirley Temple’ (73), the following transcript for an interview with 
‘Shirley’ is illustrated.57 Annand herself comments on the juxtaposition, or even 
collision, of the ‘lesbian scene alongside the computerised face of Shirley 
Temple’.58 Here, while the face is clearly directly connected with the written text, 
the lesbian scenes are not, and in this way these drawings coincide with and 
perform the written narrative’s techniques: they do not primarily attempt to 
‘illustrate’ or explain the words.59 Indeed, as McHale puts it when talking of Donald 
Barthelme’s 1970 book Brain Damage, it is possible for drawings to in this way 
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visibly and emphatically ‘bring worlds of discourse, visual and verbal, into 
collision’.60 While McLuhan and Fiore celebrate the discoveries made possible by 
the imaginative juxtaposition of such a collision of seemingly disparate elements, 
McHale asks the shrewd question of how, in practice, we might actually read such, 
what he calls, ‘schizoid’ texts.61 Is it only possible to read first one and then the 
other, or constantly back-and-forth, or might we be able to read the visual and 
verbal simultaneously? He concludes that while some texts approximate 
simultaneity, in the end the reality of our reading experience means that this is not 
possible.62 This question of reading direction is further complicated in Tripticks by 
the tension more than cohesion of the visual and verbal streams of images. 
Ultimately then, and especially given the insistence on open-ended reading put 
forward by Passages, the value of these illustrations must lie in how far they can 
be said to perpetuate Quin’s resistant reading effect. 
 
 
The words of others I saw 
 
 
You can’t get blood out of a turnip so stop thinking you are nursing a hot 
potato (139). 
 
 
In addition to the disorientating resistance to interpretation created by both verbal 
and visual streams of images, the narrative’s cut-up technique further complicates 
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the reading experience by disrupting narrative fluency. What is more, the cut-up 
seems to both undermine and celebrate mainstream culture – the words of others 
– from which it also speaks. These others function at the level of characters other 
than the protagonist, for example in the central section of the book which consists 
of letters to and from the protagonist, as well as of those faceless others ‘who had 
attempted to persuade me into their systems’ that the protagonist sees at the end 
but ventriloquises throughout his narrative. It is the interconnectedness of these 
effects of the cut-up in Tripticks – its disruption of the line of words as well as the 
cultural implications of its ventriloquism – that concern me here.  
Mixed-up proverbs and clichés make for the uncanny sense that we have 
heard or seen it all before even if it be clothed in slightly different terms or phrases. 
Words are replaced – turnip for stone above – and swapped, puns and jokes are 
created by absurd juxtapositions. The result is that there is always a double-sense 
in which the narration is at once both overly-familiar and unfamiliar. This creates an 
uncanny effect: the agonised, modernist individual (protagonist or reader) is unsure 
of how to place themselves in relation to the seemingly ubiquitous and autonomous 
(systemic) linguistic surface of things. This surface seems to frustrate the search 
for meaning or depth: the momentum of much of the narration proliferates in terms 
of a sort of sound, rhyme and rhythm free-association as opposed to sense 
structure. This produces a stream of narrative ticks: 
 
Eyes that fall away to 282 feet below sea level. I am hunted by bear, 
mountain lion, elk and deer. Duck, pheasant, rabbit, dove and quail. He 
at first feels a little like George Custer at Little Big Horn. The enemy is 
all around and awesome. The road ahead is going to be difficult there 
will be some nervous Nellies and some will become frustrated and 
bothered and break ranks under the strain, and there will be blood, 
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irony, dwarfs and dragons, skyrockets fired to celebrate orgasm’s 
efficiency. Suicide in a scented Sodom. Soul on acid. Hero angelic, 
domestic and cosmic on a journey with God on my side and the Brownie 
Troop.  
 
Meanwhile I eat a toasted cheese hamburger, and dwell on five days of 
unconfined feasts of roasted pig. A miracle for a man who has nothing to 
lose. True your family adventures may not match those of ancient 
Greece, but you’re equipped to make history and why shouldn’t you be, 
we’ve worked hard to make it that way, we took no short cuts, spared no 
expense, watched no clock. If you come filled with dreams it may 
happen that your dream changes about every 15 minutes. The most is 
yet to come. 3,000 miles of strawberry ice cream. Lips are frenchfries 
teasing cole slaw fingers. My belly a Golden Poppy and the Motto is I 
Have Yet To Find It. Or as posted to my 3 X-wives. Ranked according to 
value 
vehicle 
food 
allied products 
fabricated metal 
machinery 
stone 
clay 
glass 
lumber and apparel (8-9). 
 
Here, the references to America’s colonising history with ‘George Custer at Little 
Big Horn’ and ‘you’re equipped to make history’ are mixed in with an onslaught of 
cut-up clichés and echoes of clichés, as well as a list that mimics a record of 
exports or expenses. These words are not the protagonist’s own. They are 
borrowed and parodied from, the range of the narrative here implies, a wide variety 
of literary, historical and media texts. And so the conflicting messages: ‘The enemy 
is all around and awesome’ and ‘the road ahead is going to be difficult’, but there is 
also ‘nothing to lose’ and ‘The most is yet to come’. Furthermore, the mimicry 
means that, throughout the extract above, American culture and its people seem 
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predominantly parodied and criticised.63 This is a country that claims God and 
Brownie Troops on its side, one that believes it is and has been equipped to make 
history. These are the words of the ‘American Dream’, the self-made country 
which, while it may not match the elitist culture of ‘ancient Greece’ is nevertheless 
righteous about its ability to be the best, the most. Indeed, at this point in time, this 
kind of American self-belief was often interpreted in largely material terms. 
However, while the majority of people welcomed the material abundance post-War 
economic prosperity made possible, there were also those who scorned – as the 
narrative seems to here – the ‘soulless materialism of America’s consumer society’ 
which ranked everything according to material value.64 
 This parodic reiteration means that the prose seems to make sense, 
because much of it is familiar, but that at the same time it is difficult to interpret and 
possibly even meaningless, because it refuses ordinary cause and effect structural 
connections: ‘there will be blood, irony, dwarfs and dragons, skyrockets fired to 
celebrate orgasm’s efficiency’. The cacophonous cut-up of the language here 
reads as an allusive ‘non-sense erected as flow, [a] polyvocity that returns to haunt 
all relations’.65 This polyvocity is held together by a kind of free-association that 
directly contrasts with the opening sentences above, which deal with 
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measurements of place and the list of real animals. Here again, as with the effect 
of television, there is the sense that everything is up for grabs, that it has been 
levelled and now has equal value. Furthermore, the speed of the focal momentum 
is acknowledged: ‘your dream changes about every 15 minutes’. In this, the 
protagonist’s surreal and silly fantasising moves from being hunted by animals – 
including dove and quail – to having French-fry lips and coleslaw fingers. 
Significantly, an enjoyment of what is on offer infects the enjoyment of technique 
here: the narrative simultaneously both revels in and makes fun of this culture of 
excess made up of 3,000 miles of ice cream and unconfined feasts of roasted pig.  
A similar tension between enjoyment and criticism, pleasure and anxiety, runs 
throughout the book. In this way, the nostalgia for what has been lost is also, to 
apply Jameson’s words to Quin’s writing here: ‘fascinated precisely by this whole 
‘degraded’ landscape of schlock and kitsch, of TV scenes and Reader’s Digest 
culture, of advertising and motels, of the late show and the grade-B Hollywood 
film’.66 Tripticks is fascinated with the degradation of culture, but its materials and 
influences are not properly dissolved or incorporated either. This tension confirms 
the book’s limbo state, caught between modernist angst and postmodern assent, 
on the fulcrum as it were. While this is writing that wants to move beyond 
distinguishing between so-called high and low culture and to accept that everything 
is evened out now, it is finally unable to integrate that idea into its very fabric.  
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A book that does do this is Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955), another 
American road book.67 In her analysis of the narrative, Bowlby points out that while 
supposed oppositions between Europe and America, high culture and 
consumerism, and true literature and trash seem to perpetuate notions of original 
and fake, the book in fact challenges such assumptions.68 What drives this book on 
‘from one motel to the next’ is the way that its language actually resists Humbert’s 
snobbery by being incorporated into Lolita’s mass-cultural American world. Even 
more emphatically than that, according to Bowlby, the language of consumption is 
powerful enough to ‘take over the poetic force of the book as though against the 
grain of the narrator’s own intentions’. 69  Thus the narration is ambivalent: it 
simultaneously expresses enjoyment and disapproval and largely does so through 
the tension of the different perspectives of its two protagonists.  
Despite evidencing a somewhat similar ambivalent enjoyment of the 
language of consumption and mainstream culture, the narrative in Tripticks also 
exposes its exhaustion and loss of meaning. Rather than taking on a poetic force, 
the tone of this prose remains dulling and relentless. In the extract above, 
quotations of the words of others dominate, and this resists the readerly desire for 
a prose with distinguishable character. The protagonist’s words are inextricable 
from the words of others, without the counterbalance of the dual, charactered 
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perspective of Lolita. Here, not only does the narrative impersonate what its 
singular protagonist describes, it becomes what he describes; degraded, debased, 
clichéd and boring. Hence it is often impossible to differentiate between where the 
narrative voice mimics or ventriloquises the words of others, and where it merges 
with them: 
 
Special continuous loop tape switches track automatically for 
uninterrupted listening pleasure as you operate simple push-button on-
and-off controls with one hand exclusive. But don’t forget to practise 
Enthusiasm daily APRPBWPRAA (Affirmative Prayers Release Powers 
By Which Positive Results Are Accomplished). Take all your bills lay 
them out on the bed and then ask God what to do about the ask Him for 
a definite plan for eliminating comfortable fat matrons in opulent 
costumes feelin’ smellin’ knowin’ the corridors of the heart (35).  
 
This prose is a combination of electrical appliance instruction with a satire of 
religious practices and belief that culminates in a preposterously long acronym. 
The narrative voice has no identifiable subject but only the object of the 
exhortations – ‘you’. This longwinded and vacuous speech adds to the sense in 
which the words here are defined by an absence of meaning, where their signifying 
properties are debased and devalued. In this, the words are not merely descriptive 
but performative, and while that performance is at times excruciating perhaps that 
is precisely the point.  
In his germane discussion of David Foster Wallace, James Wood claims 
that the ‘risky tautology’ of this sort of narrative is that it shows a willingness to 
mangle and debase itself for the sake of its project.70  Wallace’s style pushes 
parodic extremes to full-immersion method by employing the technique of an 
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unidentified narration that is ugly and migrainous to read. The resulting pain of the 
experience is the intended result: the writing is effective precisely because it is 
experiential, not descriptive. In this way, Wood claims, Wallace’s fiction ‘prosecutes 
an intense argument about the decomposition of language in America’ through a 
method that degrades and discomposes his own style ‘in the interests of making us 
live through this linguistic America with him’.71 It seems to me that in Tripticks Quin 
makes a similar sacrifice for a similar effect.  
Most importantly, this excruciating performance of imperfect imitation is the 
most persuasive example of irony in Tripticks. By imperfectly invoking utterances of 
the dominant linguistic system again and again, the narrative not only scrutinises 
that system, but is able to dismember and expose the contingency of its elements. 
In her discussion of the relationship between irony and reiteration, Denise Riley 
evokes Echo as the initiator of the ironic, who ‘fingers strangeness simply through 
listening to what [the narrative] hears being reiterated’ and in this, remains poised 
‘between dullness and provocation’, petrifaction and newness.72 For irony to grip, 
she claims, it is unease as well as boredom that must alert us to the fact that 
something sounds as if it is in the wrong register. This demands ‘careful stupidity’; 
an act of miscomprehension that stops its ears to the content of what is being 
reiterated and instead becomes fascinated by the word made thing.73 Because of 
its excessive reiteration, the very ugliness and boredom which registers linguistic 
degradation is also what transforms it into something vital and active – for 
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‘reiteration produces more than inert copies’.74 It is worth briefly turning to Sianne 
Ngai here, who coins the term ‘stuplimity’ to describe the coexistence of shock and 
boredom – or as she puts it, the sublime and stupidity – experienced when reading 
such texts.75 Further, she insists on the specific political content of this discursive 
exhaustion: the tedium of aesthetic effect facilitates linguistic and philosophical 
questions about what it means for the individual to be linguistically and 
aesthetically overpowered by a large-scale system.76  
Given this, it is significant that Quin uses the cut-up technique – which itself 
both creates excessive reiteration and interrogates ideas of freedom and control – 
far more so here than in Passages. Indeed, in his analysis of the cut-up, Nathan 
Moore directly assesses the way in which, while the cut-up seems to be the result 
of control, it is actually about freedom from control in both the content as well as 
method of the writing.77 In this, the cut-up is able to create distinct effects which, 
while they do not have a coherent meaning as such – by being freed from the 
principal systems and structures of meaning – have ‘a particular evocativeness’ 
which is not that of ‘structural relations but singular intensities’.78 In this way, the 
cut-up resists the illusion of order and causal relationship that narrative usually 
creates. Not only this, but for Moore, the cut-up technique reminds us that the 
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writing is not generated by an author but by ‘itself’. It dramatises the fact that: ‘All 
writing is cut-up, already composite, hybrid, impure, unstable’. 79  Here, the 
technique cuts the words free from their sense. This allows words and phrases to 
function outside of and almost pre-emptively of their normal usage; thus, they are 
also caught up in a continual process of becoming which escapes the tyranny of a 
fixed ‘meaning’ bound up as this is with the symbolic order of the dominant culture.  
What is more, Tripticks not only uses the cut-up in a similar way so as to 
interrogate dominant American culture, it also questions the technique itself. For 
example, the cut-up narrative is dominantly focalised from the perspective of the 
protagonist and this has the interesting effect of reinstating an originator of 
meaning at the same time as undermining it. While the process might stand for the 
idea of generative freedom, the inevitable acts of selection and editing that take 
place require (artistic) control. This double-sense can be usefully thought about if 
we return to Berger’s discussion of Bacon, which considers what Bacon called 
‘involuntary marks’ on the canvas. These are supposedly chance elements of the 
composition that enable the paintings to be more deeply suggestive. The problem 
is, as Berger points out, these involuntary marks are often mixed in with the 
consciously painted; thus it is often impossible to distinguish which in fact are the 
‘accidental’.80 The apparently random and yet always necessarily selective cut-up 
technique of Quin’s writing here creates a similarly ambiguous effect, where it is 
impossible to tell which of the writing is a cut-up, accidental collage, and which 
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created. This ‘trap’ at the level of content and composition is further reinforced and 
challenged by the book’s ‘schizoid’ combination of drawing and writing. In this way, 
the book’s techniques can be seen to be always bound up with a reiteration as well 
as critique of dominant ideology. 
The latter can be thought about further if we return to the extract from 
Tripticks cited above, and specifically the section: ‘you’re equipped to make history 
and why shouldn’t you be, we’ve worked hard to make it that way, we took no short 
cuts, spared no expense’. This is a relationship where the ‘we’ guilt trips and 
manipulates its you(th) to take on its own values and aspirations. The ‘we’ and 
‘you’ here evokes a relationship between the individual and society – rather than 
family – that evidences an attempt at coercion and control. This reflects an 
intergenerational tension, found, for example, between mainstream American 
culture and its critics, as well as a shifting attitude towards psychology as a whole. 
Not only is this a narrative where the psychoanalysing has already been done – ‘I 
can’t even recommend you to my analyst, he’s a schitzy shrink with hidden camera 
and two-way mirrors’ whose ‘favourite slogan for almost any trauma is ‘don’t panic’’ 
(115) – but, whereas Berg narrates familial neuroses to expose and critique the 
veracity of the Oedipus complex, Tripticks reflects and appraises the move towards 
reading neuroses in wider, social terms – ‘Now a Geiger Counter detects Freudian 
signs of suppressed guilt feeling’ (156-157).81  
This shift from individual to group psychology was largely aligned with the 
antipsychiatry movement associated with R. D. Laing – a position recognised in the 
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narrative by its self categorising as ‘part lecture in existential psychoanalysis’ 
(163). 82  Furthermore, Zaretsky claims that the so-called counter cultural move 
away from the cult of the materialist individual in fact, especially in terms of its drug 
induced spiritualism and hippie style, remained immersed in the self-admiration 
and commodification it professed to escape. It seems to me that similar concerns 
energise the search for moral seriousness and personal meaning, which arguably 
lie, despite being often hidden behind the stream of verbal images and words of 
others, at the heart of the narrative momentum of Tripticks.  
 
 
Trips and Psalms  
 
Thus, while my analysis so far in this chapter has delineated and assessed 
different aspects of the book’s representation of mainstream American culture, 
here I consider its interrogation of the counter-culture, particularly in terms of how 
the narrative figures and thinks about the supposed connection between this 
movement, drug taking and spirituality. In this, drug taking becomes a symbol of 
the reach for the real, thus seeming an ideal focus for the book’s search for 
seriousness or a centre; however, in Tripticks, it is a symbol exposed as empty 
while the search itself is not.  
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In terms of the former, it is well worth noting that an early version of Tripticks 
in short story form won Ambit’s 1968 writers-on-drugs competition.83 Quin’s letter to 
the editors accompanying the story reads: 
 
This is written under my usual combination of nicotine, caffein [sic] and 
of course, the birth pill I take – Orthonovin 2. 
 
I should like to emphasize however that although I have never written 
under the influence of Pot, Peyote, Acid, Hash, etc., I am absolutely 
certain that having taken these, especially Peyote and LSD, they did 
actually open out a much wider possibility for my writing afterwards – 
like I think the time thing is important, i.e.: it might have taken me ten 
perhaps longer years to have reached the stage in writing I am at the 
moment, so I would like you not to disregard this aspect which I feel so 
strongly about. After all taking these things are part and parcel of 
experiences, and they are bound to have some effect on a writer’s work, 
visual and psychological.84 
 
Here, while Quin denies writing the story while under the direct influence of illegal 
or mind-expanding drugs, at the same time she claims that taking such drugs, 
‘especially Peyote and LSD’, directly influenced and progressed her writing. What 
is more, that this link between drugs and the creative process was made while 
writing Tripticks is unsurprising. Not only does its protagonist talk about and take 
drugs, but it is set in America, where the writer herself took Peyote and LSD in the 
mid-1960s. The idea that psychedelic drug taking could not only be inspirational 
and expansive for creativity but also a spiritual experience had, of course, already 
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been famously written about in Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception (1954). 
Further, in America this idea had been turned into a sometime money and fame 
spinner by Timothy Leary, who founded the ‘League for Spiritual Discovery’ in 
1966. 85  And indeed, similar connections – between drugs, the search for 
spirituality, the open road and the counter-culture movement – were also being 
dramatised in mainstream culture itself: the play Hair opened on Broadway in 1968 
and Easy Rider came out in 1969.86  
The book questions the veracity of such connections. While there is a sense 
in which the attitude towards drugs is casual – for example the flippant remark, ‘Pot 
and pop-pills are morally right’ (17) – its more serious point is an interrogation of 
the youth movement’s use of drugs, and particularly the claims that drugs could 
enable people to access the real. Further, in the example here, the narrative 
makes a connection between drugs and morality – seeming to invert the usual 
critique, and thus parodying mainstream culture’s censuring of drug taking as 
immoral. However, throughout the book references to drugs are more compellingly 
coincident with an interrogation of the ideas and motives of the counter-culture; in 
this way the example above is mimicry as critique, exposing the absurdity of any 
attempt to claim drug taking as ‘morally’ right. This indicates the narrative’s wider 
exposé and deconstruction of the relationship between drugs and religion. Not only 
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are television, advertising, drugs and mainstream ideologies exposed as elements 
of control, but so too are the ideas of drug taking freedom and the counter-culture: 
this is a youth movement that already speaks in the words of others, of dominant 
culture, as I began to outline in my discussion of the ‘frenzy of youth’ above.  
So, when the protagonist remembers his ex-wife describing her ‘medicine’ as 
she comes back into a room with spoon and syringe in hand, she says: 
 
Let’s have a party, let’s have a fix. I just don’t feature getting strung out, 
I just don’t dig it. Like there’s no need for it, no need at all. You got a 
habit, you like your habit, it makes you feel so good, so very very good, 
you gotta feed your habit, you gotta be good to your habit, it’s gonna be 
good to you. But you don’t be good to your habit, then it’s gonna turn on 
you and be mean, real mean. It’s gonna make you hurt, it’s gonna give 
you such awful pain. And man, I don’t like pain, no kind of pain. That’s 
why I got a habit in the first place. You know that commercial we watch I 
always get a bang out of it. You know the one with a bunch of women 
doing yoga, and this babe starts laying it on another babe about how 
good this yoghourt is for you. The second babe takes another mouthful. 
She swallows this stuff and closes her eyes. Then she says something 
that always makes me break u She says “Now this is inner peace.” And 
every time I see that commercial I say, “yeah, inner peace,” and I think 
about my habit (133-134). 
 
Here, the mimicry of the language of youth is clear – the ex-wife just does not ‘dig’ 
getting ‘strung out’ ‘man’. And so the quotation is funny for its humorous 
ventriloquism of a certain type of speech. But more than this, the advert purposely 
and specifically links the supposed goodness of yoga and yogurt, enabling the ex-
wife to think of her drug talking in terms of inner peace and sustenance; however, 
this is a connection being framed in terms of consumer culture. Moreover, the 
connection made here between a drugged up counter-culture and the colonisation 
of eastern spiritual practices insists on a merging between the desire for spiritual 
experience – here, as in much of hippie culture, through drugs – and the increasing 

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commodification of the counter-culture. In ‘Anticipating the Spiritual Legacy of the 
Sixties’, Franca Bellarisi discusses this blurring in terms of exploitation.87 Such 
colonisation is evident, for example, in something like the Beats’ championing of 
Buddhism or The Beatles’ widely publicised stay in an ashram in Rishikesh in 
1968, which are arguably examples of Western appropriation rather than genuine 
engagement with eastern practices. Here, any avenues ‘likely to help the individual 
transcend the barriers of the socially and linguistically conditioned self’ were tried 
out, be it drugs or Buddhist meditation, as if the effects would be the same and 
both would cleanse the ‘doors of perception’.88 As a result, the western individual, 
as the advert described above suggests, assumed that both eastern spiritual 
practices and mind enhancing drugs were equally on the market and there to be 
consumed. What began as genuine belief in the spiritual and creative potential of 
psychedelics became an obsession with drugs as a purchasable end in itself: 
‘consumer choice, in the grand American tradition, had come to the private 
revolution’.89 Or, as Roszak puts it, the counter- culture ended up: ‘proclaiming that 
personal salvation and the social revolution can be packed into a capsule’.90 
  Tripticks engages with the effects of this corruption, so that its 
representation of drug taking as spiritual quest not only interrogates 
commodification, but also the mileage of the idea in the first place: after all, what 
kind of ‘inner peace’ do psychedelics bring? Many of the drug experiences are 
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much more ambiguous and seem rather to be aligned with inner agony. The 
darkest character in the book is a drug dealer named ‘Nightripper’. In one incident, 
when the protagonist recalls asking his then wife about some photographs he finds 
of her in ‘what looked like some black mass orgy’ (59), she immediately arranges 
for a black mass to be held. The leader of this mass is a ‘sleepy-eyed, scraggle-
bearded’ man, Nightripper: ‘it was rumoured he was also called Mystic Murderer’ 
(59). This figure cynically re-inscribes the optimism of a positive connection 
between drugs and spiritual quest in reductively consumerist terms – ‘‘Most black 
magic’, he drawled ‘is a hustle to get fast money’’ (59). Further, the incident that 
follows confirms the connotations of darkness, violence and drug abuse in his 
name. In it, the protagonist’s drug experience is one of a frightening loss of control: 
 
The scene resembled a Bosch vision of hell.91 Some of the women were 
staring, some were unusually happy, some were sick, others were 
screaming, and some said the walls were moving. These days if one 
escapes being hijacked in an airplane, mugged in the street, or sniped 
at by a man gone berserk, one apparently still runs the risk of getting 
accidentally zonked by the hors d’oeuvres at a friendly neighbourhood 
cocktail party. As soon as I thought this I began hallucinating, and 
ultimately freaked out, overturning the altar, calling Nightripper my 
motherfucking father. Apparently everyone soon left, except the girl, who 
my wife asked to stay, hoping between them they could bring me 
through. I remember there was a point when I didn’t want to come down, 
but remain on an edge that appeared to touch upon a very thin line 
between life and death, and such power! I felt I was capable of anything, 
by merely putting my hand out things would fall or rise. I was Satan with 
God as my servant (62).92 
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This experience is one of ‘freaking out’ and being ‘upon a very thin line between life 
and death’ and the scene directly contrasts with the description of a supposedly 
centred but actually only ever superficial claim to ‘inner peace’ in the extract above. 
Here, while drug taking and religion are again aligned – the protagonist overturns 
the altar and the scene is reminiscent of Bosch: the effect is more melodrama than 
parody, an element that alerts us to its moral seriousness. What is more, the 
representation here engages with the counter cultural claim that drugs can enable 
a breakthrough towards a more authentic experience, but insists that as much as 
breakthrough, drugs can trigger breakdown. However, the heightened drama of the 
scene simultaneously insists that this is not reality: it is instead an image that 
gestures beyond the exciting drama of its action and language, towards the real 
fear of a possibly lost centre. In the widening gyre of the protagonist’s experience 
here, the centre does indeed not seem to hold. This is not only in the sense of the 
inevitable dissolution of a psychedelic drug experience, but also in the excessive 
language and action which both engage with and enact the anxiety for authenticity.  
Further, while this ‘bad trip’, where the protagonist hallucinates the 
Nightripper as ‘my motherfucking father’ pushes him to breaking point,93 the two 
women stay ‘hoping that between them they could bring me through’. It is only 
compassion and care, the narrative suggests – or genuine feeling – that can 
rescue him from the staring, sick, screaming women and the moving walls, from 
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


the ‘point when I didn’t want to come down’. Here again is a nostalgia for affect 
similar to the one Jameson identifies in his discussion of Munch. But, while 
elsewhere such an experience is included in the narrative’s parodic stance – ‘To 
cope with neuroses and nuisances there was a centre offering help after bad trips’ 
(45) – here the protagonist is caught, like one of Bacon’s subjects, in suspended 
animation with no way out. This scene offers no alternatives and is deeply engaged 
with the protagonist’s dilemma: the experience is at once and inescapably both 
genuine and inauthentic. This in turn necessitates a loss of distance, again 
exposing the difference between mere mimicry – as remaining at the surface of 
things – and irony – as necessarily reflective, genuine engagement.  
 Indeed, the book’s residual spiritual quest remains bound up with a desire 
for genuine engagement even while the idea that drug taking can point towards this 
is exposed as being false. In this, it seems to me, Quin develops and complicates 
the preoccupation with (Jewish) religion in Passages into a more urgent and 
personalised pursuit. For, despite the critique of the commodification of the search 
for spirituality in Tripticks, the narrative remains caught up in the question of, and 
desire for, the authenticity of the idea itself: its disjunctive ironic mode evidences a 
nostalgia for ‘the quest for paradise’ at the same time as a suspicion that this hope 
might finally be denied.94 And indeed, I propose that the book is ultimately unable 
to shake off its predilection for the spiritual contemplation-towards-revelation that 
the title’s homophone suggests. While Didion is suspicious of the late-1960s turn to 
religion, seeing its transcendental urge as a dangerous ‘itch for the transcendental, 
for purification. Right there you’ve got the ways that romanticism historically ends 
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up in trouble, lends itself to authoritarianism’,95 Roszak sees this urge as a vital 
rejection of technocracy, as a powerful and important force in the movement away 
from a prejudice against religion. He calls the counter-culture’s defection from 
sceptical, secular intellectuality ‘remarkable’.96 Indeed, like the letter of Quin’s with 
which this project opens, he is nostalgic for the ‘magical vision of life’.97  
 Finally then, it seems to me that throughout its trips, ticks, tricks and 
triptychs Tripticks successfully exposes the magic lost in the assumption that 
everything, including the counter-culture and spiritualism, can be packaged up and 
sold. Despite the play of its parody and cut-up, and the exhaustion of its 
performative, flattened language, the narrative’s irony and melodrama nevertheless 
simultaneously insist on the continuing need for the search for authenticity, for the 
real. Moreover, as my reading of the book’s final, silent scream has demonstrated, 
this evidences a seemingly backward looking but actually still vital modernist 
nostalgia which wants to break down and through towards the very centre of 
things. It is not that the narrative is immune to the attractions that such a 
mainstream culture offers but that ultimately this stream of verbal images and 
these words of others are not able to articulate a genuine self: neither, however, is 
the individual caught up in this world. Despite the cacophonous relentlessness of 
its protagonist’s self-conscious drawl, and the several different forms of speaking 
and illustrating that the narrative includes, what remains in this book is the search 
for articulation – a search compellingly captured by the image of the gaping, silent 
mouth with which the book ends. In this, I suggest, more clearly so than with the 
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more inward-looking and literary searches that motivate the forms and methods of 
Berg, Three and Passages, this book emphatically enacts the oeuvre’s 
simultaneous refusal of postmodern assent and residual longing for the real. What 
is more, it is not incidental that this preoccupation connects this book compellingly 
and directly with the theory and thinking of its time: in this, Tripticks is the book 
most clearly engaged with thinking about the possibilities of not only narrative 
expression itself, but also about the wider crises of interpretation and articulation 
both taking place and being discussed within its broader cultural and historical 
contexts.  

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Illumination 5 
 
Between 1969 and 1971 Quin suffered a series of severe breakdowns where her 
behaviour and delusions became increasingly bizarre and dangerous. These 
began when she caught the boat to Holland with Carter to see in the 1970 New 
Year. On the journey over, she remained on the freezing deck and refused to eat. 
Carter remembers that ‘At some stage Ann did come inside to tell me that 
Cleopatra’s barge had just gone past and that she had seen her father on it’.1 This 
delusion signalled she was far from being in a good state. Indeed, once they 
arrived in Amsterdam her behaviour deteriorated even further, culminating in 
Carter having to wrestle her to the ground to stop her running out onto the only 
thinly ice-covered river. After this episode Quin was given a sedative and taken to 
a psychiatric hospital. But, once out of there and having returned to London, she 
declared herself to be at the centre of a ‘conspiracy’, and escaped with an Arts 
Council grant to Denmark, Norway and then Sweden. There, she was found in a 
snowdrift in a delusional state and was again hospitalised. Refusing to eat or sleep, 
she was force fed and given electric shock therapy, after which she said to Carol 
Burns: ‘both my angels and my demons are gone’. 2  She was subsequently 
diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. 
However, after a while, Quin seemed to recover and was able to write again. 
During the relatively calm time that followed, she enrolled at Hillcroft College – ‘a 
Residential College, established in 1920, for women between 20 and 45+, who 
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have missed out educationally in their teens’3 – for the academic year 1972-1973. 
There, she studied psychology, sociology and English literature:  
 
having a whole year in which to have some systematic study, and 
participate in seminars, tutorials, and attend lectures, and discuss what I 
was reading with other people, seemed to me ideal; a way-out of the rut 
I felt I had got myself into.4  
 
 
Her piece on her time there, ‘A second Chance’, describes one of the few relatively 
happy and stable times of her later life: ‘we all seem to get on very well indeed’.5 
She charts the sense of progress achieved through studying and writing essays. 
Unsurprisingly however, her approach to the writing tasks remained somewhat 
unconventional: ‘my Lit. essay for the week : What from Middlemarch might have 
inspired the Suffragettes before 1914 – have decided to use a dialogue between 
two Suffragettes’.6  
Nevertheless, she did well and the time at Hillcroft seemed such a success 
that in spring 1973, Quin began applying to university. She wrote to Boyars: 
 
Haven’t heard from any University whether or not I’ve got in – went to 
East Anglia and hated it, such a desolate ‘Brave new world’ kind of 
place, felt I couldn’t stick it out there for 3 years, so even if they do offer 
me a place I shall refuse! Sussex, on the other hand, is a super place’.7 
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But, in the event, Sussex refused and East Anglia offered her a place. Thus, in the 
autumn of 1973, had things been different, Quin would have gone on to study 
English there under Angus Wilson.  

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The Unmapped Country, 1973: Too close reading and writing 
 
 
But that movement of mind which led her to keep the necklace, to fold it 
up in the handkerchief, and rise to put it in her nécessaire, where she 
had first placed it when it had been returned to her, was more peculiar, 
and what would be called less reasonable. It came from that streak of 
superstition in her which attached itself both to her confidence and her 
terror – a superstition which lingers in an intense personality even in 
spite of theory and science; any dread or hope for self being stronger 
than all reasons for or against it. Why she should suddenly determine 
not to part with the necklace was not much clearer to her than why she 
should sometimes have been frightened to find herself in fields alone: 
she had a confused state of emotion about Deronda – was it wounded 
pride and resentment, or a certain awe and exceptional trust? It was 
something vague and yet mastering, which impelled her to take this 
action about the necklace. There is a great deal of unmapped country 
within us which would have to be taken into account in an explanation of 
our gusts and storms.1 
 
 
The title of Quin’s final, unfinished book, The Unmapped Country, is taken from the 
assertion of ‘a great deal of unmapped country within us’ at the end of this extract 
from Daniel Deronda. This claim makes the realist move from the particular to the 
universal. In this way, the narrator’s commentary on the incident is supposedly able 
to reveal its truth. When Gwendolen Harleth, compelled by ‘something vague and 
yet mastering’ decides to keep the necklace, the narrator knows what makes her 
act in this way – ‘it came from that streak of superstition in her’ – whereas 
Gwendolen herself does not. This ‘unmapped country’ within her, the narrator 
would have it, can tell us something about an unknown within real people in the 
world outside of the text, something ‘within [all of] us’ that ‘would have to be taken 
into account in an explanation of our gusts and storms’.  
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Eliot’s narrator is thus simultaneously within and outside of the world of the 
text, able to employ a meta-language – ‘that language which tells us what is really 
happening’2 – which claims to bridge the gap between fiction and truth. However, 
this meta-language has an ironic effect, for it exposes the narrative as a fiction at 
the same time as consolidating its claim to the real. This tension is exacerbated by 
the way that the detail of the incident insists on the constructedness of the writing. 
The returned necklace is the one Gwendolen suspects Deronda of rescuing from 
the shop she pawned it to in order to continue gambling at the start of the novel. 
That vision of her gambling, and Deronda’s response to it, is a central idea, not 
only in terms of content, but also of the book’s causal structure. Indeed, as Cynthia 
Chase points out, this is a narrative where causality is the logic at work throughout 
the text.3 The incident above – the second rescuing of the necklace – is therefore 
itself a key part of the structural mapping of the text.  
Gwendolen herself recognises these rescuings of the necklace as portents, 
signifiers of things to come if only she were able to read them correctly, but the 
narrator’s claim to an authoritative reading instead gives the reader access to that 
coveted, knowledgeable position. In this way, the extract is one of the many 
moments in Daniel Deronda where the narration is as much about the activities of 
reading and writing as about events within the world of the story. It exposes a 
tension between what is known and not known both in and outside of the book: 
between the mappable writing and reading processes that take place in the 
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constructing and receiving of a realist text and the (at that point in time) largely 
unmapped human psyche. More specifically, this ‘unmapped country’ is also 
always bound up with articulation: it is the unknown within us, which must be taken 
into account for an explanation of human behaviour. We are faced with a paradox 
– the claim that something unchartered, unwritten and unknown is at the same time 
necessary for understanding and interpretation. 
But, why Daniel Deronda, and why at this point in Quin’s writing? The 
specific motivation for this last book may well have been bound up with a criticism 
Nye made of Tripticks: ‘It can still be hoped that Miss Quin will chuck the box of 
tricks away and sit down one day to write a whole book in which observation of the 
heart’s affections is allowed to predominate and inform’.4 This rather gendered 
appraisal and distinction, between the ‘box of tricks’ and ‘observation of the heart’s 
affections’, was nevertheless an attack that stung Quin into response: ‘Am also 
well into another book – another journey of discovery/rediscovery and taking 
Robert Nye’s criticism seriously: writing/dealing with ‘matters of the heart’. 5 
However, what both the unfinished story of ‘Matters of the Heart’ and incomplete 
book The Unmapped Country narrate are their protagonists’ literal and 
metaphorical, final journeys into madness and subsequent incarceration in 
psychiatric hospitals – Linda in ‘Matters of the Heart’ says ‘This is, I suppose, the 
first stage on the real journey’,6 and Sandra in The Unmapped Country is asked by 
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a psychiatrist to ‘Tell me about the journey you took’.7 After the Mediterranean 
trains and American car trip then, The Unmapped Country can be seen as Quin’s 
final journeying and search story. 
But, rather than narrate the ‘heart’s affections’, Quin turned to Eliot and 
Daniel Deronda, a novel which not only maps the lives of its protagonists onto the 
social and political issues of its time, but also one which is specifically engaged 
with the question of narrative form. Indeed, Eliot is arguably herself a tricky writer 
who interrogates and even deconstructs key realist questions of causality and 
order, even from within her realism.8 Moreover, as I have shown, Quin is a writer 
who, despite the escalating experimentation of her books, is always either writing 
in the shadow or in rebellion of realist forms and structures – for instance, the 
resistance to the determinist oedipal frame in Berg, and the play with the journal 
form in Three and Passages. Indeed, on one level, there is a sense in which even 
the writing in a book like Tripticks demonstrates not merely a descriptive but a 
performative, full-immersion attempt to write reality, where its very excess is its 
realism. There, as opposed to the transparency and self-effacing language of the 
classic realist narrator, we find a realism that is experiential rather than descriptive: 
it is not realist in the classic sense of being unmapped or ‘unwritten’ – as Colin 
MacCabe terms the third-person narration of traditional realism, and Eliot is his 
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example 9  – but rather exactly because it is over-written; frenetically and 
exhaustively mapped and signified. What is common to both Eliot and Quin is that 
it is a supposed faithfulness and truth (interpreted differently) of representation, 
which dictates and determines the writing’s style.  
In Quin’s other writing the possibility of effacement is undermined and 
deconstructed, not only by the thickened accretion of the narrative surfaces, but 
also because it is so clearly causal and authored. Not only does (part)repetition 
echo throughout the letters, stories and books to determine our reading, but, as I 
demonstrate in my opening chapter, for Quin the earlier writing mapped out the 
later – hence Berg as ‘a sort of map I had to plan out’ 10 – as well as her life. Here, 
the deterministic foreshadowing and causal structure of clues that realism relies on 
for the logic of the text (as well as our seduction by it) seemed to pattern life too. In 
this way, both writing and life always returned to and were shadowed by what had 
gone before, by what had already been written. However, such ideas seem in 
tension with even the title of The Unmapped Country, which already suggests an 
attempt to do something different, the desire for a new journey. The writing here is 
unusual in that in some ways it participates in a more traditional form than the rest 
of the oeuvre: for example, its first chapter is narrated by an omniscient third-
person narrator. This works to create a distinction similar to the one MacCabe finds 
in Eliot’s writing: between the articulated speech of characters and the surrounding, 
supposedly unwritten, narration.  
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Below, I assess the final form of Quin’s ‘realism’ in the available two 
chapters of the overlapping and repeating The Unmapped Country, and, in 
particular, demonstrate (this) realism’s madness in terms of both form and 
content. 11  The book’s story narrates its protagonist Sandra’s experience of 
madness and incarceration in a psychiatric hospital. In this, the writing not only 
coincides with madness as a topical social and political issue, but also with the 
writer’s personal experience.12 Here, the text engages with questions of what was 
supposedly known and unknown about madness by 1973. The previously 
unmapped country of the mind was something which had, by this point in time, to 
some extent already been rather deterministically ‘mapped out’ by things like the 
Oedipus complex of earlier twentieth century psychoanalysis – hence Quin’s title 
can be seen to be intentionally ironic as well as serious. In the 1960s and 1970s 
the idea that madness was something in need of a further or different mapping 
made this the fashionable endeavour in the fields of psychiatry and anti-
psychiatry.13  
Writing in the mid to late-1970s, Shoshana Felman refers to the ‘well known’ 
fact that madness was the ‘crucial question in the current cultural scene’, with 
people keen to promote their ‘‘madness’ goods as the latest thing in order to 
                                                 
11
 These two chapters are all that remains/was written of The Unmapped Country. While the first 
chapter has been published, the second chapter is not, and exists in draft manuscript form only.   
12
 I employ the term ‘madness’ as it is the one Quin herself uses in The Unmapped Country. It is 
also, as Baker, Crawford, Brown, Lipsedge and Carter point out, the term which best includes and 
represents the social, personal, and cultural contexts that surround it, Madness in Post-1945 British 
and American Fiction, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 3.  
13
 Laing had become one of the most prominent and famous figures of this zeitgeist since the 
publication of, for example, the popular and widely read The Divided Self (1960) and The Politics of 
Experience and The Bird of Paradise (1967). This popularity is discussed by Jenny Diski in The 
Sixties (2009). In these Laing attempted to write the unwritten about madness. The shift in 
emphasis, from case-study analysis in the former to pseudo-mythic literature in the latter, signifies 
the increasingly romanticised currency of the genre of madness. 
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publicize [their] avant-gardism’.14 Indeed, this fashion for madness had already 
been explicitly engaged with and interrogated in fiction of the 1960s.15 The most 
relevant examples here are Jennifer Dawson’s The Ha-Ha (1961) and Sylvia 
Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963), both of which narrate the difficulty of articulating the 
experience of being inside madness: Dawson’s mad protagonist can never find the 
right words when speaking and Plath’s is a budding writer whose illness renders 
her unable to read or write; nevertheless, they are still able to first-person narrate 
their experiences in highly evocative detail. In this way, both books, as Quin’s text 
here, attempt to write the experience of being inside madness.16  
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Quin’s writing more successfully goes 
some way towards actually activating (rather than describing) madness at the level 
of reading and writing itself, specifically by performing an overemphatic and ‘mad’ 
demonstration of the coding that realism relies on to make itself work. In The 
Unmapped Country, this happens in the places where the oddness of the over-
writing – the repeated signs and tics – at word level undermines the apparently 
unwritten and transparent realism of the third-person narrator.17 As Daniel Deronda 
reminds us, a classic realist text is a specific hierarchy of discourses which places 
the narrator and reader in a position of dominance. However, Quin’s writing 
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 Felman, Writing and Madness, (Trans.) Shoshana Felman, Martha Noel Evans and Brain 
Massumi, Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, respectively 12 and 13. 
15
 Possibly the most famous example of this trend is Ken Kesey’s 1962 One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest. 
16
 Whether or not this is possible, Felman remarks, is a key question in Michel Foucault’s Madness 
and Civilisation, which was relevantly first translated into English in 1973. 
17
 MacCabe makes an explicit connection between reading a realist text and ‘reading’ madness (as 
the twentieth century heir to neurosis): ‘The problems and method of reading a realist text may be 
usefully compared to the problems an analyst faces in the analysis of a neurotic’s discourses and the 
methods used to disengage significant interpretations from those discourses’, 21. 
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problematises such an assumption: there is a tension and in places a collapse of 
the assumed opposition between the third-person  narrator as a dominant authority 
who writes the interpretative frame – the reality – and the ‘mad’ person who reads 
clues everywhere to deconstruct it. This last book is concerned less with the 
question of articulation more generally, and more with the possibility of articulating 
or activating madness itself. In this way, madness does indeed function as 
unmapped territory rather than abject otherness. 
Significantly, Felman’s 1978 Writing and Madness, which my thinking in the 
analysis below is both informed by and moves beyond, associates the fashion for 
madness with an upheaval in the status of knowledge. This not only interrogates 
the meaningfulness and adequacy of theories and claims to knowledge (mapping) 
about the world and human person, but engages with the question of how we read 
apparent signs of causality in the world around us to tell a story about our 
existence, as well as the question of whether it is possible to adequately or 
truthfully write or know madness at all. In this context Quin’s turn to Daniel 
Deronda at this point in time becomes clear. The Unmapped Country, by directly 
evoking Eliot’s book in its title, overlays a reading, writing and deconstruction of 
causality – the way a text means and a reader knows – over the story of madness 
in the 1960s and 1970s. That earlier narrator’s instinct that something ‘unmapped’ 
can be offered in ‘explanation’ is interrogated. In this, the unfinished book does not 
just engage with madness as a fashionable idea or genre, but with the far more 
probing question of the connection between madness and writing itself.  
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(Un)writing about and out of madness 
    
 
   ‘Good morning and how are we today?’ 
      ‘Bloody rotten if you must know’. 
      ‘Why is that – tell me more?’ 
   Silence. Patient confronted psychiatrist. Woman and man. She looked 
at the thin hair he had carefully placed over his yellow husk. Thin lips, 
almost no lips. Thick hands, bunches of spiders on his knuckles. He 
wrote or doodled, leaning forward, back. 
      ‘I don’t like your madness’. 
      ‘What do you mean by that, Sandra?’ 
   Pen poised, ready to stab yet another record. She could not see his 
eyes, the light bounced, spiralled in his spectacles. Black tentacles crept 
from his nostrils. In the distance a woman screamed.18 
 
 
 
To begin, I consider how The Unmapped Country interrogates language’s ability to 
represent madness by assessing the effects of its third-person narration 
specifically in terms of its evocation of stereotypes. This is evident in the published 
first chapter of the book, which focuses on the experiences of its protagonist, 
Sandra, in a psychiatric hospital. The lines above, with which the book opens, are 
part of a description of her morning session with one of the hospital psychiatrists. 
Although the chapter is written from a predominantly third-person  narrative 
perspective, it is also one which closely sympathises with the protagonist. What is 
more, the role, position and symbolism of this third-person  narrator is significant, 
particularly for thinking further about this book’s tricky but sustained relationship 
with realism.   
For example, above the patient psychiatrist opposition is not only stated – 
‘Patient confronted psychiatrist’ – it is also exacerbated by the dehumanising, 
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 The Unmapped Country, Beyond the Words, 252. In this part of the chapter I will be 
predominantly reading this chapter, and subsequent page references will be in parenthesis in the 
body of the text.  
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revolting and sinister description of the almost lipless, yellow husked, pen stabbing 
and eyeless doctor. The description of the doctor is in staccato, reduced to 
fragments of close-up detail. The result is both observationally specific and 
evocative but also somehow stereotypically villain-esque: we might well think of 
Berg here, or Judith. Again, the strangeness of the details – here the ‘bunches of 
spiders on his knuckles’, the ‘black tentacles’ which creep from his nostrils – 
undermines the sense in which the general clarity of the prose and third-person 
perspective might imply an objective or ‘transparent’ record of the meeting. This is 
instead an exaggerated and ambivalent description, made strange because it loses 
any sense of distance. It is conscious that the notion of the ‘evil’ doctor and mad 
‘victim’ are already encoded and mapped out. In this, the writing does not so much 
describe the experience of being inside madness as it performs and interrogates 
an overly encoded and stereotyped way of seeing the world. 
Indeed, the passage knows, and to some extent performs, stereotypical 
power oppositions – sane/mad, doctor/patient, woman/man, human/animal, 
villain/victim – while at the same time subverting and undoing them: the patronising 
‘how are we today’ is sent up by the ‘bloody rotten’ answer. Sandra, under attack 
from the doctor’s questioning, offers mutinous silence and terse, tightly controlled 
answers in return, despite the horror of having to listen to another woman 
screaming. This scream is not the silent gaping mouth of Tripticks; neither is it the 
protagonist’s. Instead, in contrast with the inarticulate and agonised sound heard 
‘in the distance’, Sandra’s protests are perfectly comprehensible, lucid and even 
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witty: she says it is the doctor’s madness she does not like.19 Significantly, his 
response is to ask what she means, which admits that her speech could indeed 
have meaning, in spite of her ‘madness’. This raises the crucial question at hand, 
which is whether and in what ways it might be possible for language and writing to 
mean madness. While Sandra’s response here is lucid it is also ludic, irreverent 
and playful. The writing’s lucid-ludic double-sense, where what seems to be in one 
register always carries within it and implies the sense of another, recalls the 
transgressive and carnivalesque ambivalence that we find the clearest precedent 
for in Berg. Its inclusion of binaries – the way in which the narrative here is both in 
and outside of madness, where it knows and subverts stereotypes, its register is 
lucid and ludic, its images and logic both realist and surreal – not only recalls the 
transgressive-resistant tension of, for example, Passages, it is also the most 
persuasive way that Quin’s final writing is able to expose the way in which 
madness was at this time both emphatically over and yet still not quite properly 
being articulated or mapped.   
 
The first chapter as a whole charts the course of one of Sandra’s days and is in 
short sections which communicate its minutiae and scheduled manner. She 
converses with psychiatrists and fellow patients, writes in and reads old entries in 
her diary, and attends a group therapy session and ward party. She spends time 
walking and drawing shapes in the snow in the hospital grounds, as well as several 
times trying (and not being allowed) to go to sleep. She is also visited by her lover 
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 This is surely a playful reference to the anti-psychiatry movement’s emphasis on the world as 
mad as opposed to the individual labelled as such. 
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Clive, a man who wants to leave as soon as he has arrived, but not before she has 
performed her ‘duty’ and taken ‘him in her mouth’ (262). At the end of the day and 
the chapter, she is finally allowed to sleep. Throughout, the rigidity of the 
institutional context is reinforced by a seemingly traditionally realist unwritten 
narrative in which passages of speech and description are clearly demarcated. 
These qualities, which make things so much easier than other of Quin’s texts for 
the reader, and flatter our desire to ‘know’ the text, did not go unnoticed. While 
elsewhere championing the innovations and experiment of Quin’s prose, it was 
these more conventional seeming qualities that Gordon praised when he called 
this: ‘Her best writing, in fact, the actual quality of perception and its handling in 
prose’.20 And indeed, in some ways the seemingly clear form of the third-person 
narration in this writing in this book could not be further from the escalating 
experimental forms of Three, Passages and Tripticks. 
Predominantly here, the third-person voice describes a madness that is very 
much separate from and outside of itself, and with a tone that knows the 
stereotypes of the madness ‘genre’. The effect interrogates the possibility of writing 
about madness from without:  
 
The Red Queen breathing through the tunnel. Her face at the bottom of 
the lavatory, grinned u Flush her away. Sandra sat for some time in the 
lavatory, the only place she could be by herself and not be distracted, 
and go back over the journey; even so their voices interrupted ‘It’s all in 
the head you must realise that – in the head in the head inthehead 
inthehead inthehead…’ and she saw the doctor’s faceless presence 
behind his desk, like the painting ‘Le Principe du plaisir’, by Magritte, 
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 Letter: Gordon to Boyars, 27th February 1974. The collection, Beyond the Words, began as a 
collaboration with B.S. Johnson, who died shortly after Quin in the late summer of 1973. In the 
introduction to the collection Gordon writes: ‘Judging by the opening chapter printed here, it could 
have been her most considerable work’, introduction to Beyond the Words, 11. 
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except the figure in the painting was infinitely better, more pleasing. 
Then there was the Red Queen’s face; even when dead her mother, no 
doubt, would be watching her. And Clive – what of Cilve [sic]? 
Frightened of his own madness; seeing her actions, reactions as 
interpretation of what he considered a madness just round the corner for 
himself (255). 
 
 
This description of madness is a clichéd one where Quin places Sandra’s 
experience in the context of a very much mapped country; the references to Lewis 
Carroll’s ‘Red Queen’ and Rene Magritte’s ‘Le Principe du plaisir’ make this clear. 
Elaine Showalter claims that: ‘For woman writers, Alice’s journey through the 
looking glass is a more apt analogy than Ophelia’s decline’.21 Given this, when 
Sandra sees the face of her mother, referred to throughout The Unmapped 
Country as the Red Queen, grinning up from the bottom of the toilet, the vision 
knows and is determined by what has gone before.22 In contrast, the faceless 
presence of the doctor is described as ‘infinitely’ less pleasing than the one in 
Magritte’s painting. The painting’s title, translated as ‘The Pleasure Principle’, of 
course recalls Freud, whose psychoanalytic theories sought to map the mind, and 
it depicts a doctor’s face obliterated by a shining light representing the ‘light of 
reason’.23 This reference to Magritte’s image here both recalls – ‘the light bounced, 
spiralled in his spectacles’ – and contrasts with the detail of the description and 
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 Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980, London: 
Virago, 1987, 211. 
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 In ‘Matters of the Heart’ (also 1973), the protagonist, Linda, also names her mother the Red 
Queen throughout. This repetition affirms the significance of the allusion, not only in terms of the 
pugnacious and heckling nature of both mother characters, but also of a known association between 
Carroll’s Red Queen and madness. It could also be seen as a play with the generalisation that 
madness and bad mothers go together.   
23
 Quin sent a postcard with this image on to Blomfield in the summer of 1973. 
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behaviour of the doctor in the earlier extract, which there works to undermine his 
status and reasonableness.24  
Much of the thinking about madness at this time opposed madness and 
reason, including, for example, Foucault, who Derrida criticises for remaining 
attached to the ‘concept of madness as unreason’.25 Above, similar assumptions 
about clear oppositions between reason and madness, clarity and confusion, 
knowledge and ignorance are interrogated by a tension between the third-person 
narrator’s ‘transparent’ language and the places where the narrative seems to slip 
into Sandra’s voice. While the quotation marks around the ‘it’s all in the head’ 
speech of ‘their voices’ reinforces the sense of an unwritten and transparent 
narration MacCabe identifies with the realist narrator, where speech marks define 
what is articulated against what is not articulated and the writing is thus distanced 
from the experience, in places here the narration is more ambivalent and 
unidentified. The narrative seems to inhabit Sandra’s first-person perspective with 
– ‘And Clive – what of Clive?’ –the distance of a third-person narrative perspective 
collapses.  
This ambiguity is further complicated by the sense in which, even when 
hallucinating her mother as ‘The Red Queen’ grinning up at her from the bottom of 
a toilet, Sandra seems to remain lucid and ironically aware – she evaluates the 
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 We find, perhaps, similar caution about reasonableness as the only proper response if we return to 
Gwendolen, whose behaviour ‘would be called less reasonable’ but is nevertheless, the narrator 
implies, genuine and legitimate. 
25
 Derrida, Writing and Difference, (Trans.) Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 1995, 38. Sass also 
identifies and refutes the ‘ubiquitous image of madness as irrationality’, Madness and Modernism, 
2. In this book, as well as The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the 
Schizophrenic Mind, Sass argues instead for an interpretation of madness (and specifically 
schizophrenia) as reason in extremis.  
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Magritte painting as ‘infinitely better, more pleasing’ than the faceless doctor she 
looks at – while other patients are depicted as more obviously ‘mad’ and without 
such articulation and self-awareness.26 For example, Thomas believes he is ‘Judas 
Iscariot reincarnated’; that ‘God is Mrs Carr, and my young friend Bob is Jesus 
Christ’ (253).27 His God, Annie Carr’s, speech is profane – ‘you cunt you bloody 
fucking cunt’ (254): at the lunch table she exposes herself – ‘Annie Carr shouted, 
pushing out her left breast, dipping it in the gravy’ – and then tears off her 
nightdress ‘and on all fours gave herself to the linoleum’ (256). While, absurdly, her 
behaviour poses no challenge to Thomas’ belief, confirming the strength of his 
delusional world-view, it also serves to provide another exaggerated example of 
‘madness’. Other unnamed characters scream, are drugged, whimper, rant and 
rave, and even try on post-lobotomy wigs: ‘Well I got this lobotomy op coming up 
and they shave the head you see – nice isn’t it – they designed it specially so it 
would look like my own hair’ (265).  
The simultaneous horror and humour of Annie Carr’s behaviour and the 
normalised chatter about lobotomy surgery here engages with the problematic 
question of the treatment of patients diagnosed as mad in the 1960s. In this way, 
the wider cast of characters not only recall literary and otherwise stereotypes of 
madness, they are also the point at which the narrative most evidently engages 
with the fashion for protests about how the mad should or should not be treated, 
and in turn with questions about authority. As with those depicted in The Ha-Ha 
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 This distinction reflects the kind of interpretation Felman calls ‘an illusion of reason’ whereby a 
person who is mad does not know they are mad and is instead convinced of their reasonableness, 
Madness and Literature, 36. 
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 While the character’s words are ‘serious’, Quin winks an ironic awareness naming the title of 
Thomas’ book setting out his world view ‘God’s Joke’. 
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and The Bell Jar, the psychiatric hospital here is not a place of refuge from the 
outside world, but one where the mad person is confined, reduced, misinterpreted, 
and acted upon with drugs, electro convulsive therapy and lobotomy surgery: the 
patients are thus rendered powerless and completely at the mercy of the system.28 
However, while they might contain a censure of discipline and the institution at one 
level, as D. A. Miller points out, realist texts in fact exercise policing powers of their 
own and the third-person narrator is the key representative of their ‘institution’. He 
assesses the omniscient narrator of the type we find here and argues that it 
‘assumes a fully panoptic view of the world it places under surveillance’ and that 
‘nothing worth knowing escapes its notation’.29 In this way, even a supposedly 
sympathetic third-person narrator is also always an agent of a textual system which 
attempts to dictate the interpretative frame. This creates a narratorial ambivalence 
whereby any critique of the system is a covert reinforcement of it because of the 
power relations it enacts: the third-person narrator’s attempt to tell the experience 
of madness in the language of reason is the most powerful example of this. 
 In addition, points of apparently sympathetic engagement with the wider 
debate are also often the places in the text where the narrative expresses a level of 
resentment about and resistance to Sandra’s fellow patients, the point at which it is 
most horrified by and alienated from them: 
 
  Someone changed the television channel. Screams of protest. 
‘Well you weren’t watching anyway just natter natter natter’. 
‘That’s not fair we were watching’. 
                                                 
28
 In 1960 Erving Goffman had called the asylum a place in which the person’s self ‘is 
systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified’, Asylums. Middlesex: Penguin, 1970, 24. 
29
 Miller, The Book and the Police. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
Press, 1988, 23. 
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‘No you fucking wasn’t’. 
‘No need for that’. 
Silence. A picture came on of a table laden with food. 
‘Looks nice doesn’t it?’ 
‘Not poisoned like it is in here’. 
    They leaned forward and watched the picture intently. 
    They leaned back and swallowed their saliva; carried on chattering, 
nose picking, knitting; fingers plucked at buttons, cigarettes, fingers at 
fingers, a battle of insects (268). 
 
The anonymising and distancing effects of ‘someone’ and ‘they’ here is reinforced 
by the disembodied and depersonalised speech of the squabbling patients. They 
have been so reduced by the institution which supposedly feeds them ‘poisoned’ 
food that they are left with nothing to argue about and invest in except for the 
television (the ubiquitous ‘drug’ of dominant culture in Tripticks). The listing 
technique demonstrates the reductive and dehumanising effects of an institutional 
experience which leaves people salivating, chattering, nose picking and ultimately 
reduced to ‘insects’.  
But, such a description also seems to condemn them with its own disgust: 
their frantic, plucking fingers and the knitting are ordinary activities made strange, 
frightening and ridiculous. In this way, at the same time as criticising what is done 
to the patients, here again, as with the cliché of the Red Queen, the narrative voice 
is always distanced from them. This double-effect, which both sympathises with 
and is removed from these patients, both reinforces and problematises the notion 
that madness is an already mapped and familiar realm. The wider cast of 
characters provide a familiar sense of the chaos and bedlam of archetypal mad-
people, but it is precisely because of this that the narrative is unable to penetrate 
them. Thus this third-person perspective remains, as we might expect, very much 
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on the outside of a seemingly inaccessible and alien experience: hence the resort 
to stereotype.  
This contrast, between the other characters (both patients and doctors) and a 
sympathetic, articulate protagonist, is similar to the contrast we find in The Ha-Ha 
and The Bell Jar. However, both of those are written in the first-person and in this 
way insist on both the possibility and difficulty of articulating madness from within. 
In contrast, Quin’s third-person perspective not only fails to write madness from 
without, it also, by its very narrative position but also, the writing implies, because 
of something about the nature of the experience itself, refuses Sandra the 
possibility of speaking from within her experience: 
 
If speech at all then it was the spaces between words, and the echoes 
the words left, or what might really be meant under the surface. She 
knew, had known. No longer knew. Only remembered. In the 
recollection, pictures, words, visions, thoughts, images built themselves 
into citadels, gigantic towers that toppled with the weight of it all; the top 
heavier than the foundations. Last events came first, the beginning at 
the end, or suddenly reversed, or slid into panels midway. Had ECT 
done that – damn them? (257). 
 
 
For Derrida, any attempt to speak out of madness will always fail because 
‘madness is what by essence cannot be said’.30 There is a similar absence of 
language here when Sandra attempts to speak her experience – instead all that 
remains are ‘the spaces between words, and the echoes the words left’.31 The 
passage indicates that madness has broken her relationship with vocalised 
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 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 43. 
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 The poignancy of this description of the limits of articulation is acknowledged by the fact that the 
title of Gordon’s anthology was inspired by these words: ‘my Hutchinson anthology, incidentally to 
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language to the point that she no longer knows but only remembers what words 
might mean, or how they might speak and relate to experience. She has lost the 
ability to put language in orderly – and ordinary – coherence and a space has 
opened up, between her experience and the words, so that speech is always just 
out of reach. However, there is also a sense in which this particular failure of 
articulation – the lacunae of rational or ordinary speech – may be precisely what 
reaches towards ‘what might really be meant under the surface’.32 At the same 
time, this possibility seems always denied and in deferral. Any recollection of the 
sense of language remains only as a visual metaphor of concrete structures (we 
may well think of the structures of realism here) and now these have toppled and 
lost their order. Further, any notion of the realist idea that the organisation of 
language and indeed the world itself contains inalienable causality is deconstructed 
– ‘last events came first, the beginning at the end, or suddenly reversed, or slid into 
panels midway’. While the passage here implies that this severance and 
obliteration may have been caused by ECT, Derrida’s assertion that the attempt to 
articulate madness is always in deferral – always, we might say, an act of amnesia 
– would indicate that these destructive effects are the result of the illness itself.33 
Further, when we recall that Derrida also – in Memoirs of the Blind – likens 
representation itself to amnesia, this similar effect of the two suggests that writing 
(as representation representing) madness is always something doubly deferred.34  
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 As already cited in my chapter on Three, Nye called Quin a writer especially ‘alive to the 
elusiveness of what happens between people, to what is lost in conversation, and to the possibilities 
of the English language for suggesting these little communicative lacunae’.  
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 Deleuze describes the violence of the effects of madness on language as ‘less a question of 
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	

The amnesia of mad Sandra’s relationship with language, then, engages 
with the vexed question of the madness of writing itself. The ambivalent position of 
the third-person narrator is particularly important here – and it is this which marks 
Quin’s text out from Dawson and Plath’s first-person narratives. Not only is this a 
book dealing with the forces of social regulation and standardisation, both in terms 
of psychiatric institutional content and realist form, it is also one which, from the 
narrator’s distanced position of authority in the text, wants to articulate an 
unspeakable and lawless experience. The third-person narrator – who figures the 
‘transparent’ language of reason itself – is inevitably challenged in a text about 
madness, which always signifies a crisis of knowledge and understanding; its claim 
to authority is always shadowed by a realisation that there are places the language 
of reason cannot map or explain.35 In this way, the attempt to write about madness 
in the language of ‘reason, which masters and represses’ is always a failure of 
translation: ‘to talk about madness is always, in fact, to deny it’.36 In the extract 
above, we might read the failure as being Sandra’s own, when of course, because 
of the filter of the third-person voice; it is actually a failure of supposedly 
transparent articulation itself. The third-person perspective can only talk about the 
experience and not of it: can only ever stereotype, and therefore deny it. 
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 As Derrida points out in his critique of Foucault, and Quin’s text here also demonstrates, there is 
the problem of how to talk about madness except but in the language of reason which has exiled it. 
Politically, as Waugh reminds us, this was an era when reason was seen to have failed, The Harvest 
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Signs of madness everywhere 
 
 
hallucination begins by a reading of signs. Madness is, before all else, 
an intuition about the functioning of the symbol, a blind and total faith in 
the revelation of a sign.37 
 
 
But, if Quin’s writing in The Unmapped Country rejects the possibility of writing 
about madness, does it wholly reject the possibility of writing or reading madness 
at all? It does not. While I began my reading by assessing the narrative’s critique of 
the possibility of writing madness in the voice of a rational third-person narrator, I 
now turn to the reading effect of signs and hallucination. This is not only in terms of 
considering whether the reading experience itself might better communicate 
Sandra’s, but also of how the ‘signs of madness everywhere’ create a patterning 
which works to interrogate realist narrative structures. What emerges is that while, 
on the one hand, the narrative demonstrates reason’s failure to write madness, on 
the other it insists on the madness of the reading and writing of realism itself.  
In Daniel Deronda, Gwendolen’s instinct is that the necklace is somehow an 
important thing-become-sign of the future: it seems to me that Quin’s second 
chapter of The Unmapped Country is similarly primarily about, dramatises and 
interrogates the function and effects of reading signs. This conscious enactment of 
the reading experience brings the constructedness of realism to the fore – these 
are texts structured on foreshadowing and signification. In turn, this foregrounds 
the idea that interpretative mastery is based on clues, but begs the question of who 
has the authority to correctly interpret those clues: Gwendolen is unable to read 
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them properly and Sandra is mad. While ordinarily the realist text places the 
narrator, and in turn the reader, in a position of interpretative dominance, in this 
second chapter there is no stable third-person narrator to do this for us. The signs 
are coercive, but their meaning is unclear. The reader is left in the position of 
knowing that they must be interpreted, and probably differently to Sandra’s own 
interpretation, but is without a narrator to chart the ‘correct’ reading for us. Indeed, 
as well as apparently aiding or directing our interpretation, these signs that are 
everywhere seem also to figure madness as an ‘irreducible resistance to 
interpretation’.38  This quality is something we have seen before in Quin – for 
example in the suggestive titles of Passages and Tripticks, which seem to both 
lead on and then frustrate the reader’s attempt at interpretation – but here there is 
a sense in which the subject matter itself resists interpretation because it generates 
clues and signs that lead to nowhere. What is more, we readers do interpret this 
resistance, as I demonstrate here. 
The protagonist’s name, (Cas)Sandra, has already warned us that this will 
be a text concerned with the reading of signs. Cassandra, in different versions of 
Greek mythology, is alternately able to speak or hear the future (even, in some 
versions, to hear the language of animals), and foresees, but is powerless to stop, 
her own demise. In the second chapter of The Unmapped Country, which to date 
remains unpublished,39 Sandra hallucinates a world full of signs that indicate what 
will happen or what she should do – she has an intuition about the functioning of 
the symbol, a blind and total faith in the revelation of these signs – although these 
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do not lead her anywhere except to a psychiatric hospital. The most striking, 
repetitive and insistent of these visions are those bound up with the cold war and 
the one she has of God’s face. These signify and activate the paranoia (spies) of 
madness – and indeed of the experience of reading a realist text – as well as 
interrogating the relationship between authority and meaning. Moreover, Sandra’s 
madness is thus significantly bound up with the way she reads the world – indeed, 
as Felman suggests, madness may on one level be described as ‘nothing other 
than an intoxicating reading’ of word and world.40  
 
This second chapter of the book narrates Sandra’s experience prior to her 
breakdown, in a confused prose where the differences between what happens in 
and outside of her head become almost completely elided – while this elision is 
reminiscent of Berg or Tripticks, the nature of the experience here is more 
fantastical and surreal, and harder to separate from the ‘real’. The narrative is told 
in a mixture of third and first-person narrative; this first-person is not synonymous 
with Sandra, although it is predominantly focalised from her perspective. For 
example, the chapter opens with an unidentified narrator, ‘I am a bird hovering, 
searching for human shape’, who then ‘step[s] into the shape of a woman I no 
longer know’.41 Despite the strangeness of this opening, initially the situation of the 
narrative seems fairly mundane: Sandra waits, in both anxiety and anticipation, for 
her lover Clive’s return from work. However, when he arrives, the normality of the 
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scenario is disrupted and refused as she reads his behaviour in terms of ‘fugitive 
signs’ – red lights in the flats opposite that act as a warning, her attempts to draw 
out the ‘Knight’ with the help of the North star, ‘the spectre of his Grandfather [who] 
refuses the warmth’ instead (29). In what seems like a performance of the 
structuring of a realist text, she exists in a wholly over-determined world, one 
where her behaviour and next-step is always informed and directed by the signs 
she reads around her. This world is an overemphatic, mad, demonstration of the 
coding that traditional realism relies on to make itself work as well as of the reading 
experience it creates – it is also an overemphatic demonstration of the coding of 
Quin’s letters, stories and books. Thus, the writing here is an exaggerated and 
climactic performance of the writer’s directive prose elsewhere, one that can assist 
and complete our reading of the earlier texts. Throughout the oeuvre, this is writing 
that wants to shape the way it is read at the same time as it resists our 
interpretation, in terms of the shadows, signs, repetition and directive titles of the 
books – not forgetting the fact that the writer herself read her own life in these 
terms. As the first-person narrator here puts it: ‘I have to go back into the past of 
this existence; the interpretation lies before me here and now’ (31).  
The writing in this chapter is thus a kind of maddened performance of 
realism, where all objects stand for far more than themselves and bear great 
semiotic importance – ‘Two blue cars parked outside this house, a sign that it is all 
right’ (33). The narrative also interprets Clive’s speech in this way. For instance, his 
criticism – ‘You’re not going in for all that cranky vegetarian stuff are you Sandra?’ 
– is followed by – ‘His grandfather prongs a turnip. Other spectres come and go’ 
(29). And, when he admits that the vegetables are, after all, edible, the narrative 
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continues: ‘But listen to what he is really saying, gestures belie what is being said; 
hand clutches throat. The faces round the walls are in conspiracy’ (29-30). 
Moreover, when Sandra leaves the flat, the world outside is overwhelmingly full of 
signs and visions. Some, such as the vision of the two blue cars and the belief that 
the pulse in her wrist is ‘twitch[ing] in time with the stars’ (31), are benevolent and 
allow her a feeling of communion with the world similar to the one described in 
Berg and Passages and hoped for at the end of Tripticks. Others – the pain 
through her left side indicating she has taken the wrong turning, the park that is 
‘teeming with serpents’ (34), the belief that her radio is tapped into – are frightening 
and alienating. Such anxieties push her into stealing an outfit for disguise and 
fleeing in such a panic that she gets lost. The chapter ends with her wanting to call 
on one of the ‘Underground movement’ – the people she believes are protecting 
her – for help, but fearing that even these might ‘pretend I was some mad woman 
and call the police’ (40). 
Furthermore, in this chapter, Sandra sees – or hallucinates – agents of 
control everywhere: the police, Russian spies and members of the underground 
movement. Indeed, as I have established, a sense of being watched and pursued 
is everywhere in Quin’s writing, from the requisite undead dad at the end of Berg, 
to the trespassers in Three and government agents in Passages: it serves as a 
reminder that, of course, writing is always spied on by its reader. Here though, it is 
also a conscious acknowledgement of the paranoia of both cold war stereotypes 
and madness, as well as a dramatisation of the forces of control always at work in 
a realist plot: 
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I move like a blind person. But the signs are there. As long as I keep 
within the Controlled Zone I will be safe, outside of that it is enemy 
territory. The traffic lights are for me all the way. My right side gives me 
the route to take. But it is all very difficult to learn. A pain goes through 
my left side, I have taken the wrong turning. I am out of the controlled 
zone. Two Russian spies are waiting on the corner, just like in a corny 
film, hiding behind newspapers. The traffic speeds up, then slows down 
so I can run across the road and into the park (33). 
 
 
There is a strong sense in which this is an exaggerated performance of being mad. 
It is as if Sandra is ‘a blind person’, unable to see rationally, though at the same 
able to see signs which communicate a different ‘truth’ of things. These signs lead 
her – ‘traffic lights are for me’ ‘right side gives me the route to take’ – through a 
safe, controlled zone. However, reading such signs is difficult and she takes a 
wrong turning – ‘pain goes through my left side’. These dramatic, physical 
responses to the right or wrong reading of signs exaggerate and send up the realist 
reading process. At the same time the whole experience is filtered as if being seen 
on a screen in the stereotype of a film where spies wait at the corner ‘hiding behind 
newspapers’. 42  This makes the scene seem distanced and unreal as well as 
exaggerated and clichéd; it adds to the stereotyping of the doctors and patients in 
the first chapter. Again, the supposedly unfamiliar and unmapped world of 
madness is exposed as being already always over-plotted and determined in a way 
that is reductive and unsatisfactory as well as humorous.  
More specifically, the well-known paranoia of the madness here is figured in 
the unsurprising (given the time) terms of the cold war – the spies who watch 
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Sandra are, of course, Russian.43 Similar cold war paranoia pervades ‘Matters of 
the Heart’; especially once the protagonist Linda has had a breakdown: ‘A large 
grinning chap from Red China in the Restaurant car watched me. And there’s a 
large Russian woman occupying the seat opposite mine’.44 Given this, it is no 
coincidence that the pervading agent of oppression in both narratives, ‘the Red 
Queen’ – who will, Sandra thinks, be watching her ‘even when dead’45 – is also a 
‘Red’ agent: and is thus simultaneously a figure of both the cold war and madness. 
Indeed, Adam Piette makes the point that the cold war manifested as a ‘paranoid 
plotline’ in many Anglo-American texts at this time.46 This paranoia, according to 
Piette, tapped into the longing for a direct link between private fantasies and the 
military-industrial complex running the world. He calls this: ‘the most powerful of 
dreams: that the big world of the cold war has an entranced relationship with the 
[individual] citizen’s unconscious’.47  
Such reading or writing of an individual’s inner life in terms of world events is 
also one that lies at the heart of traditional realist texts. For example, in Daniel 
Deronda, Deronda is an individual whose ‘destiny’ – to unite the Jewish Diaspora – 
is seen in real-world historical terms. In addition, the first chapter of The Unmapped 
Country ends with ‘The pendulum swung back’ (274), surely a reference to both 
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Léon Foucault’s pendulum, a device that demonstrates the rotation of the earth, 
and to the writing process of someone like Eliot, which connects its protagonist’s 
individual story with the wider themes of time, history, politics and philosophy. This 
realist way of reading the connection between word and world directly coincides 
with a claim Felman makes about madness which is that it is ‘the illusion of being 
able to salvage something from time, the belief in the possibility of eternity… in 
God’.48 Here, the mad person sees their insight as bound up not so much with 
world history as with eternity, and even God.  
Of course the attempt to salvage something from time by hallucinating God – 
or even believing oneself to be God – is again a stereotype of madness: for 
example in the first chapter we have Thomas as Judas, Sandra as John the Baptist 
and Annie Carr as God. Such hallucinations were given credence in Laing’s 
assertion that madness, specifically schizophrenia, could also be a mode of insight 
and prophecy, of religious vision and spiritual quest. 49  However, this is an 
interpretation sent up in Quin’s text by the behaviour of Annie Carr – surely meant 
to refer to Mary Barnes, who smeared shit as self-expression during her widely 
publicised ‘therapy’ with Laing and Joseph Berke – who shouts ‘May the blessed 
Virgin shit on you – shit shit shit’ (254).50  
This engagement with and critique of a romanticised notion of madness as 
spiritual quest is developed more fully in the insistent vision of God’s face that 
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recurs throughout Quin’s writing and thinking at this time. This vision appeared real 
and vivid, so fundamental in fact, that it seemed to negate the possibility of writing 
anything meaningful afterwards – ‘my vision of God was so much more purposeful 
than anything I could ever write’.51 She goes on: 
 
It’s very difficult to talk about, but I just knew it couldn’t be anything else. 
There was every possible landscape in the face: valleys, trees, 
mountains, hills. It was composed of every landscape, and it looked like 
a picture from Blake, with snowy white hair and a long white beard. It 
was important to my work because I have found it difficult to believe in 
writing since.52  
 
 
The experience described here is something difficult to talk about – both hard to 
put into words and embarrassing to admit – but is at the same time perceived as 
being valuable and real. The vision was of God, something fantastic, but the tone 
of the description is ordinary, matter of fact. It seems to both confirm and disrupt 
conventional ways of knowing – ‘I just knew it couldn’t be anything else’. This 
‘knowledge’ is not logical or reasonable but is in fact counter to those things; 
nevertheless, it seems irrefutable. In this way, this is an experience on the edge of 
madness, for religious beliefs, experiences and visions have the strange status of 
being both indicators of madness and of reasonable, ‘sane’ faith. This is evident in 
the way in which the sublime and extraordinary religious vision recounted above is 
something that has real and ordinary effects on Quin’s thinking about her writing. 
Moreover, the notion that this vision is purposeful and important means it shadows 
and repeats throughout what was written afterwards.  
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Indeed, a similar vision of God is very probably the experience that triggers 
both Sandra and Linda’s descent into madness and hospitalisation. In her diary in 
‘Matters of the Heart’, Linda records: ‘I saw the face of God – just like a Blake 
picture, snowy white hair and beard, in His face every conceivable landscape: 
valleys, mountains, lakes, rivers, oceans, trees; the whole universe in fact’.53 In 
The Unmapped Country, Sandra narrates:  
 
Staring at a white wall I see a face appear. White against white. Soon 
valleys, mountains, forests, rivers, lakes and many oceans appear in the 
face, in the white hair and long beard. The eyes contain day and night, 
and in their depths stella [sic] spaces. Each strand of hair is luminous. I 
know it is God’s face. This is the absolute (32). 
  
 
Across these repetitions the description is very similar, although increasingly 
elaborate: by this version God’s ‘eyes contain day and night… their depths stella 
spaces. Each strand of hair is luminous’. There is a sense in which the description 
seems very literal and simplistic – the flowing white beard and hair – at the same 
time as being mystical and expansive – the face contains ‘every conceivable 
landscape’. It is significant that the image that repeats at this time – the one which 
caused Quin to question the purpose of her writing – is one of God, a figure who in 
turn presences the idea of the author as well as authority.  
The slippage here between Quin’s belief that her own vision was a sign 
bound up with the meaning and purpose of writing and the mad protagonist 
hallucinating a revelation of God, recalls Felman’s notion of madness as ‘a blind 
and total faith in the revelation of a sign’. What the repeating vision of God signifies 
is the notion of absolute authority, a way of reading the world as something which 
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is created, meaningful and purposive.54 Indeed, the figure of God also connects 
with questions about the function, continuing relevance and veracity of realist 
writing, which is founded on structures of authorial and narratorial authority. Of 
course, both God and the author had, by this time, been declared ‘dead’, but this 
writing nevertheless instantiates their continuing presence as key figures in the 
reading process. 55  What is more, God’s role as a guarantor of meaning is 
underpinned by reference to a well-known quotation from The Brothers Karamazov 
(1880): ‘if, as Dostoievsky [sic] puts it, there is no God then everything is 
permitted’.56 Thus, the repeated and insistent vision of God here functions to insist 
on and dramatise the restrictive as well as suggestive role of this figure, who here 
works to signify both madness and realism at once.  
It is also a description grounded in the romanticism of Blake, who by the 
1960s had become an ‘icon of campus revolution’ and thus rather misread and 
clichéd.57 However, the vision of God here refuses the urge to romanticism. It is 
instead an experience exposed to the ridicule the writer seems to anticipate in the 
interview above, when Sandra attempts to capture and articulate the vision during 
a painting therapy session: 
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In a grain of sand the whole universe – something like that, Blake put. 
He had visions. A God who laughed, belched, snored and picked His 
nose. Her God had been straight out of Blake, long snowy beard and 
snowy locks, and in His face every conceivable landscape. 
‘That’s a funny face Sandra’. 
‘It’s God’. 
‘Looks like a lump of shit to me’. A patient said, making up her face 
with paint brushes.58 
 
Here, the notion of Blake’s vision as romanticised is refuted by the claim that his 
God ‘laughed, belched, snored and picked His nose’ much like the patients 
described in an extract above. Here, the capitalised ‘His’ is juxtaposed in between 
‘picked’ and ‘nose’ to contradictory effect: it simultaneously both denies and bows 
to the conventions of respect. Further, the assertion that ‘Her God had been 
straight out of Blake, long snowy beard and snowy locks, and in His face every 
conceivable landscape’ is at odds with the preceding description, which is 
apparently also straight from Blake. On the one hand this refutes the desire to 
claim Blake for romanticist purposes only, and on the other, it asks the meaning of 
such juxtaposition. Crucially, this God is never Sandra’s (or Quin’s or Linda’s) own 
even though it is called ‘Her[s]’, but is always figured in terms of other 
representation, is always shadowed by what has gone before.  
However, when Sandra’s representation of this laughing, snoring, belching, 
nose-picking God is likened to a ‘lump of shit’ not only is this comment 
transgressive, it also signifies a verbal slippage – from face to faeces. While this 
faeces serves in turn to deface the face of God – just as the patient who describes 
Sandra’s picture ‘defaces’ herself with paint, which in turn again refers to Barnes’ 
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painting with shit – it also signifies an absurd ambivalence and blurred ‘wavy’ 
meaning, a maddened language.59 Here, not only is the repeated signifying chain 
of variations of the beauteous and flowing image of God disrupted by ‘His’ bad 
habits, which defamiliarises the repetition, but at the level of the language itself, the 
face represses and denies, but also always already carries within it, the faeces. In 
this, the notion of the authority and the fixed meaning of signs is emphatically 
refuted and denied: at the same time, the narrative is unable to escape the fact that 
the activity of interpretation must also always be one of reading signs. 
 
 
Furor scribendi – the madness of realism 
 
It would seem that we are condemned for some time yet always to 
speak excessively about reality.60 
 
 
Thus far in response to The Unmapped Country, my reading has shown how the 
third-person narratorial position exposes the failure of writing madness from 
without and in the language of reason. In contrast, I have suggested, we do find 
evidence of madness in the over-signification of the writing. Moreover, the 
excessive proliferation of signs and visions, together with the insistent images of 
both spies and God, seem to suggest that the realist reading experience itself is a 
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kind of maddened activity. Finally though, I would like to consider how and in what 
way we find madness at the level of the writing itself. Indeed, it seems to me that it 
is precisely where the emphatic and excessive detail of the writing becomes 
slippery and sticky that madness is most compellingly betrayed. 
Most interestingly, this madness is not something separate to the language 
that speaks about it, but comes from within. As a result, there are places where the 
third-person narrative perspective is undone, and the language is activated into an 
excess that it cannot know or explain, creating an ambivalent realism and opening 
up a ‘contestable space for the expression of resistance to dominant meanings’ – 
here the language of reason.61 Thus, the language itself seems to break free from 
reason’s control, into ‘a madness that is acted out in language, but whose role no 
speaking subject can assume’:62  
 
She rose and went inside, up to the ward, or rather into a parrot house. 
Those who were not chattering, stalked the room, or fluttered on chairs, 
made stabbing movements with knitting needles, skeins of coloured 
wool spilled onto the floor, dribbled yellow and red between flapping 
arms, someone croaked, another barked. A mouth opened, closed, 
opened again, no sound came. But eventually a howl did emerge. Doors 
opened, and in rushed the keepers. The howl continued. People turned 
their heads, froze in contorted positions, as the keepers bent over a 
young girl struggling on the floor; her head curiously twisted; the white of 
her eyes showed through dark feathers, damp with sweat. The howl 
changed to a gurgle, the gurgle to gasps, as the body writhed in the net 
of arms. And like a huge octopus the group moved slowly out of the 
room. The girl’s shoe remained, on its side. Someone kicked it across 
the floor. The knitting needles pierced the air, click click click, and 
bodies took up their preceding positions, and went through the motions 
of survival of the fittest.63 
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In place of Sandra’s inarticulate lacunae – the endless deferral or amnesia of 
speech – here the sound at the centre of the passage is the howl of the young girl. 
While initially ‘A mouth opened, closed, opened again, no sound came’, ‘eventually 
a howl did emerge’. However, this sound of protest is soon reduced to a gurgle and 
then gasps as the girl is subdued by the ‘keepers’ – this recalls the woman’s 
scream (which soon becomes a whimper) Sandra hears at the start of the book.  
This, then, is another story of the scream – unlike the scream in Tripticks, 
sound does come after the silence, but it is inarticulate and soon suppressed. 
Here, the scream reduces the girl to a howling beast, an image of the archetypal 
and primordial mad person. In some ways, she seems to represent another 
stereotype reinforcing the opposition of madness and reason, where madness 
seems, as with the characters Annie Carr and Thomas, ‘a role to be played’.64 In 
addition here, there is the poignancy of the abandoned shoe that is kicked across 
the floor. With this, the girl’s victim status is confirmed. The doctors or ‘keepers’ are 
also stereotyped as the oppressors of the piece who take the girl away. As with 
Tripticks, the scream here signifies an individual being overwhelmed by the system 
– and indeed the dominance of the reasoned words of others. The girl’s howl 
signifies her disconnection from the language of reason as well as her 
powerlessness. In turn, these are signs of the condition which has led to her 
incarceration; a condition which is itself a label assigned from the outside and in 
the words of other, more ‘reasonable’ people. As Felman reminds us; ‘the term 
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madness is [always] borrowed from the language of others’.65 Indeed, this kind of 
reading of the extract would seem to confirm the impossibility of a language for or 
of madness itself, as the assignation of madness is still a stereotype about it, which 
comes from without and in the language of reason.  
 However, I propose that when we look more carefully, what also happens in 
the extract is precisely a language of madness. Throughout, the writing is 
punctuated – its surface pierced – by repeating, stuttering ‘t’s and ‘k’s, which 
perform the violence not only of the knitting but also of the illness, as well as acting 
to instantiate the concrete meaning of the words. These sounds repeat those in the 
extract cited earlier: ‘chattering, nose picking, knitting; fingers plucked at buttons, 
cigarettes, fingers at fingers, a battle of insects’ (268). The briefer evocation of the 
sounds there are repeated, exaggerated, and proliferated in this longer piece, 
where sustained consonance makes the language strange and unwieldy, 
completely denying transparency: this, the knotted pattern of the texture insists, is 
certainly not unwritten narration. Instead, the patterning of the language – a 
glossomania particularly in terms of sound, movement and rhythm rather than 
sense – seems to be something very purposefully controlled and performative.66  
Yet something in the language here also spills over and out of control – 
‘skeins of coloured wool spilled onto the floor, dribbled yellow and red between 
flapping arms, someone croaked, another barked’. Here, the text unravels just as 
the knitting does, dramatising and infecting Quin’s writing process as it juxtaposes 
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and interweaves sound and sense connections to create a knotty and tangled 
surface. Knitting is knotting with gaps; it produces a tangled order out of skeins of 
wool. It is an ideal metaphor for writing which spills over with meaning, and indeed 
had already been used as such by Quin herself in Three – as I discuss above in 
the example where Ruth’s knitting foregrounds the knotted and holey textuality of 
the prose – as well as by one of Quin’s key influences, Woolf, in To the 
Lighthouse.67  In addition, knotting had also been used as a metaphor for the 
patterning of madness and psychological binds: in Knots, Laing claims that 
language is able to reveal such experiences – ones that cannot be articulated in 
the language of reason – through word patterns such as ‘knots, tangles, fankles, 
impasses, disjunctions, whirligigs, binds’.68 In these intertexts, as well as in The 
Unmapped Country here, the images of knitting and knotting both invade the text 
and are the text – in Quin’s writing the madness of the description is generated at 
the point where the text, writing about itself, tangles up, knots and unravels itself. 
Furthermore, the flow of the spilling and dribbling of this undoing directly 
contrasts with the overwhelming quantity of jerky and unpleasant movement – 
stalked, fluttered, stabbing, flapping, writhed, kicked – and sound – chattering, 
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steel needles at the mouth of it’ for the Lighthouse keeper’s little boy, Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 
London: Wordsworth Classics, 2002, 19. The action stands as metaphor for the interwoven 
patterning of Mrs Ramsay’s thoughts as well as the constructedness of the prose. The repetition of 
this trope in The Unmapped Country then, not only enacts these same aspects of the metaphor but 
also interweaves references to Woolf, that, given Quin’s established familiarity with and admiration 
of the writer, are surely deliberate.   
68
 Laing, Knots, New York: Random House, 1970, preface. Throughout the book Laing generates 
patterns of neuroses and psychoses through partial and ambivalent repetition. 
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croaked, barked, howl, click – throughout the extract.69 In particular, the sound of 
the ‘click’ is something repeated elsewhere in this first chapter, for example, ‘The 
nurse clicked her teeth, and took mental note of the patient’s words’ (255). Not only 
is the onomatopoeia of the ‘ck’ and ‘t’ here similarly threatening, but the repetition 
into a different context makes the sound seem strange and insistent.70 In this, it is 
precisely the nature of the realism of such descriptions that transform them into an 
unsettling and ambivalent version of the ‘reality effect’. Rather than a ‘relatively 
straightforward claim of realistic representativeness’, this ‘version of the reality 
effect’ is a maddened one which speaks excessively about reality.71 This at once 
both reinforces and subversively undermines its realism. Knitting has a common-
sense, mundane reality in the world outside the text, but an insistent, threatening 
and unstable one within it. This ambivalent representation is ‘characterised by the 
productive equivocation of its semiotic structures’.72  It is productive because it 
unsettles the reader’s perception of how to receive the text – does it remain under 
the control of a third-person  narrator? How does the equivocation of the words 
here affect meaning and interpretation? Are there places where the accelerating 
repetition of sounds, effects and intertexts means that the writing is no longer about 
madness but somehow also of it?  
It seems to me that the very ambivalence of the writing here, where it is both 
the third-person  narrator’s description of Sandra’s experience and a realism-gone-
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 The dehumanising effect of the jerky movement and sound here recall Leonard’s erratic 
movement and disturbing barks of laughter in Three – it is the same scene where, presciently 
enough, Ruth sits knitting.  
70
 Like Riley’s Echo, who fingers strangeness by listening to reiteration. The effect of the strange 
use of something familiar here also recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘deterritorialization’.  
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 Coulson, 16. This is reminiscent of what I called the overt, excessive ‘reality effect’ in Berg. 
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mad – in terms of the knitting of exaggerated signification and its knotted profusion 
of detail – is the most persuasive way that The Unmapped Country manages at 
once to be both about and somehow of madness. This becomes clearer when we 
also consider the effect of the bird metaphor here. The flapping, fluttering patients 
are not seen as people, but as if birds in the ‘parrot house’ with the staff as 
keepers. Indeed, throughout Quin’s writing, birds take on an over-signified, 
hallucinatory quality. For example, the ‘gigantic bird [which] wheeled, then 
plummeted down’ (253) and the gulls that Sandra remembers in this text – ‘she 
saw again three gulls circle the ship’s mast’ (253) – not only recall the gulls in Berg, 
but also the description of the birds’ flying formation in Passages, which itself 
recalls Leonardo’s description of birds’ flight. 73  More specifically, Sandra’s 
distancing from language is described in terms of birds: ‘Once she had understood 
the language of birds, now no longer, it took her all her time to understand her own 
language’ (257). This echoes the connections made between madness and the 
‘language of birds’ elsewhere in Quin’s writing – for example, ‘She had wanted to 
understand the language of birds. They spoke now to get out getoutgetoutget’.74 In 
turn, these surely reference Septimus’ hallucinations of birds talking to him in 
Greek in Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway. 75  In this way, Sandra’s claim to have once 
understood the language of birds both describes an experience of madness and 
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 Gulls haunt Quin’s writing elsewhere; they are in Three and Berg too. In ‘Leaving School’ Quin 
recalls a poem ‘about gulls being damned souls’ which won her a ten shilling prize, 65.  
74
 ‘Ghostworm’, 64. 
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 ‘A sparrow perched on the railing opposite chirped Septimus, Septimus, four or five times over 
and went on, drawing its notes out, to sing freshly and piercingly in Greek words how there is no 
crime and, joined by another sparrow, they sang in voices prolonged and piercing in Greek words’, 
Woolf, Mrs Dalloway, London: Penguin, 2000, 26. As the notes to the text confirm, Woolf herself 
had ‘imagined she heard the birds singing in Greek’, 218.  
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activates the madness of realist language itself – the signs of madness everywhere 
– by repeating an already over-encoded image and idea. 
Thus, the chains of signification move through Quin’s writing here and 
beyond to emphatically perform a sense of ‘hallucinatory inflation’.76 This inflation 
comes precisely because the images and signs in The Unmapped Country echo 
and hallucinate, and are in a sense relentlessly pursued by, a literary inheritance of 
madness, not only of Plath and Dawson, for example, but also Woolf and beyond. 
Here then, the madness of Quin’s text is in part created by an obsessive 
internalisation of others’ representations of madness. This generates not only the 
seemingly banal and clichéd aspects of the writing here, the sense in which we 
have heard it all before – for example, the wider cast of characters or Sandra’s 
conversation with the psychiatrist at the start of chapter one – but also provides the 
necessary cultural repository out of which Quin’s writing is able to signify and 
activate madness through the very profusion of its reference and reiteration. In this 
way, The Unmapped Country performs a maddened realism where excessive 
signs, stereotyping and repetition are in fact precisely what unsettle the boundary 
‘between psychosis and stereotype’, enabling it to speak out of as well as about 
madness.77 This brings madness into a state of coming out in the language: it ‘is 
not the origin of [the] writing, the cause of meaning, but an effect’ of the excessive 
repetition, shadowing and echo.78 
To conclude then, the writing in this last, unfinished book can be seen to 
both proliferate and pin down some of what seem to me the most compelling 
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properties of Quin’s writing as a whole. Moreover, while the attempt to activate this 
writing into a kind of madness necessarily sets into motion some of the oeuvre’s 
wider methods and effects, it is here that the reiterating and over-determined forms 
and qualities of the writing elsewhere finds its most convincing expression: it is the 
paradigm example of a writing both of the shadows and writing its own. In this, 
although the third-person perspective figures a failure to articulate madness in 
order to demonstrate that it cannot be articulated from outside, Sandra’s 
experience of an over-encoded reading process works to presence and perform 
the reading experience itself as already always working within a kind of madness. 
Furthermore, I have argued that the rippling echoes of intertexts – both of others 
and Quin’s own – work to proliferate the explicit and implicit clues which 
characterise the writing’s madness as a form of strange, reiterative realism. In this 
way, the writing here voices an argument about what kinds of writing and reading 
might be able to experience and activate madness – the unmapped country – if the 
language of reason cannot. Paradoxically, the very form this writing finds its 
expression of madness in is an extreme performance of the coding of realism, the 
traditional form of which pretends to a kind of unwritten rationality and 
transparency. Thus, The Unmapped Country insists on madness as a literary 
thing.79 In addition, its return to and reflection on realism, enables the reader to 
better look back on and describe the forms, after effects and on-going place of the 
wider oeuvre’s gusts and storms. 
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Illumination 6 
 
 
Be given to, the sliding of water, to forget, be forgotten; premature 
thoughts—predetermined action.1 
 
She threw her body, no longer her body, but just a body hurled out of 
the ground, into the mountains of water, she bent her head under, rose 
up, bent again, and struggled out. Further out into higher and higher 
mountains. Away from the beach, where she knew he waited, watching, 
not quite knowing. Unsure again. 
   And if she returned? 
If she chose not to, but moved on out into the ocean until perhaps the 
areas she had so nearly reached could be touched upon.2 
 
 
 
For the last few months of her life, Quin had been finishing her time at Hillcroft 
College, applying to university, and working on several radio plays as well as The 
Unmapped Country and ‘Matters of the Heart’: things seemed to be moving 
forwards. However, it was also a time of loss and frustration. In the February of that 
year, she had lost many of her books and manuscripts from a flat she had been 
subletting out. These were ‘apparently thrown out by Estate Agents’ Builders ‘cos 
they were covered in cat shit!’’.3 Further, she spent her final weeks that summer 
unable to go on a hoped for work trip to Geneva and instead felt increasingly 
trapped by having to look after a convalescing mother in Brighton.  
Then, in late-August 1973 – a month or so before she was due to take up 
her place at the University of East Anglia – Quin took off her clothes and walked 
slowly into the sea at Black Rock, Brighton, watched by a man fishing. Her body 
was washed ashore at Shoreham on the Bank Holiday two days later, on the 27th 
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2
 ‘Eyes that Watch behind the Wind’, 142-143. 
3
 Letter: Quin to John Carter, 7th February 1973. John Carter Papers. 
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of August. While the coroner’s report gave an open verdict and the death certificate 
records ‘death by drowning’, this has since been widely read as suicide.  
Several of her friends, as well as her mother, attended the funeral on the 
14th September. Sewell remembers: ‘We drank two bottles of wine to Ann’s 
memory, which was perhaps a form of ritual salute to her, a tribute to her 
achievement as a writer, and gesture of farewell, that she would have 
appreciated.’4 
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Afterword: Tracing flows and causing them to circulate 
 
 
An author is great because he cannot prevent himself from tracing flows 
and causing them to circulate, flows that split asunder the catholic and 
despotic signifier of his work, and that necessarily nourish a 
revolutionary machine on the horizon. That is what style is, or rather the 
absence of style—asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when 
language is no longer defined by what it says, even less by what makes 
it a signifying thing, but by what causes it to move, to flow, and to 
explode—desire. For literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a 
goal, a production and not an expression.1 
 
 
 
I have chosen to end with a citation from Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, not 
only because the book’s title coincides with Quin’s deconstruction of that myth 
throughout the narrative of Berg – where uncertainty ‘split[s] asunder the catholic 
and despotic signifier’ of Oedipus – but also because it is one of the theoretical 
texts which shadows my thesis, without my having yet engaged directly with it. 
Moreover, the thinking that takes place in the extract here coincides with my desire 
to finish by reflecting on the effects of my own theorising and methodology, as well 
as on the wider implications of the writing’s self-theorisation in terms of the 
relationship between experimental writing and theory in the 1960s and ‘70s. 
Above, Deleuze and Guattari state that an author is great because [s]he 
‘cannot prevent [herself] from tracing flows and causing them to circulate’, which is 
exactly what I have shown Quin to do throughout the writing’s persuasive 
reiteration, activation and interrogation of intertextual material. Furthermore, this 
flow is specified as ‘a process and not a goal, a production and not an expression’ 
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 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 145. They are talking specifically here about what they term 
‘Strange Anglo-American literature’ written by those who know how ‘to scramble the codes’, 144. 
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– the former distinction here coincides with the one I also made in my introduction 
when discussing how we ought to read Quin and with reference to Cage’s 
emphasis on experimental processes over outcome. This approach, I suggested 
there, allows us to suspend judgement: a deferral which I have shown the 
ambivalence of the writing to create and demand. In addition, throughout my 
analyses I have demonstrated how this oeuvre is increasingly written expression 
precisely as role-play and experiential performance, as production.  
More specifically though, for Deleuze and Guattari, writing is able to enact 
this flow and desire only when it is not reduced to an object by ‘oedipalization’ – or, 
enslavement to dominant ideology.2 As I have demonstrated, Quin’s writing resists 
such enslavement both by interrogating the dominant ideologies of traditional 
narrative form, and in terms of the critique of the political, historical and social 
issues of its time. This is writing which successfully utilises and then scrambles the 
codes of such ideologies, by re-enacting and recasting them. Indeed, the 
cumulative reading effects of the oeuvre can be argued to trace, circulate and 
emphatically demonstrate such a resistance. I have proposed that the writing which 
most convincingly interrogates the dominant narrative ideology of, for example, 
realism, are texts like Tripticks and The Unmapped Country, which activate 
narrative as glossomania – ‘asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when language 
is no longer defined by what it says… but by what causes it to move, to flow’. Here, 
what seems like an ‘absence of style’ in Tripticks in the very reiteration and cut-up 
of its intertexts, is paradoxically where the narrative is most powerful and active – 
or explosive, as Deleuze and Guattari put it above. In this way, it is precisely where 
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the language is no longer defined by what it says, but by what it does: in activating 
the shadows and echoes of intertexts and ideas which demand that we then attend 
to the strangeness we hear reiterated. Thus, I have argued that this being steeped 
in its intertexts is precisely what energises the writing’s resistant rebellion to and 
ironic interrogation of its time. 
What is more, my own method in this thesis has been to trace – and in turn 
to enable and activate my reader to trace for themselves – the flows, echoes and 
resonances between the writer’s life, contexts, writing and intertexts. As part of 
this, the paratactic position of the ‘Illuminations’ as alongside, but not part of, my 
analyses, not only resists the reader’s desire to think about parallels found across 
my own texts in terms of cause, it also overtly and productively participates in and 
proliferates Quin’s own reading effect by generating further echoes without either 
explaining or interpreting them. Moreover, these illuminations are neither life-
writing nor close reading, but blur with and vibrate both in that they inhabit the 
hyphen between life and writing, as well as enabling a closer, more attentive 
reading which causes flows to circulate and ripple further, rather than closing 
interpretation down. Indeed, these incidences from life are offered as themselves 
ambivalent and unclear texts which defer meaning and understanding, rather than 
as if transparent, ‘unwritten’ or giving access to the real. The result is a response to 
Quin which holds her life, writing and contexts in paratactic tension; without 
dismissing the interpretative value of any of these texts, but refusing to place them 
in a hierarchy either. In this way, I believe, this method acts to generate and 
perpetuate the productive friction between intelligibilities that we also find 
throughout the oeuvre itself.   
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Of perhaps wider significance though, this symbiosis between my 
methodology and Quin’s also characterises my theoretical approach. Increasingly 
explicitly across the oeuvre this is, as my readings have demonstrated, writing that 
not only actively thinks about the relationship between narrative processes and 
cultural contexts, but whose own theorising also clearly coincides with thinkers of 
its time: in this, it acts as an example which begins to map a relationship between 
theory and experimental writing. This is a synergy most evident, perhaps, in The 
Unmapped Country, which voices an argument about what kinds of writing and 
reading might be able to experience and activate madness, given that the 
language of reason cannot. In this, the text most clearly articulates the oeuvre’s 
wider argument about the inescapable madness of realist structures, patterns and 
determinism found even in experimental writing, which seems to refuse realist 
narrative representation. More than this, I suggested that here – in its activation of 
madness by an extreme performance of the coding of realism – the thinking in 
Quin’s writing moves beyond some of the thinking offered by Felman. 
My analyses have traced theorising in the earlier writing too. Most 
significantly, I have proposed, those narratives reflect, enact and necessitate 
engagement with, for instance: Barthes’ theories of reading; Derrida’s destinerrant 
indirection; Deleuze’s discussion of stuttering and minor literature; cultural critique 
in the early 1970s. Throughout, engagement with such thinkers and thinking has 
responded to close observation of Quin’s reading effects, which identifies similar 
kinds of thinking in traits such as the performativity of the writing and slippage 
identifiable in Berg across character, narration and description, and the insistent 
refusal of closure in Three. In Passages it is compellingly evident in the oscillation 
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between structural and thematic binaries, which is also staged at word level in the 
morphing and stuttering line of words: the resultant perpetuation of momentum and 
denial of closure, I argued, both thinks about and contributes to the activity of 
unresolved (re)reading by disrupting and diverting interpretation. Even more clearly 
perhaps, Tripticks thinks about the possibilities of not only narrative expression 
itself, but also the wider crises of interpretation and articulation taking place in its 
cultural and historical contexts. Throughout the oeuvre, unlike those of her 
contemporaries whose theorising about writing was something separate to as well 
as within it – Christine Brooke-Rose is a useful example here – Quin’s thinking 
happens always and only through the creative processes of the writing itself.  
In a final reflection then, this thesis has established that Quin’s is writing 
which traces and causes to circulate flows and echoes of not only fictional and 
personal intertexts, but of wider theoretical ones too. In particular, the argument 
about writing put forward by the oeuvre means that where it seems the most 
derivative, clichéd and determined by the shadows of what went before, it is 
actually precisely here that it most compellingly designs its own. This is the 
writing’s method: to actively think about and test out the ways in which ‘the 
‘seriality’ of prose, the mode of its continuities, might be altered’, specifically by 
effecting both continuity and alteration at once. Further, this not only disrupts the 
readability of the prose; it also insists that proper reading is already and always an 
inevitably disrupted and resisted process. Here, the writing begins to think about 
those aspects of reading and writing which were also taken up and extended by 
contemporaneous critical thinkers, for example Barthes and Deleuze.  
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Thus, reading Quin’s writing is valuable not only for disrupting the story of 
twentieth century British fiction, as my preface proposed, but also, as my analyses 
throughout the thesis have performed and demonstrated, for noticing elements of 
parallel thinking between theory and experimental writing in the sixties and 
seventies. In order to think about this, rather than acting as if it were possible to 
stand back from the writing’s circulating flows, my methodology has embraced the 
necessarily participatory and reiterative nature of reading this oeuvre’s shadows 
and designs. 
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